The Westphalian model and trans-border ethnic identity : the case of the Chewa Kingdom of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia by Kayuni, Happy Mickson
i 
 
 
 
 
THE WESTPHALIAN MODEL AND TRANS-BORDER ETHNIC IDENTITY: 
THE CASE OF THE CHEWA KINGDOM OF MALAWI, MOZAMBIQUE 
AND ZAMBIA 
 
 
 
HAPPY MICKSON KAYUNI 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science) in the Faculty of Economic and 
Management Sciences, Department of Political Studies, University of the 
Western Cape. 
 
Supervisors: Professor Joelien Pretorius and Professor Laurence Piper 
 
 
June 2014 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
THE WESTPHALIAN MODEL AND TRANS-BORDER ETHNIC IDENTITY: 
THE CASE OF THE CHEWA KINGDOM OF MALAWI, MOZAMBIQUE 
AND ZAMBIA 
 
Happy Mickson Kayuni 
 
KEYWORDS 
Westphalia 
Chewa 
State  
Sovereignty  
Ethnic Identity  
Malawi  
Mozambique  
Zambia  
International Relations 
Politics of Representation. 
  
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study is an investigation of the informal trans-border Chewa ethnic movement of 
Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia and its relationship to the formal state boundaries defined 
by the Westphalian model. The Chewa refer themselves as belonging to a Kingdom (formerly 
the Maravi Kingdom) which currently cuts across the three modern African states of Malawi, 
Mozambique and Zambia and its paramount, King Gawa Undi, is based in Zambia. The 
secretariat of the kingdom is Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO), which is headquartered 
in Malawi. The fundamental quest of this study is to investigate how the Chewa understand, 
experience, manage and interpret the overlap between formal states (as defined by the 
Westphalian model) and informal trans-border ethnic identity without raising cross-border 
conflicts in the process. Indeed, it is this paradoxical co-existence of contradictory features of 
Westphalian political boundaries and trans-border ethnic identity that initially inspired this 
study. 
 
The main research aim is to interrogate whether the Chewa Kingdom (of Malawi, 
Mozambique and Zambia) is challenging or confirming state boundaries, and to reflect on 
what this means for the contemporary Westphalian model. In International Relations (IR), the 
Westphalian model provides the assumption that states are independent actors with a political 
authority based on territory and autonomy. Despite a large number of criticisms of the model, 
it has not completely been dismissed in explaining some elements of the international system. 
This is evident by the underlying assumptions and perspectives that still persist in IR 
literature as well as the growing contemporary debates on the model, especially on its related 
elements of state sovereignty and citizenship. In Africa, the literature focuses on the formal 
structures and ignores the role of informal trans-border traditional entities - specifically, how 
trans-border traditional entities affect the re-definition of state and sovereignty in Africa. 
Such ignorance has led to a vacuum in African IR of the potentiality of the informal to 
complement the formal intra-regional state entities. Within a historical and socio-cultural 
framework, the study utilises [social] constructivism and cultural nationalism theories to 
critically investigate and understand the unfolding relationship between the Westphalian state 
and Chewa trans-border community. Another supporting debate explored is the relevance of 
traditional authorities under the ambit of politics of representation. In this case, the study fits 
in the emerging debate on the meaning, experience and relevance of state sovereignty and 
national identity (citizenship) in Africa. 
 
Drawing on a wide range of sources (informant interviews, focus group discussions, 
Afrobarometer survey data sets, newspaper articles and comparative literature surveys in 
Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia), the study finds that although the upsurge of Chewa trans-
border ethnic identity is theoretically contradictory to the Westphalian model, in practice it is 
actually complementary. Within the framework of [social] constructivism, the state has with 
some variations demonstrated flexibility and innovation to remain legitimate by co-opting the 
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Chewa movement. In this case, the study finds that the co-existence of Westphalian model 
and trans-border Chewa ethnic identity is mainly due to the flexibility of the state to 
accommodate informal ethnic expressions in ways that ultimately reinforces the mutual 
dependence of the states and the ethnic group. For instance, during the Chewa Kulamba 
ceremony held in Zambia, the state borders are „relaxed‟ to allow unhindered crossing for the 
participants to the ceremony. This does not entail weakness of the state but its immediate 
relevance by allowing communal cultural expressions. Another finding is that the Chewa 
expression of ethnic identity could not be complete if it did not take a trans-border 
perspective. This set-up ensures that each nation-state plays a role in the expression of Chewa 
ethnic identity - missing one nation-state means that the historical and contemporary 
relevance of this identity would be lost. It is also this same set-up that limits the movement‟s 
possibility to challenge the formal state. 
 
This argument reinforces the social constructivist perspective that sovereignty is not static but 
dynamic because it fulfils different uses in a particular context. The overall argument of this 
study is that the revival of the informal Chewa trans-border traditional entity offers a new, 
exciting and unexplored debate on the Westphalian model that is possibly unique to the 
African set-up. One theoretical/methodological contribution of this study is that it buttresses 
some suggestions that when studying African IR, we have to move beyond the strict 
disciplinary boundaries that have defined the field and search for other related African state 
experiences. The study also strengthens one of the new approaches in understanding IR as 
social relations - in this approach, individuals and their activities or their social systems play 
a prominent role.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1 Chapter introduction and background to the Study 
This study emerged in order to investigate the informal trans-border Chewa ethnic movement 
of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, despite the likely barrier of formal state boundaries 
defined by the Westphalian model. It is this co-existence of seemingly contradictory features 
of the Westphalian model and trans-border ethnic identity that initially inspired this study. 
The treaty of Westphalia was signed on 24 October 1648 and symbolised the end of Europe‟s 
„Thirty years‟ religious war which had caused much political, social and economic upheaval 
in the region. An important element of this treaty is that it recognised the sovereignty and 
independence of each state. More precisely, it is argued that the treaty formalized the 
existence of the modern state system with states as legitimate entities with its rulers within 
specified political boundaries (Brown 1992; Boucher 1998; Gross 1948; Evans and 
Newnham 1990; Morgenthau 1985; Zacher 1992). As explained below this is where the 
concept of the Westphalian model is drawn from and provides the contemporary 
characteristics of states. Based on this understanding of the concept, states are deemed 
independent entities with absolute authority within their borders. This study examines the 
Chewa Kingdom within the conext of this conceptual understanding of the model. 
 
Thus, this study, as already mentioned, focuses on the case of the Chewa kingdom
1
 which 
cuts across three countries: Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. At the pinnacle of the Chewa 
tradition is the Kulamba annual ceremony, held at the headquarters of Paramount Chief Gawa 
Undi in Katete, Zambia. Undi‟s informal traditional authority extends to the countries of 
Mozambique and Malawi. This ceremony brings together about 150 thousand Chewa chiefs 
and sub-chiefs from Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia. The British colonial government 
banned the ceremony in 1934 when it was noted that the Chewas paid more allegiance to the 
Paramount Chief compared to formal state authorities. The recent democratisation process in 
the region led to the revival of the Chewa kingdom by, amongst other things, restoring the 
Kulamba ceremony in 1994. The significance of the ceremony became more evident in 2007 
when, for the first time, three heads of state (Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique) attended the 
ceremony. The importance of informal trans-border traditional authorities for these three 
countries was highlighted by the President of Malawi whilst attending the Kulamba 
ceremony, when he said, “Presidents of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia look up to you, 
                                                          
1The term „kingdom‟ is not used in this study to imply the strict contemporary understanding of a political entity 
of nation-state, but is loosely used to refer to trans-border geographical areas (in Malawi, Mozambique and 
Zambia) that are Chewa-dominated and recognise the traditional authority of Kalonga Gawa Undi. Whilst 
acknowledging that there are some conceptual differences, for the purposes of this study the terms „Chewa 
Kingdom‟, „Chewa ethnic movement‟ or simply „Chewa transborder community‟ have interchangeably been 
used. Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO), as explained later in Chapter 5, is a registered secretariat which 
aims at protecting the interest of the Chewa people.  
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chief, for the social and economic prosperity of their countries” (Mana 2007). The Chewa 
Heritage Foundation (CHEFO) was recently created by Undi to act as a Secretariat to him 
and the chiefs in the three countries. Its headquarters are in Malawi and the current 
Chairperson of the Foundation is the former Vice-President of Malawi, Dr Justine Malewezi
2
. 
Specifically, this study sets out to argue that although African states are arguably operating to 
a larger extent within the dictates of the Westphalian model with all its formalised structures, 
an informal trans-border ethnic entity such as the Chewa Kingdom of Malawi, Zambia and 
Mozambique is a unique example of a conceptual problem associated with the model. This is 
especially true in the core elements of the model‟s definition of state and sovereignty. Taking 
into consideration that many scholars (Brown 2006, Engel and Olsen 2010, Englebert 2009, 
Englebert 1997, Grovogui 2002, Herbst 2001) have already explored the relevance or 
irrelevance of the Westphalian model in Africa using the formal institutional analysis, this 
study goes a step further by, inter alia, attempting to revisit the model through an informal, 
trans-border, empirically-driven, African case study. Suffice to mention that not all the afore-
mentioned scholars were using the term Westphalian model as such but examined the 
elements embedded within the model in their analyses. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Despite the Westphalian model‟s influence in IR, the concept has, over the years, been 
relentlessly criticised by numerous scholars, especially after the end of the Cold War. These 
scholars have inter alia argued that the model is a myth or that it is no longer relevant; others 
argue that it needs to be replaced (Bryce in Gross 1948, Barkey and Parikh1991, Zacher 
1992, Nagengast1994, Hirsch 1995, Krasner 1996, Clapham 1996, Mann 1997, Precee 1997, 
Robinson 1998, Krasner1999, Strange 1999, Buzan and Little 1999, and Philpott 1999). To 
some extent, the criticism of the model is well founded and should have closed the debate 
some years back. However, the major problem with critics is that they tend to focus on the 
classical definition of the model whilst ignoring its evolutionary aspect. As Valaskakis (2001) 
argues, a focus on the principles of the Westphalian model should not specifically highlight 
what was signed in 1648, because the model has evolved over the years to include later 
international treaties and conventions. More importantly, scholars such as Engel and Olsen 
(2010) argue that the model cannot be ignored as a starting point in the analysis of the 
contemporary state system. Consequently, the model‟s key aspects such as state sovereignty 
and citizenship are the focal points of this study.  It is against this background that this study 
aligns itself with the recent growing body of relevant literature which  further extends the 
debate on the Westphalian model and its associated concepts by, among other things, calling 
for a revisit of the model (Hettne 2000, Philpott 2000, Burch 2000, Sindjoun 2001, McGwire 
2001, Valaskakis 2001, Falk 2002a, Falk 2002b, Kissinger 2002, Kegley and Raymond 2002, 
Lake 2003, Beaulac 2004, Axtmann 2004, Brown 2006, Walker 2007, Lisberg 2008, Rudolph 
and Rudolph 2010, and Kayuni 2011). Through a systematic, critical analysis of the said 
                                                          
2
At the time of this study, the CHEFO Chairperson was Dr Justine Malewezi but now its Professor Kanyama 
Phiri of Malawi. 
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growing body of literature, the contribution of this study to IR scholarship is to go beyond the 
prevailing debate and to make an attempt at filling the empirical and conceptual gaps (from 
an African perspective) in the model‟s debate as identified below. 
 
1.3 Research Question and Claim 
This study is based on the following research question: Is the Chewa community (of Malawi, 
Mozambique and Zambia) challenging the Westphalian Model? The study claims that the 
revival of the Chewa trans-border community is constructed in a way not to challenge the 
Westphalian model, but rather reinforces the flexibility or adaptable nature of Westphalian 
state sovereignty. 
 
1.4 Study Objectives 
The specific objectives of the study are:  
1. To analyse briefly the socio-political transitions of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia 
with special reference to the role of traditional authorities or politics of representation; 
2. To trace the origin, development and contemporary organisation of traditional trans-
border Chewa entity of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique; 
3. To analyse the extent to which the revival of Chewa ethnic identity accommodates 
contemporary state sovereignty (and borders); 
4. To examine the extent to which Chewa cultural trans-border ceremonies pose as a 
challenge to state sovereignty. 
 
These objectives were primarily constructed in order to answer the main research question 
provided in Section 1.3 above. In other words, each objective is providing a specific answer 
to the question. Apart from answering the above stated overarching question, ultimately these 
objectives also provide a coherent linkage of the core elements of this thesis. For instance, 
objective 1 is meant to provide an understanding of the evolution of the Westphalian model 
up to the present as it has been applied to the area in which the Chewa Kingdom operates 
(Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia). In dialectic reasoning, objective 1 provides the 
argument with its thesis. Objective 2 allows an exploration of the Chewa cross-border 
community up to the present and as such (in the dialectic logic that the argument follows) 
poses as the antithesis to objective 1. Objective 3 synthesises the thesis (the Westphalian 
model) and the antithesis (the Chewa cross border community‟s revival) by analysing how 
the Chewa identity (ethnic nationalism) is constructed by the representatives of the Chewa 
and the three states. Objective 4 provides an empirical example of this social construction of 
the Chewa activities vis-a-visa the Westphalian model by investigating the most important 
manifestation of the Chewa revival, the cultural ceremony. The ceremony is an especially apt 
illustration of the claim that the thesis makes, because it involves the crossing of borders. The 
ease with which borders can be crossed can be seen as a test of how rigidly or flexibly the 
Westphalian model in its traditionally realist understanding is applied in an area.      
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1.5 Significance of the study 
This study is significant in several respects. Falk (2002b:321) rightly states that the choice of 
either to refine or to drop the Westphalian model largely depends on undertaking several 
empirical studies. Accordingly, this study becomes part of the empirically-driven analysis 
that examines the model. Another significance of this study is its scope. The methodology is 
meant to address the perennial IR problem of balancing the relevance of research findings in 
relation to universalism and particularism. In this regard, Keller (2002:13) observes that “in 
the near term, Africanist students of politics should initiate studies in…international relations 
from the perspective of regions and sub-regions”. Consequently, this study agrees with 
Keller‟s observation and takes a sub-regional (particularism) approach whilst interrogating a 
universal model. 
 
In this case, there is a thriving body of literature yearning for an African contribution to IR 
scholarship (Nkiwane 2001, Dunn 2001, Brown 2006, Clapham 2006, Dietrich 2008, and 
Smith 2009). The argument is specifically that scholarly engagement of key IR concepts with 
an African contribution and perspective is largely ignored or sporadic.  Consequently, this 
study attempts to contribute to IR scholarship by critiquing key IR concepts of state 
sovereignty and citizenship (as espoused in the Westphalian model) through an African case 
study. Thus this study is a contribution to ongoing “increasing scholarly attention to the 
influence of the state on social movements, ethnic mobilisation, and ethnic identity” (Barkey 
and Parikh1991:526).  Notably, research on ethnic identity has mainly tended to focus on the 
politically „explosive‟ groups which are explicitly and aggressively demanding their rights 
within the formalised state. Ethnic groups that have not been explicitly demanding their 
political rights have not attracted much attention. Ignoring such salient ethnic groups has led 
to a scholarship vacuum in IR. The choice of the Chewa ethnic group case study, in this case, 
is unique as the Chewa are not demanding the right to self-determination. 
 
 
1.6 The Chewa Kingdom case study as a relevant approach 
There are several reasons why the Chewa Kingdom case study is a relevant approach. Firstly, 
many scholars, such as Clapham (1996), have emphasised the importance of interrogating 
African IR using a bottom-up approach so as to complement and „even correct‟ the top-down 
approach which has dominated IR. In an African setting, more social- political issues takes 
place at local level than is reflected in the official documentation of the relevant government 
ministries. A bottom-up approach would ably highlight and uncover some informal processes 
which would be significant to the understanding of IR in Africa. The Chewa case is ideal in 
the sense that instead of analysing the formal/informal state interface from a narrow 
perspective of top policy makers, the focus will also be on the grassroots people themselves. 
Another value of such an approach is the much needed analysis of African IR experience. In 
explaining the concepts „African contributions‟, „African insights‟, and „African experience‟, 
Smith (2009) states that “insights gleaned from a close interpretation of African experiences” 
are critical because “it is the African experience, the African context, which has led the 
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scholar to revise/innovate on/contribute to existing IR theory” (Smith, 2009: 271). Smith 
(2009: 275) further argues that in order to benefit from the African IR contribution we need 
“to look beyond the disciplinary boundaries of IR, beyond the often aggressively guarded 
notion of what constitutes the field”. Consequently she suggests that we become more 
innovative, and that we glean from available African stories. These stories may be brought 
out through: 
1. Reinterpreting old stories. 
2. Telling stories in a different language. 
3. Telling stories with new main characters. 
4. Telling stories about existing characters but with a new plot (Smith 2009: 276). 
 
The Chewa case would be ideal as an attempt to highlight the possibility of answering the 
first and fourth suggested approaches above. Specifically, the Chewa as an ethnic group have 
existed for a long time and their story has been viewed based on anthropologigal or historical 
disciplines, a further dimension of analysis of the Chewa that takes into question the formal 
state setup provides an opportunity to reinterpret what has already been narrated. Among 
others, the current main existing characters in the Chewa community are trans-border cultural 
activities and centrality of the King. Thus, a trans-border dimension puts these characters into 
a „new plot‟ because they are for the first time being examined in the context of three 
contemporary states. 
Regarding the African IR experience argument discussed above, another value of the Chewa 
case is the socio-cultural element in state analysis. Sindjoun (2001:224) argues that the way 
the state is interpreted in IR does not reflect on reality as “the state has generally been taken 
for granted, considered identical everywhere, yet the other factors (eg social, cultural and 
political) have an impact on the state. In this case he calls for a sociological input because the 
concept of the state, as well as IR itself, is dynamic. Sindjoun (2001:225) suggests an 
intensification of interdisciplinary approaches so that IR should accommodate disciplines 
such as philosophy, anthropology, sociology and other related fields. This view is also 
supported by Clapham (1996:7) who contends that a proper and effective analysis or 
understanding of state relations in Africa must “go some way beyond the confines of any 
narrow conception of International Relations”. More importantly Sindjoun (2001:225) 
succinctly notes that “the encounter between International Relations and Cultural Studies will 
increase reflections on the concepts used, on the social and historical origins of international 
relations theories”. 
In addition, Clapham (1996:3) argues that personal political survival of the ruling elites has 
guided African IR, not the issues of liberation, nationhood and African unity. In this case, 
Clapham points to the fact that attention to formally stated goals may be misleading. If we 
take Clapham‟s argument, we might conclude that engagement with, and acceptance of, the 
informal trans-border political/cultural entities by the political leaders of Malawi, 
Mozambique and Zambia could be one of the ways in which the ruling elites are trying to 
reposition themselves. It is well documented that citizens in Malawi, Mozambique and 
Zambia regard the traditional chiefs as relevant institutions which will continue to play a key 
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role in the near future. In this case, the ruling elites might not really be for unity per se, but it 
could be that the reality on the ground (as manifested in the traditional institutions) has led 
them to accept and start creating a platform for them. In this case, we might say that the 
traditional institutions are using their connectivity to the citizenry (form of power) to „force‟ 
the formal state towards a more integrated region. This form of socio-political interplay can 
further be explored within the Chewa Kingdom framework so as to understand the formal vs 
informal power relations at trans-border level. 
 
Finally, Nkiwane (2001:279) observes that “case studies, theories, and examples from Africa3 
are exceedingly rare in international relations”. She therefore calls for an examination of the 
possibility of African scholarship contributing to conventional IR debates through the 
interrogation of core concepts. In this case she states that African examples and African 
scholarship may lead towards another understanding of various currently accepted IR 
perspectives. The Chewa case study being analysed by this study somehow fulfils this call. 
 
1.7 Definition of concepts 
This section defines the concept of Westphalian model and two interconnected core 
Westphalian model concepts of state and sovereignty. Due to its closeness to other relevant 
issues that this study is examining, the concept of citizenship (in this case with special 
reference to ethnic identity) is also discussed in this section. As understood in this study, 
these concepts are not entirely mutually exclusive. It should be emphasized, however, that a 
more detailed discussion of the concept of “state” and “sovereignty” is provided in the 
subsequent chapter.  
 
1.7.1 Westphalian Model 
In simple terms, Westphalian model refers to an international relations construct which depict 
elements that comprise the modern state. In literature, some authors refer to it as 
„Westphalian state system‟ or simply „Westphalian system‟. Increasingly the term „model‟ 
has been added by some scholars (Krasner and Froats 1996; Beaulac 2004; Stirk 2005: 
Rittberger 2008; Kayuni 2011; and Stirk 2012). In these cases, the term „model‟ is loosely 
used to emphasize the systematic process and  construction element of the modern state 
system but its meaning is not really different from others who refer to it as „Westphalian 
system‟ or „Westphalian state system‟. According to Stirk (2005: 153-154), the Westphalian 
model can be described as having two main interpretations: a strong interpretation and a weak 
one. In strong interpretation, Westphalian model has no real link to the Peace of Westphalia 
but it is the product of 19
th
 century nationalism. Thus in this interpretation, the main actors in 
international relations are states which claim absolute sovereignty and “states are centralised 
and lack „internal political differentiation‟, international community is largely excluded”. 
                                                          
3
 This study acknowledges that Africa is so diverse that using the term to represent all countries in the region is 
contentious. However, according to Smith (2009), despite several variations it is possible to use the term to 
represent the region due to several overarching commonalities. 
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However, in weak interpretation, “states are the prime actors in international relations, but not 
necessarily the only ones…states are not necessarily centralized…Sovereignty is not 
absolute”. Although there are these notable differences in weak and strong interpretation of 
sovereignty, both interpretations form part of the understanding of the model because they 
highlight the state as the main actor and sovereignty is an underlying principle. 
 
One of the reasons why this study uses the term Westphalian model is to provide a 
comprehensive entry point in reference to the concept of state. In other words, this study has 
decided to problematize the concept of the state rather than accept it as „given‟. According to 
Hurd (2008:6) constructivism as a theory has led to numerous debates and controversies 
among scholars on diverse issues including what constitutes a unit of analysis for the state. 
Hurd calls this the „controversy of state‐centrism‟ and constitutes the dilemma that 
researchers face in relation to the state as a unit of analysis. For instance at the beginning of 
empirical research, the question is: should the concept of state be taken as „given‟ before 
subjecting it to a more critical analysis? In this regard, the dilemma is on what to 
problematize and what to take as „given‟ because at the end of the day the final decision may 
have implications on what is lost in the analysis. In this study, the decision was to use the 
concept of Westphalian model instead of „Contemporary state‟. The value of using the former 
is that it appropriately rekindles a more comprehensive debate and understanding of the state 
and its contemporary relevance- which is the hallmark of this study. In a nutshell, the concept 
of Westphalian model inter alia explains the origin, attributes, nature and relationship of state 
and sovereignty. These Westphalian model‟s elements of state and sovereignty are further 
examined below. 
 
 
1.7.2 State 
Dunleavy and O‟Leavy (1987:1-3) define the state 4  from organisational and functional 
perspectives. From an organisational perspective, “it is a set of government institutions with 
rules that control and guide behaviour” while from a functional perspective, it is “a set of 
institutions carrying out specific goals, purposes and objectives”. From a Westphalian 
perspective Buzan and Little (1999:90) point out that the state is conceptualised on two 
critical issues: firstly the state has precisely defined territorial boundaries and secondly all the 
powers within this territory are centralised in a form of a self-governing unit. This has been 
the traditional way of understanding the state. This centralist perspective of the state acts as 
the starting point in the understanding of state in this study. In order to have a better picture 
of the state and its role, the study later takes the definition of the state as emerging from a 
contested interaction between state and society. This conceptualisation of the state is further 
explained by Barkey and Parikh (1991).  
 
                                                          
4
Despite the common usage of the term nation-state, most scholars agree that these terms are different. Vincent 
(1987:29) argues that a state can exist without nationalism but not vice versa. He goes on to add that the concept 
of state is grounded in several theories but nationalism has no adequate theories but “there may be adequate 
theories about what nationalism does”. 
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According to Barkey and Parikh (1991) the state-society approach takes an empirically-
driven perspective that places the state in the context of its immediate society. Barkey and 
Parikh (1991: 525) argue in this case that the state and society are regularly interacting and 
this interaction defines the state as well as its role applicable to that society. This is the notion 
of state adopted by this study. According to Demirovi´c (2011:38), the question of whether 
the nation-state has lost power or not is not relevant because “the way the state exercises its 
power is changing, meaning it is taking a new form”.  
 
1.7.3 Sovereignty 
Vincent (1987:34) argues that the first person to systematically use the concept of sovereignty 
was a French philosopher, Jean Bodin, and he associated the concept with the idea of state. In 
this case, the concept of sovereignty represented by the monarchy, implied supremacy above 
the citizens and the law. This supremacy has over the years been interpreted differently to 
imply the constitution/law of the land, the people/citizenry or office of rulership and not 
necessarily the person in office. Sovereignty is generally regarded as a critical element of the 
Westphalian model (Croxton 1999). In this case Beaulac (2004:181) rightly suggests that 
Westphalia put to the fore the notion of „state sovereignty‟ and became a “cornerstone” in the 
actual treaty of Westphalia. Consequently, from a Westphalian perspective, Axtmann 
(2004:260) points out that state sovereignty meant that legally and politically the state had 
absolute authority “not accountable to anyone but itself”. In relation to trans-border control, 
Krasner (2001d: 28) states that sovereignty implies the capacity to control or ability to 
regulate trans-border movements as well as those within the boundary of the state. Part of this 
perspective of sovereignty which implies the capacity to control or ability to regulate trans-
border movements have been adopted by this study. 
 
It is important however to take note that the concepts of state and sovereignty are not 
completely mutually exclusive. This is why other studies combine them. In other words, 
when the concepts of „state‟ and „sovereignty‟ are combined, the study takes the initial 
perspective that state sovereignty implies the absolute authority and ability to regulate trans-
border movements as well as to decide on political affairs of those within the boundary of the 
entity. This is the starting point in the understanding of state sovereignty taken by this study. 
Later, the study takes a constructivist perspective of state sovereignty as defined by Smith 
(2001). From a constructivist premise, Smith (2001) argues that state sovereignty is not static; 
it can change, and has been changing, over time and we can only determine its composition 
through empirical research within a specific context. This is partly what this study is actually 
examining on the element of state sovereignty. This view is aptly captured by Sindjoun 
(2001:223) who states that state “sovereignty still makes sense in international relations 
through new meanings and specific uses” (emphasis added). Thus sovereignty is socially 
constructed and dynamic – and this “potentially opens up new avenues for understanding 
international politics” (Lake 2003:308). 
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In other words, in agreement with scholars such as Engel and Olsen (2010), the study starts 
with the definition of the centralist Westphalian model of state. Later in the analysis it 
examines the relevance of a constructivist perspective of state sovereignty. 
 
1.7.4 Citizenship and ethnic identity 
At the heart of the discussion of the state in Africa is the changing nature of the concept of 
citizenship in Africa, as well as the role of traditional authorities in this change (Keller 2002). 
Yuval-Davis (1997:4) links the issue of citizenship to the state by mentioning that “the 
interest in citizenship is not just in the narrow formalistic meaning of having the right to carry 
a specific passport [but]…the relationship between the individual, state and society”. More 
importantly, the issue of citizenship, as Haste (2004:421) argues, is also an issue of identity 
(identity has also an implication on the notion of ethnicity). 
Ethnic identify construction may be defined as the process of creating a particular group‟s 
reference point for social-cultural meaning and experience which is often historically based 
(Bekker 2001). As discussed above in an African context, the concept of citizenship is highly 
linked to the concept of ethnicity. This is the case because ethnicity in some cases tends to 
take an upper hand in identity rather than citizenship. One of the influential theorists on 
citizenship, Marshall, defined citizenship as “a status bestowed on those who are full 
members of a community” (Marshall, in Yuval-Davis 1997:5).  Yuval-Davis (1997:5) points 
out that the significance of this definition is, among other things, the view that we do not 
necessarily link citizenship to the formal state as liberal definitions do, but rather open it up 
to encompass a variety of collectives that may include “local, ethnic, national and trans-
national”. Such a perspective is also supported by Bakan and Stasiulis (1994) who point out 
that the concept of citizenship needs to be examined not solely focusing on the state, but in 
relation to multiple formal and informal citizenships in more than one country. It can be 
deduced from this view of citizenship that there is space available for citizens in the 
„informal‟ communities to influence formal structures of the state whether at national or 
intra-national level.  
In line with the Westphalian model and as a starting point, citizenship is defined in this study 
as membership of a formal state. Later in the analysis this study takes the view that the 
concept of citizenship in Africa should be discussed within the context of ethnic identity. In 
other words, the socio-political changes taking place in Africa raise the possibility of aptly 
extending the concept of citizenship beyond the formal state boundary and including 
affiliation to informal (ethnic) groups. How this multiple citizenship (formal vs informal) 
may be (or is) harmonised, as well as understood, is what this study intends to investigate 
further through the Chewa Kingdom case example. Accordingly, the study explores the 
significance and relationship of ethnic based informal „citizenship‟ to formal state 
citizenship
5
.  
                                                          
5
Gaventa and Tandon (2010:10) argue that defining citizenship to state is not easy because “citizenship is 
complex and multidimensional”. In this case Gaventa and Tandon (2010:11), aptly contend that citizenship can 
be regarded as vertical (in relation to the state) and horizontal (being a member of a trans-border institution). 
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1.8 Theoretical and Conseptual Framework 
This study largely utilises the constructivism approach or theory as its theoretical and 
conceptual framework. However, taking into consideration some of the shortfalls of this 
theory to adequately address the issues being examined, the other theoretical approaches 
being employed are the cultural nationalism and politics of representation as discussed in 
subsequent sections. 
1.8.1 Constructivism theory 
For many years, IR has been dominated by realism/neorealism and liberalism/neoliberalism 
as mainstream theories of IR. Among other issues, realism emphasises national interests and 
the role of the state in inter-state relations while liberalism focuses on pursuance of common 
interests. In this case realism assumes competition amongst states while liberalism assumes 
that states strive for cooperation. Constructivism (also referred to as social constructivism) 
emerged mainly as an alternative to these two theories. Nicholas Onuf was the first to 
introduce constructivism in IR. Onuf (2013) provides a more basic understanding of social 
constructivism. He starts by explaining social constructivism in a relational context. He 
points out that people create societies and societies create people and for us to study them we 
have to choose a middle ground which connects both of these entities. In this case the middle 
ground comprises of social rules that define what is acceptable or unacceptable. The way 
people react to these rules such as obeying, breaking or changing them is what is known as 
practices and these rules provide us with an understanding of which individuals or groups are 
active participants. These active participants within the rules are referred to as agents and 
these agents may be individual human or even governments. The rules determine whether the 
agent has to act in a particular way or not. Agents have specific goals they want to achieve 
(whether they were provided with full information or not in the formulation of their goals) 
and often they are guided by rules. Over time, these rules and practices form a particular 
pattern which is called institutions. Consequently, “agents act on, and not just in, the context 
within which they operate, collectively changing its institutional features, and themselves, in 
the process” (Onuf 2013:5-6). In a society, several institutions exist whose actions have an 
effect (intended and unintended consequences) on these agents and the agents are forced to 
respond.  In this case, “any stable pattern of rules, institutions and unintended consequences 
gives society a structure” (Onuf 2013:6). There is no general agreement on what this structure 
(or social pattern) is: whether physical or in the mind of agents. Agents may decide to change 
the rules when experiencing unintended consequences.  States are regarded as 
institutionalised but operating through their agents in an archaic world (no state rules over the 
other). From this perspective sovereignty is understood as a condition in which “no institution 
above states ruling them” (Onuf 2013:7). 
 
 Onuf‟s work was followed by a series of influential articles by Alexander Wendt who 
consolidated the theory in IR (in Jackson and Sorensen 2007:168). There is some controversy 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
This study explores the discussion of citizenship in this context in which the Chewa trans-border ethnic 
citizenship is being likened to Gaventa and Tandon‟s membership to a trans-border institution. 
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on the precise boundaries that separate constructivism from other approaches because these 
boundaries are not very clear (Hurd 2008:299). Zehfuss (2004:6) argues that the key claims 
of constructivism are largely controversial and “although constructivism has been defined, 
explained, assessed and positioned, there is little agreement about what it is”. From a 
constructivist‟s perspective, states are socially constructed and this even includes their 
relationship to other states or other actors (Sindjoun 2001). Wendt argued that the behaviour 
of states is largely defined by its identity and interest. Specifically, “Constructivists focus on 
the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argument in politics, stressing in particular 
the role of collectively held or „intersubjective‟ ideas and understandings on social life” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 392).   
 
Intersubjectivity is the central concept in constructivism, the concept means that individuals, 
groups, or states develop identities, interests or ideas through the process of interaction with 
or among each other (Hurd 2008). When this interaction is sustained for some time, certain 
beliefs and expectations emerge between or among those involved. In other words, 
intersubjectivity denotes the shared understanding, meaning and even significance of 
relational matters which have been constructed over time between or among states. Using 
Wendt‟s theoretical understanding of constructivism, he argues that originally states begin 
their interactions with a neutral position: they are neither influenced towards cooperation nor 
conflict. The initial phase of interaction is where intersubjectivity is constructed and it is also 
this phase which determines the nature of subsequent interactions. If initially the 
intersubjective meaning construction is on a negative route, then the states in question will 
consistently be in a hostile relationship. However, due to other factors, the intersubjectivity 
meaning may change for better or worse. It is through this understanding that Wendt (1995: 
73) argued, “500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 
North Korean nuclear weapons”. It ably captures issues of identity, thoughts, beliefs and 
ideas of actors in IR. There have been several criticisms directed at constructivism and one of 
the criticisms is that the theory focuses much on explaining the past at the expense of 
predicting future events (Walt 1998). 
 
Hurd (2008) has aptly provided a good summary of constructivism by providing its 
distinguishing features. According to his analysis, the first distinguishing feature of 
constructivism is “An Alternative to Materialism”- Unlike neorealism which argues that 
material forces such as military hardware and economy determine international political 
behavior. Hurd (2008) explains that the world we live in is socially constructed and the 
patterns in the behavior of states as well as cause and effect in relationships rely on a 
complex set of meaning and practices. These meaning and practices are not permanent but 
ever changing hence certain ideas or practices which can easily be predicted now may over a 
period of time take another form which is different from what it is now. The second 
distinguishing element is the “Construction of State Interests”. Hurd (2008:4) argues  from a 
constructivist view that “the influences on interest formation are social”. In other words, each 
state‟s interest emerges through the social process of interaction with other states and the 
social environment. The third feature is “Mutual Constitution of Structures and Agents”. In 
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this feature, it is argued that when states interact, their actions lead towards the formation of 
particular international institutions and norms. Conversely “these institutions and norms 
contribute to defining, socializing, and influencing states” (Hurd (2008:5). The fourth 
distinguishing element is “Multiple Logics of Anarchy”. Generally speaking, in international 
relations the term anarchy implies absence of institutions which are authoritative and 
legitimate; hence absence of a hierarchical system of authority is described as an anarchical 
nature of international state system. From a neorealist view, such kind of scenario leads to 
certain types of behavior amongst states such as self-interests as well as balancing their 
power. Constructivism argues that this pattern of behavior is not fixed and actually it is 
derived from the perspective that these states consider each other as rivals in their quest for 
scarce resources. Instead of looking at the hierarchical structure, Wendt (in Hurd 2008:5) 
“proposed a spectrum of international anarchies based on variation in the ideas that states 
have about themselves and others. With enmity at one end and friendship at the other, and 
with indifference in the middle”. He further explained that it is possible to have anarchy of 
friends and anarchy of enemies and these may generate different types of behavior though 
they are both in an anarchical structure. 
 
This study intends to mainly utilize this constructivist analytical framework because of its 
concept of intersubjectivity. Specifically, the study perceives that the states of Malawi, 
Mozambique and Zambia have, through the trans-border Chewa, developed identities, 
interests or ideas in the process of interaction which enables them to effortlessly 
accommodate the trans-border Chewa ethnic groups. More importantly, the theory aptly 
argues that states and other related institutions, which form the hallmark of state-society 
interaction, are socially constructed and dynamic. The way the state is perceived will 
determine how other actors will react to it. The state of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique are 
inhabited by the Chewa who recognize another parallel authority, their King of Zambia. 
Constructivism is better suited to explain how the Chewa construct or understand the formal 
state as opposed to their trans-border kingdom. The major limitation with constructivism is 
that it mainly focuses on state relations and pays little attention to other actors. It is from this 
noted shortfall that other theories or perspectives have been adopted namely, cultural 
nationalism and politics of representation perspectives (this shortfall and complementarity of 
other approaches is further discussed in section 1.8.4). 
 
1.8.2 The Cultural Nationalism Perspective 
Apart from the constructivism theory, this study also adopts the cultural nationalism 
perspective, as argued by Hutchinson (1999) and others in order to offer a better explanation 
of the underlying motives for the creation and mobilisation of the contemporary Chewa 
Kingdom. By introducing the cultural nationalism perspective, Hutchinson (1999:392) has 
ably demonstrated that nationalism is not only a political project, but a it is also a cultural 
project– an aspect which is often ignored in most studies. In other words, the cultural 
nationalism perspective incorporates the argument that some movements might take a 
cultural agenda but in reality might be pursuing a political agenda.  (Some scholars even 
argue that all cultural movements are political in nature). Although cultural nationalism might 
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lead to conflict especially in multi-ethnic populations, according to the cultural nationalism 
perspective, the said conflict may “have a positive integrative function” (Hutchinson 
1999:395). While not necessarily referring directly to cultural nationalism, Bekker (2001:3) 
agrees with this assertion by arguing that ethnicity in moderation builds communities rather 
than causing them to disintegrate. 
 
Hutchinson‟s perspective aptly fits the Chewa Kingdom, which is mainly cultural in 
orientation with seemingly minimal political reactionary elements. In general, it is normally 
seen that when ethnic movements pursue the political agenda, it is deemed to be a threat to 
state sovereignty. Unless there is excessive politicisation of ethnic movements, this study 
takes the cultural nationalism perspective in the analysis of the Chewa Kingdom because it 
does not assume that all ethnic mobilisation or moderate politicisation of the movements is 
perpetually a challenge to the formal state.   
1.8.3 Politics of representation 
Although not many scholars have committed themselves to specifically define it, the concept 
of politics of representation is not normally discussed in isolation but it is embedded within 
the wider political discourse which touches on the relationship between citizens or subjects 
on one hand and the state on the other. In other words, the politics of representation discusses 
questions such as who has the legitimacy and authority to represent and speak for the 
populace. In the context of Africa, the debate is directly related to the question of the role of 
traditional authorities, especially in rural areas. Edigheji (2006: 94) argues that political 
representation in Africa has been compounded by several developments such as an 
ambiguous role of traditional leaders. In this case he mentions that after independence, the 
existence of traditional rulers and elected representatives “has led to an ambiguity in the roles 
of the former and conflicts between both institutions that see themselves as representative of 
their people”. In this case it is the constant struggle between the formal state and informal 
traditional authorities for control of the local populace. As discussed comprehensively in 
Chapter Three, Mamdani (1996) and others have brought to the fore this politics of 
representation debate by arguing that the contemporary role of traditional authorities has led 
to Africans being divided into two parts, namely citizens and subjects. Citizens are urban 
inhabitants (where chieftaincies do not exist) who enjoy their full democratic rights and 
obligations. Subjects, on the other hand, are rural inhabitants who are under the control of 
autocratic traditional authorities. According to these scholars, there has been a tussle since the 
colonial period between the state and the traditional authorities on who is a bona fide 
representative of the people, especially in rural areas where the majority of the population 
live. The state uses its official authority for legitimacy, while traditional authorities use 
cultural issues as the source of legitimacy. Although both claim that their roles are separate 
but complementary, in reality there is a constant political tussle (overt and covert) which has 
manifested itself in several ways since the colonial period. This is the hallmark of the concept 
of politics of representation in Africa as applied in this study. The concept of politics of 
representation is discussed in this study neither as a theory nor an approach. In other words, 
this study deals with the concept of politics of representation not as a salient concept, but as 
an underlying supporting perspective. 
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The politics of representation also partially touches on the issue of citizenship identity. 
According to Sassen (2002:8) it is erroneous to define citizenship and nationality solely in 
relation to nation state because other forms of citizenship, even in the west, are developing, 
which he refers to as the „informal citizenship‟. Immigrants in the western countries enjoy 
most of the rights and obligations of the bona fide citizens, yet they do not have the formal 
citizenship. Similarly, it is possible for individuals to value their attachment to informal 
institutions or communities outside the formal state; hence their identity is not the nation state 
in the first place. In this case, if communities value their informal citizenship (such as ethnic 
organisations) more than state citizenship, it has an implication on the politics of citizenship. 
In other words, it implies that informal institutions such as ethnic groups, which are led by 
traditional chiefs, are perceived as more legitimate than the state authorities. It becomes even 
more interesting academically when an ethnic group, such as the Chewa, is trans-border in 
nature because the debate on politics of representation takes a broader and non-explored 
trans-border perspective. 
 
1.8.4. Linkage and application of the theoretical and conceptual issues 
The study is framed within the constructivism as its overarching approach, but not the exact 
constructivism approach of Alexander Wendt, who still takes the state and not people as the 
unit of analysis in IR (the realist notion). Wendt has been criticised for this approach; for 
instance Koo (2006: i) points out that “having states as given units in his methodology, his 
theory cannot comprehend the notion of human that must be included in a constructivist 
approach. Consequently, his theory loses consistency within constructivist logic.” This study 
supports this perspective of Koo by arguing that the human dimension to the state system is 
critical and it provides a broader and more encompassing perspective of the international 
system.Consequently, the study addresses this criticism of constructivism by making people 
the unit of analysis (people as political actors and cultural actors, acting alone or in groups or 
institutions). Therefore, paraphrasing Wendt, this study argues that:  “the Westphalian model 
is what people make of it” (not: “Sovereignty is what states make of it”). Consequently the 
study is taking an anthropological/sociological constructivist approach which provides an 
avenue for other debates to provide more insight in this argument.   
Taking into consideration that this study is based on cross-border ethnicity and the state, the 
theoretical debates associated with the concepts/notions of cultural nationalism and politics of 
representation are essential. In other words, these debates assist the study to move beyond the 
state as a unit of analysis and explore the process of social construction by people (as 
individuals and groups) representing the three states and the Chewa respectively of 
nationalism and citizenship. The Chewa people‟s construction of these notions provides some 
insights on whether or not the Westphalian state is being challenged through their cross-
border ethnic activities. It should not be taken for granted that the Chewa activities and 
allegiance to the King are non-threatening due to their informality. It takes politics 
(contestation) to construct nationalism, citizenship, sovereignty and other related elements. 
Consequently, including “politics of representation” is essential for a social constructivist 
approach. In relation to the role of the Chewa King in the whole setting, a couple of notions 
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are introduced for debate. Whether the final analysis is that the King‟s position is merely 
ceremonial or not does not disregard the value of critically examining how his current role 
has been constructed (or being constructed). 
 
The study assumes there is a dynamic interaction between Westphalian state‟s sovereignty 
and territory on one hand and Chewa trans-border ethnic identity and social or politcal 
cultural elements on the other hand. The linkage between ethnicity and constructivism is that 
ethnicity itself can be interpreted and understood from a constructivism perspective. As Hale 
2004 argues, ethnicity can broadly be understood from two theoretical perspectives namely, 
“primordialism” and “constructivism”.  In primordialism, ethnicity is interpreted as given and 
provides examples of language, culture, a common ancestry and other related elements. 
Constructivism on the other hand argues that ethnic identity as well as ethnicity itself can be 
interpreted as socially constructed by groups and individuals. Yavuz (2001:3) argues that 
“one needs to remind policy makers that nationalism [or ethnic identity] ….is always 
constructed by 'identity entrepreneurs' and shaped by political context”. These identity 
enterprenuers are mainly traditional authorities and their associates. Furthermore, Brass (1991: 
8) professes that ethnicity and nationalism are political constructions and are products of 
elites “who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the 
groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain 
political and economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves”. Romano 
(2006:21) reinforces this argument by mentioning that this cultural framing by the elites 
creates a shared understanding of their entity and also helps them to legitimize as well as 
motivate their collective actions. This “cultural tool kit” provides insights as to the decisions 
and processes taken by certain groups in order to achieve their goals. The linkage and 
application of theoretical and conceptual issues in this study is further highlighted in Table 1 
below: 
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Table 1: Linkage and application of the theoretical and conceptual issues 
 
Theory or 
perspective 
Main argument(s) 
postulated 
Specific contribution to the 
study 
Key issues examined Specific  
thesis 
chapters 
Constructivism States and institutions 
are socially constructed. 
And the concept of 
„Intersubjectivity‟ 
which implies the 
shared understanding, 
meaning and even 
significance of 
relational matters that 
have been constructed 
over time between or 
among individuals, 
groups and states 
The study perceives that the 
states of Malawi, Mozambique 
and Zambia have, through the 
trans-border Chewa, developed 
identities, interests or ideas in 
the process of interaction 
which enable them to 
effortlessly accommodate the 
trans-border Chewa ethnic 
groups. More importantly, the 
theory argues that states and 
other related institutions, 
which form the hallmark of 
state-society interaction, are 
socially constructed and 
dynamic hence the theory 
provides us with an 
opportunity to examine this 
dynamism between the Chewa 
and the state. 
1-Social construction 
perspective of the state 
(Territory/boundaries and 
sovereignty/authority). 
 
2- Social construction 
perspective of the 
relationship between the 
Chewa Kingdom and the 
state (Extent to which they 
might be challenging each 
other) 
 
3-Process of construction 
of the Chewa identity and 
its implication on state 
sovereignty. 
 
All 
chapters 
Politics  of 
representation 
Examines the debate on 
who has the right, 
legitimacy and authority 
to represent and speak 
for the citizenry. 
Highlights the 
complementarity or conflictual 
relationship between 
traditional authorities and the 
state in the three countries 
(Malawi, Mozambique and 
Zambia). It contextualizes the 
authority and the role of the 
Chewa King in the three 
countries and highlights the 
relationship between citizens 
or subjects on one hand and 
the state on the other. It helps 
us to interpret whether the 
Chewa King‟s authority is 
challenging the legality of the 
conventional state. 
1-Role of traditional 
authorities in African state. 
 
2-How, when and where 
does Chewa King derive 
his authority (Extent to 
which his authority can be 
perceived as challenging 
the state). 
Chapters 
3-5 
Cultural 
nationalism 
It incorporates the 
argument that some 
movements might take 
a cultural agenda but in 
reality they might be 
pursuing a political 
agenda. 
Offer a better explanation of 
the underlying motives for the 
creation and mobilization of 
the Chewa across the three 
countries. In other words, the   
more politicised the more it is 
a challenge to the state. 
1-Traditional ceremonies: 
Gule wamkulu & Kulamba 
(Extent to which they are 
politicised) 
 
2-Trans-border movements 
and ethnic identity (Extent 
to which they challenge 
state territory/borders). 
 
3-Revival of the Chewa 
Identity & motives for 
those involved (Extent to 
which their motives can be 
said to be political) 
Chapters 
6-7 
Source: Author‟s own construction 
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It is therefore not complete to simply provide a cultural or political framing alone. The study 
assumes the existence of the Chewa thrives on exploiting of one or both of these framings to 
suit their own interest. The interplay of these two lenses facilitates the source of power and 
recognition which ultimately has a bearing on Westphalian state sovereignty and territory of 
the three countries of Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia.  
 
1.9 African tradition ‘illusion’ debate and implications for the study of the 
Chewa Kingdom 
Some scholars have questioned the existence of a genuine African tradition or custom
6
. These 
scholars specifically claim that contemporary reference to African tradition is an illusionary 
exercise because these traditions are a recent invention because they were formulated by 
colonialists with the assistance of some African elites who stood to personally gain some 
social benefits through this invention. Ranger (1983/2010:460) provides an even more 
comprehensive list of creators of African tradition by mentioning “colonial administrators, 
missionaries, „progressive traditionalists‟, elders and anthropologists”. Hobsbawn (1992:1) 
argues that traditions “which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and 
sometimes invented”. In other words, according to this school of thought, the post-colonial 
African tradition is actually a product of interaction between Africans and the colonial rulers, 
and the invention was shaped mainly to favour the African elites (who emerged as winners in 
the competition amongst themselves) and colonial interests. Ranger (1983/2010:456) 
mentions four specific groups which benefited from the invention of tradition as follows:  
1. Elders- this group often referred to tradition in order to dominate the young. 
2. Men used tradition to rule over women. 
3. Paramount chiefs and ruling aristocracies in politics- tradition was a mechanism to 
maintain and extend their control. 
4. Indigenous populations-appealed to tradition to exclude migrant populations from 
political power. 
 
Chanock (1998) stands out as the strongest proponent of the illusionary perspective of 
African tradition in central Africa (Zambia and Malawi). According to Chanock (1998), in 
central Africa, there were numerous social, political and economic changes during the pre-
colonial period (especially in the nineteenth century) so that we may not effectively establish 
that a coherent traditional system and institutions existed in the area. According to him, 
powerful groups took advantage of the colonial courts to establish their interests which were 
legitimised as custom. In this case he points out that what later emerged as customary law or, 
in this context, African tradition, “was the winning representation of intense conflicts 
                                                          
6
This study acknowledges the fact that „Tradition‟, „Custom‟ and „Culture‟ are not necessarily the same. In 
general, traditions may be regarded as actions and processes that are passed on from one generation to the next 
and are generally perceived to be in existence for a relatively long time, while customs are those perceived to be 
of relatively shorter period and more specific. However, this study uses these terms interchangeably unless 
where explicitly explained. 
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between ethnic groups, genders, and generations, winning because they found accord with the 
ideas and interests of the colonial rulers” (Chanock, 1998: vi). 
What these critiques of the African tradition are asking is that contemporary social scientists 
and historians should “free themselves from the illusion that the African custom recorded by 
officials or by many anthropologists is any sort of guide to the African past” (Ranger, 
1983/2010: 460).  
Despite the fact that Ranger‟s (1983/2010: 460) work became one of the most cited to the 
proponents of the „illusion of African tradition‟, Ranger himself later in his work of 1993 
revised some of his arguments and critiqued himself. For instance, he dropped the word 
“invention”, sensing that it did not accurately depict the historical phenomenon of tradition 
and culture in Africa. Ranger‟s revised arguments drastically watered down his initial 
„aggressive‟ approach to the concept of „illusionary‟ African tradition. Briggs (1996) 
contends that those who critisise the existence of African tradition, do not understand the 
historical processes in African politics which have always hovered around disputes over 
tradition. Consequently, the conflict over tradition during the colonial period was normal and 
not necessarily a product of the colonial powers. 
 
A closer analysis of Chanock‟s (1998) work also raises a number of weaknesses. First of all, 
it should be understood that Chanock‟s work is largely based on the issue of customary law. 
It is from this perspective that he draws a number of related African historical and social 
arguments such as „traditional‟ political authorities and gender. Though the legal perspective 
might have its own merits, it should also be appreciated that there are several limitations as 
societies are affected by numerous social factors beyond the legal perspectives. Secondly, 
although Chanock‟s work claims that it is highlighting the colonial experience, it is 
interesting to note that his major source of data is limited to 1931 and 1945 in Malawi and 
Zambia respectively. In this case, the validity of the findings to represent the colonial 
experience is highly questionable. What is also missing in his work is the actual African 
opinion relating to this process of creation of African „tradition‟. Almost all the views are 
from a European perspective of how they interpreted the African utterances- except for 
African voices as recorded in court settings. In this case the findings are somehow skewed 
towards the European, not the African, opinion.  
 
In general, arguably the most able critique of the anti-tradition perspective has been provided 
by Spear (2003). Spear‟s major argument (2003:3) is that “the case for colonial invention has 
often overstated colonial power and ability to manipulate African institutions to establish 
hegemony”. The fact that colonial authorities relied on the traditional authorities already 
implies that the colonial authorities‟ power was limited. Furthermore, individuals and groups 
have, over the years “continually re-interpreted and reconstructed tradition in the context of 
broader socio-economic changes” (Spear 2003:4); in this context, colonial authorities “often 
stimulated rather than stilled” this debate and the struggle for development of traditions. 
Another critique of the colonial invention of tradition is MacGonagle (2007). MacGonagle 
(2007) embarked on a complicated and lengthy examination of identity formation among the 
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Ndau, or Shona, ethnic group in eastern Zimbabwe and central Mozambique. Her focus was 
on the cultural, social, and political aspects of Ndau identity over a period from 1500 to 1900. 
Using a historical approach (interviews and archival research), MacGonagle proves that the 
process of Ndau ethnic identity started many years before the arrival of missionaries and 
colonial administrators on the continent. According to her explanation, pre-colonial rulers 
relied on the invention of ideology to promote ethnic identity and to enhance the subjects‟ 
loyalty. What is central about this work is that MacGonagle challenges the well-established 
argument that tribalism or ethnic identity is a colonial period invention. In this case, she 
argues, “Neither primordial nor the product of colonialism, ethnic identities arise from 
collective historical experiences. Identities are fluid; they cross borders and they have a long 
and messy history in this region of southeast Africa” (MacGonagle 2007:2). 
 
The above analysis has three major implications for the study or analysis of the contemporary 
traditional Chewa Kingdom. These implications hover around questions such as:  
 
a) Did the Chewa Kingdom exist in the pre-colonial period?  
b) Is the contemporary Chewa Kingdom, with its traditions, a creation of the colonial 
powers? 
c) What is the starting point in understanding or analysis of Chewa tradition which is 
associated with the Kingdom? 
 
First, the existence of the Chewa pre-colonial kingdom is a historical fact (see Chapter 5 for 
more details). In this context, extending the defence of the existence of the African tradition, 
there is abundant evidence from numerous scholars and available ancient documents of early 
traders pointing to the fact that centralised authorities have always been in existence in 
Africa, long before the establishment of colonial powers. In other cases of traditional 
authorities allegedly created by colonial authorities, Nieuwaal and Dijk (in Spear, 2003:10) 
argue that “the viability of chieftaincy rests on its acceptability and legitimacy, and thus the 
central question is not whether chieftainship was imposed or not, but how it was made 
acceptable, given meaning and imbued with respect and awe.” 
 
Secondly, to attribute the existence and sustenance of African chieftaincy such as the Chewa 
solely to colonial authorities might be misleading. It is correct, as argued by Chanock and 
others, that there is no identifiable time-based static benchmark for the analysis of African 
tradition, but this is due to the fact that tradition has constantly re-shaped itself to suit the 
current socio-political and economic factors. However, this process has been on-going, both 
before and after the arrival of colonial authorities. Despite this dynamism, there are some 
notable traditional attributes that have survived over the years which set apart one traditional 
grouping from another. In this case the Chewa is an identifiable group with specific shared 
attributes that have been passed on over the years. 
 
This study takes the view that the traditional Chewa Kingdom existed in the pre-colonial 
period,although the contemporary kingdom‟s „traditions‟ may not exactly reflect what existed 
during the pre-colonial and colonial periods. In other words, the Chewa Kingdom of the pre-
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colonial and colonial periods is not exactly what is currently in existence, because it has 
inevitably re-invented itself several times due to numerous prevailing environmental factors. 
However, it is still a viable entity to be analysed as a „traditional‟ grouping.  Suffice to 
mention that it is not the aim of this study to critically analyse the evolution of traditions over 
the years in the Chewa Kingdom in the light of socio-political developments in the region. 
Although reference to these evolutionary dimensions may be directly or indirectly alluded to, 
the study mainly focuses on the relationship between the formal state and trans-border 
traditional ChewaKingdom of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia.Virtanen (2005:243) notes 
that the debate on traditional authority in Africa has mainly focused on whether it is authentic 
or fabricated (ie invented or false). Virtanen argues that such a conception is based on a 
modernist perspective and that “this distinction is neither theoretically fruitful nor politically 
prudent”. In this case the political legitimacy of traditional authorities should not be 
determined by a long unbroken historical lineage but by the acceptance of their authority by 
their immediate local community. 
 
1.10 Research Design and Methodology 
Case study approach is the research design guiding this study. According to Kothari 
(2004:113) the case study method is normally a form of qualitative approach which “involves 
a careful and complete observation of a social unit, be that unit a person, a family, an 
institution, a cultural group or even the entire community”. In terms of scope, Kothari adds 
that it “places more emphasis on the full analysis of a limited number of events or conditions 
and their interrelations”. There are several case study designs but the one adopted is the 
embedded single-case-design as highlighted by Yin (2003:42). Taking into consideration the 
expanse of the study and nature of the issue being examined (three countries and only one 
ethnic group), the single-case approach was the best and most relevant approach. The 
findings may also provide insight for researchers working on similar cases of cross-border 
ethnic groups in Africa. As Flyvbjerg (2006:225) points out, “it is incorrect to conclude that 
one cannot generalize from a single case [but]... It depends on the case one is speaking of and 
how it is chosen”. Yin (1981:59) argues that what makes a case study approach unique as 
compared to other approaches is that it attempts to examine “(a) a contemporary phenomenon 
in its real-life context, especially when (b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident”. The Chewa Kingdom case clearly fits into the description as 
explained by Yin (1981), because it is being analysed in connection with the contemporary 
understanding of the key Westphalian concepts. The concepts are analysed within this clearly 
defined context. Yin (2003:9) further argues that a case study approach may be undertaken 
when “a „how‟ or „why‟ question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over 
which the investigator has little or no control”. This study is, among other things, also asking 
how and why the Westphalian model is applicable (or not) in the Chewa Kingdom.  
 
The study is mainly empirical and relies heavily on qualitative methods of data collection. 
According to Kothari (2004) almost all case studies used qualitative methods. However some 
quantitative data was also used- which was mainly drawn from the Afrobarometer data sets. 
Consequently the study is exploratory and descriptive in nature. Similarly, the collected 
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empirical data relies on qualitative research methods to interpret relationships among 
variables emerging in the study. The role of quantitative data from Afrobarometerdata sets is 
to supplement shortfalls in the qualitative data. 
Taking into consideration the relative population of the Chewa in the three countries as well 
as areas, the study purposely selected one district/province in Zambia and in Mozambique, 
and two districts in Malawi (hence four districts/provinces in total). The researcher sought 
some assistance from CHEFO (Chewa Heritage Foundation) during the period of the study so 
as to facilitate access to some identified key individuals. Although Miles and Rochefort 
(1991) in their study found that the perceptions of ethnic group members in rural areas 
differed from those in the urban areas, this study did not take the urban/rural comparison into 
consideration. Hence apart from some key informants, field research focused on rural-based 
Chewa communities. For the purposes of this study, a rural area is one which falls within 30-
40 kilometres of a geographically defined urban centre; all the villages that participated in 
this study fall within this range. The study agrees with the argument by Osaghae (1994) that 
there is no significant difference between rural and urban ethnicity in Africa. This view is 
also supported by Logan (2008, 2009 and 2011), hence the urban/rural comparison was not 
investigated. 
1.10.1 Unit of Analysis 
According to Bailey (1978) and Yin (2003), the unit of analysis is described as the main 
entity that is being examined or analysed in the study. In other words,the unit of analysis 
could be individuals, groups, artefacts, geographical entities or social interactions. Extending 
from the conceptual framework above, this section further discusses the study‟s units of 
analysis. Engel and Olsen (2010:8) argue that “the state as a unit of analysis has been 
privileged to an extent that” many disciplines do not conceptualise it, or even its related 
concepts, that are based on it. In other words, it is in most cases taken for granted hence not 
fully expounded. According to Barkey and Parikh (1991:525) “the state in empirical research 
is operationalized [sic] in terms of specific institutions and actors”. Using this perspective, at 
state level, the unit of analysis for this study were states of Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia 
as represented by their specific actors and institutions such as Ministry responsible for 
traditional leaders, local administration and Ministry responsible for foreign affairs and 
immigration (as well as officials working in these institutions). In relation to the Chewa, the 
unit of analysis were CHEFO and its officials, Chewa chiefs and their subjects in the selected 
aforementioned three countries. 
1.10.2 Data Collection Methods 
As briefly discussed above, the study used the following data collection methods (see 
Appendix 18): 
1.10.2.1 Comparative Literature Survey 
Comparative literature surveyed in this study implies desk research or the collection and 
systematic analysis of available literature on state/society relations in Africa and the role of 
traditional entities, especially in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. At this stage, the focus 
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was on a thorough critical analysis of key concepts relevant to this study. According to 
Kothari (2004:111) secondary data “refer to the data which have already been collected and 
analysed by someone else”. In this regard, the desk research was mostly based on data from 
government publications, books, journals, press releases, other published and unpublished 
papers as well as internet searches.   
1.10.2.2 Key Informants Interviews 
Key informant interviews mainly rely on information collected from interviews with 
individuals who are knowledgeable, through experience and by virtue of the nature of their 
positions/jobs, on issues related to the study (Kumar 1987). In this study, key informants 
included officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Malawi), Departments responsible for 
Immigration (Malawi/Zambia/Mozambique), academics/researchers (Malawi, Zambia and 
Mozambique), local government officials in the sampled areas (Malawi, Zambia and 
Mozambique), officials from Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO), and Chewa traditional 
leaders (Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique). These key informants were identified using a 
non-probability sampling technique (purposive sampling). In this regard non-probability 
sampling is ideal in key informant interviews because of its main advantage of “convenience 
and economy” (Bailey 1978). Specifically, purposive sampling is described as a method 
whereby “researchers rely on their experience, ingenuity… to deliberately obtain units of 
analysis in such a manner that the sample they obtain may be regarded as being 
representative of the relevant population” (Welman and Kruger 2004: 63).  It is expected that 
the above mentioned individuals were likely to provide information on some of the objectives 
of this study which would not have been possible if a different method had been employed. 
Specifically, 54 key informant interviews (using an interview guide attached in Appendices 
5-7) were conducted in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia (this excludes 153 individuals who 
participated in FGDs) as summarised below (see Appendix 1): 
 2 Officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Malawi),  
 6 Officers in the Department of Immigration (2 from Malawi, 2 from 
Mozambique and 2 from Zambia), 
 9 Researchers and Academics (5 from Malawi, 2 from Zambia and 2 from 
Mozambique)  
 4 Local government officials in the sampled areas (2 from Malawi, 1 from 
Zambia and 1 from Mozambique) 
 2 Officials from Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO)  
 24 Chewa traditional leaders/chiefs (11 from Malawi, 7 from Zambia and 
6 from Mozambique) -from the sampled areas. 
 1 Political Science Association President (Malawi) 
 2 Officials in the Office of the President and Chiefs‟ Administration 
(Malawi) 
1.10.2.3 Focus Group Discussions 
According to Wilkinson (2004), a focus group discussion (FGD) is generally an informally 
organised discussion, directed at a certain topic, involving a specially selected small number 
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of individuals. The individuals are selected due to their potential to provide special insight on 
the issue under investigation.  Taking advantage of group dynamics, the interaction amongst 
the participants themselves provides richer information which could otherwise not have been 
possible to get from an individual interview.  In this case, the researcher is able to see the 
community‟s reality from their perspective through incorporation of their experiences, 
interests, beliefs and views relating to the phenomenon (Kitzinger 1994). In this study, a total 
of 15 FGDs were conducted (using a semi-structured discussion guide, see Appendix 5) in 
the purposely selected Chewa villages in Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia. In total 153 
individuals participated in FGDs (84 females and 69 males). Each FGD had an average of 10 
participants. Participants in these discussions were also identified through purposive 
sampling with the assistance of Village Headmen (the composition ensured a proper mix of 
each participant‟s age, education and position/status in the community). The full details of the 
said FGDs are presented below: 
 
Table 2: Number of FGDs and participants per country 
 
In this case the FGDs complemented other methods identified by this study to capture how 
grassroots people understand the concept of citizenship, state and sovereignty and also how 
this is linked to their traditional Chewa kingdom practices.  
Apart from the above mentioned points, another advantage of this method is that in 
comparison with other approaches, FGDs allow interviewers to study people in an ordinary 
setting, enabling them to gain access to various cultural and social contexts which might raise 
interesting issues for further exploration (Bailey 1978). Taking into consideration the scope 
of this study, FGDs assisted in lowering the research costs by interviewing a large sample at 
 Country Village District/Provi
nce 
No. of 
male 
participa
nts per 
village 
No. of  
female 
participa
nts per 
village 
Total 
number 
of 
participa
nts per 
country 
No. 
of 
FG
Ds 
per 
cou
ntry 
1 
 
Zambia Kasikula Chipata 14 12 41 4 
Ikwele Chipata 8 7 
2 Mozambique Katsekami
nga 
Angonia, Tete 10 8 40 4 
Mphande Angonia, Tete 15 7 
3 Malawi Bango Lilongwe - 14  
72 
 
7 Chiwoza Lilongwe 10 12 
Dzunda Lilongwe 7 14 
Mwakulam
waona 
Chikhwawa 5 - 
Nkhabeka Chikhwawa - 10 
Total   69 84 153 15 
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the same time. All the interviews were recorded using a digital recorder and the researcher 
later transcribed the interviews.  
1.10.2.4 Newspaper articles 
Newspapers can either be regarded as secondary or primary data depending on how they have 
been used. Speeches, diaries, interview notes and survey results generally form part of 
primary data due to the fact that they have not been processed or re-interpreted. Newspapers 
may in some cases fall in the same category due to some of the included information which 
might, for instance, include interviews and eye-witness accounts. In other words, newspapers 
form part of primary documentary research and, according to Mogalakwe (2006: 222), 
“primary documents refer to eye-witness accounts produced by people who experienced [or 
saw] the particular event or the behaviour we want to study”. Used correctly, he argues 
further that this method can actually be much better than the survey and in-depth interview 
methods that social scientists tend to rely on. Mogalakwe (2006: 224) provides examples of 
respected social scientists such as Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim whose work relied almost 
exclusively on primary documents. The only cautionary note is that the source must have 
authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning: 
 
Authenticity refers to whether the evidence is genuine and from impeccable sources; 
credibility refers to whether the evidence is typical of its kind, representativeness refers 
to whether the documents consulted are representative of the totality of the relevant 
documents, and meaning refers to whether the evidence is clear and comprehensible 
(Mogalakwe 224-225). 
 
Van Binsbergen (1987:143) points out the importance of newspaper articles as sources of 
primary data by arguing that “newspapers turn out to contain the type of nation-wide, many-
sided, relatively unprocessed data suitable for a first empirical exploration”. He however 
acknowledges that newspapers harbour some inherent stereotypes, especially on issues of 
traditional authorities, but he explains that it is still possible to put aside these stereotypes and 
collect empirical facts. He further points out that “even the journalistic stereotypes 
themselves supply significant information: they are public, widespread and influential 
statements of collective representations” on issues of chiefs, tradition, power, political and 
moral orders (van Binsbergen 1987:143-144). In other words, newspapers represent a 
reflection of the level of entrenched affinities as well as the socio/political culture of that 
particular community. More importantly, newspapers carry the nation‟s mood at that 
particular moment in relation to particular issues.  
 
Some of the known problems of newspapers include excessive biases, deliberate distortion of 
facts and exaggeration of issues. The study took note of these shortfalls and ensured that they 
were controlled. Thus, while cautious of their shortfalls, this study widely used newspapers 
published in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique, including those which are on-line. Taking 
into consideration the unprofessionalism associated with newspapers as already mentioned 
(especially on-line papers), the researcher sought advice from each country‟s experts on the 
level of credibility associated with the targeted newspapers before using them in the study. 
Facts raised in the papers were also cross-checked with other sources (including country 
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experts) to verify their accuracy. Consequently, newspaper articles are therefore regarded in 
this study as part of primary data and where necessary, extensive quotations of the same have 
been made. 
 
1.10.2.5 Afrobarometer survey data sets 
The study also benefited from quantitative primary data captured through Afrobarometer 
surveys. In general, data from surveys is collected through pre-set closed questionnaires. 
Tayie (2005:51) explains that the survey technique “allows the researcher to examine many 
variables (demographic and lifestyle information, attitudes, motives, intentions, etc) and to 
use multivariate statistics to analyse the data”. Afrobarometer survey data is therefore useful 
in various aspects for researchers. According to the official Afrobarometer webpage, they 
introduce it as follows: 
The Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures the 
social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa. Afrobarometer surveys are 
conducted in more than a dozen African countries and are repeated on a regular cycle. 
Because the instrument asks a standard set of questions, countries can be 
systematically compared. Trends in public attitudes are tracked over time. Results are 
shared with decision makers, policy advocates, civic educators, journalists, 
researchers, donors and investors, as well as average Africans who wish to become 
more informed and active citizens” ( [www.afrobarometer.org], accessed on 12th 
January 2012). 
Afrobarometer conducted face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative probability 
sample of 1200 adults in each country. This sample of this size gives an overall margin of 
sampling error of +/-3 percent at a 95 percent confidence level. 
There are several advantages of using these data sets for this study: Firstly, the Afrobarometer 
data sets substantially reduced the cost of this study as it would have meant designing a [mini-
] quantitative approach running parallel to the qualitative one. Secondly, since this study was 
mainly designed as qualitative there are certain elements which may require quantitative 
measures to present evidence effectively. These include national opinions compared to Chewa 
ethnic group opinions. In other words, the Afrobarometer data supplements the gaps that may 
appear in the qualitative data. Thirdly, since Afrobarometer uses standardised data collection 
instruments across several countries, including Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, it enhances 
the comparability of issues related to the Chewa across the three countries covered by this 
study.  
Afrobarometer surveys are broader in nature and do not necessarily focus on issues of 
ethnicity per se. Consequently there are several issues that need elaboration which are not 
addressed from an ethnic perspective. Related to this, the targeted respondents are not selected 
on the basis of ethnic background, but geographical/regional basis. This may side-line the 
„voice‟ of certain ethnic groups (however a rough estimate of the ethnic background of 
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respondents shows that the numbers of participants were proportional to national 
demographics).  Another problem is that some countries have not been involved in all 
Afrobarometer studies from the beginning. For instance Mozambique was involved from the 
Round 3 (2005-2006) survey; hence comparisons over time between Malawi, Mozambique 
and Zambia become limited. Finally, the latest survey, Round 5 (2012), did not include some 
of the key questions on traditional leadership which are relevant to this study. Hence in some 
cases the study was forced to rely on 2008-2009 results and regard these as the latest. The 
issue is that on some issues it is problematic to compare the study qualitative field data which 
was collected in 2012/2013 with the 2008/2009 Afrobarometer data. This anomaly is in some 
cases explained in the study where necessary. However, it was not considered a serious 
problem which would affect the overall quality of the study as the difference of 3 years may 
not be significant. More importantly, this may apply only to a few questions and not 
necessarily to the bulk of the study areas.  
1.10.3 Validity and Reliability 
Joppe (2000 in Golafshani 2003: 598) explains that in pure quantitative research, the issue of 
validity means “the extent to which the research truly measures what it was intended to 
measure” while reliability refers to “the extent to which the results are consistent over time 
and an accurate representation of the total population”. The proposed study acknowledges 
several debates questioning the applicability of the concepts of validity and reliability in 
qualitative research, especially that of reliability. However, it is the view of the current study 
that these concepts are critical. In this case, the study takes the view of Golafshani (2003: 
603) who advocates a method of triangulation (converging findings from multiple sources 
and methodologies) so as to cover validity and reliability in qualitative research. In this 
regard, Golafshani (2003: 603) argues that “triangulation is typically a strategy (test) for 
improving the validity and reliability of research or evaluation of findings”. She further 
argues that “to acquire valid and reliable multiple and diverse realities, multiple methods of 
searching or gathering data are in order…engaging multiple methods, such as, observation, 
interviews and recordings will lead to more valid, reliable and diverse construction of 
realities”. 
1.10.4 Data Analysis 
The study mainly used the narrative discourse analysis approach to analyse the qualitative 
data. Narrative discourse analysis approach was originally prevalent in the disciplines of 
history, psychology, anthropology, and linguistics, but has now moved on to other social 
science fields as well (Bruner 1991). It is mainly a combination of two approaches, the 
narrative and discourse analysis approaches (Genette 1980, Chase 2005). Narrative analysis 
may be described as recording of experiences based on interview/observation which the 
researcher has to rearrange and think through, expound and present them in a revised shape. 
At the centre of narrative analysis is the reformulation of an account which has been put 
forward by the research participants in different contexts and experiences (Genette 1980, 
Chase 2005). Building on the narrative analysis is the discourse analysis approach. Guided by 
the goals of the research, discourse analysis focuses on trying to make sense of the 
transcribed interviews. A researcher mainly refers to the identified research context when 
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interpreting the message as it is assumed that any social phenomenon can be described 
differently depending on the context (Gergen 1994). Combining these two elements is what is 
referred to as the narrative discourse analysis approach. 
In order to understand how the data was analysed, it would be worthwhile to start with an 
explanation of how the questions and interview guides were developed. Initially, a set of 
questions were developed as guided by the objectives and research questions of the study. 
Afterwards, several interview guides were also developed (for individual interviews and 
FGDs) and each guide had a set of questions which were corresponding to a particular 
research objective. In the field, the same interview questions were posed to each relevant 
respondent/interviewee with their answers being initially recorded using a pen and a note 
book as field notes, and where permission was granted, the interviews were recorded using an 
audial recorder.  
 
Building on the description of the narrative discourse approach mentioned above, in practice, 
all responses from the interview were categorised according to the objectives or research 
questions of the study. The researcher read through the text to properly understand and derive 
meaning from the said interview in relation to the specified objective of the study. The 
process of reading the interview text in order to interpret and derive meaning largely followed 
what was propounded by Miller and Crabtree (1999 in Schutt 2012).  Miller and Crabtree 
mentions that the qualitative narrative analysis approach (of reading interview text) mainly 
starts from reading the text literally (focuses on its literal content and form) then it moves on 
to reading the text reflectively (focuses on how researcher‟s own orientation shapes the 
interpretation) and finally reading the text interpretively (focuses on constructing researcher‟s 
own interpretation to create meaning). It is at this final stage that the researcher presents 
his/her findings in a write-up, and where necessary, relevant interviewee quotations are 
included. However it should be mentioned that, as is the case in almost all qualitative 
research, this process of reading through the data and interpreting them continued throughout 
the research process.  
 
For the Afrobarometer qualitative data sets, the researcher used Statistical Package for Social 
Scientists (SPSS) to develop cross-tabulations (relationship between variables) and frequency 
distributions (grouping respondents into subcategories depending on the identified variable). 
In relation to presentation of data in graphs, Microsoft Excel software package was used.  
 
1.11 Delimitation of study period 
Although the pre-colonial and colonial period is extensively covered in this study, the main 
focus is on the period between 1960 and 2013. 1960 onwards captures a period when the 
countries understudy attained their independence and consolidated the core elements of the 
Westphalian model. More importantly, the period from 1993 represents a phase when the 
three countries of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique embraced multiparty systems of 
governance which also contributed to the revival of the Chewa Kingdom (Kayuni 2011). 
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Field research for this study was completed in early 2013; hence the study does not 
incorporate the issues emerging thereafter. 
1.12 Methodological Challenges 
There were several challenges that the researcher encountered while conducting this study 
and some of these challenges include the following: 
In Mozambique it was very difficult to interview officials due to language problems. Most of 
the officials could not understand English or Chichewa/Nyanja; for instance, the District 
Commissioner could only speak Portuguese and Shangaan. When the option of using an 
interpreter was suggested, he was not interested, and instead handed the researcher to 
someone junior for assistance. However, the junior officer noted that there was a recently 
retired senior administrator who could be much more helpful because he could speak English 
and Chichewa. The researcher benefited from this arrangement apart from interviewing the 
junior officer. 
Another challenge is that due to financial constraints, the study was not designed to interview 
individuals based in the capital cities of Mozambique (Maputo) and Zambia (Lusaka). 
Consequently, it was difficult to find experts in the sampled areas of Mozambique and 
Zambia who were able to provide the required information as independent key informants 
with expert opinions. Even those found in the sampled areas referred the researcher to experts 
based in Maputo or Lusaka. However, since the major informants for the study happened to 
be the local grassroots Chewa people, these were readily available in the sampled areas and 
they formed the hallmark of the data for this study.  
1.13 Ethics Statement 
The study adheres to internationally accepted ethical standards for conducting social science 
research which highlight the importance of confidentiality of informants/participants, 
informed consent and giving feedback. Through application to relevant authorities in Malawi, 
Zambia and Mozambique the researcher sought official permission to conduct field research 
in the specified areas (see Appendices 2 to 4). The study also ensured that potential 
interviewees/research participants were not forced to take part in the study. All those who had 
agreed to take part were willing participants after being provided with all the information 
concerning the aims of the study, as well as its significance. Participants/interviewees were 
accorded confidentiality in the presentation of the findings; in this case the findings are not 
attributed to specific individual names unless the interviewer had been given permission to do 
so. More importantly, the participants were allowed to withdraw from the study at any time if 
they wished to do so. All participants were asked to sign a consent form (see Appendices 8 
and 9) as evidence of consent to participate.  
 
1.14 Conclusion 
This chapter has mainly focused on introducing this study by, amongst other things, 
highlighting the background information in relation to the Chewa Kingdom as well as 
defining the key concepts as used in this study. More importantly, the chapter has extensively 
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discussed the reasons for conducting the study (problem statement) and also the main as well 
as specific objectives. From this introductory background information, it has been clarified 
that the study aims at interrogating whether the Chewa Kingdom of Malawi, Mozambique 
and Zambia is challenging, contradicting, compromising, complementing, confirming or 
calling for a reconstruction of the Westphalian Model of state system. The study uses the case 
study approach drawing mainly from qualitative data collection methods. Constructivism and 
Cultural nationalism perspectives form the theoretical framework of the study. The next 
chapter further contextualises the study by discussing the Westphalian model‟s concepts of 
state sovereignty and other related concepts as well as their relevance in Africa. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE  WESTPHALIAN  MODEL  AND  ITS  RELEVANCE  IN  AFRICA 
  
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides the conceptual framework of the study by extensively discussing the 
concept of Westphalian model and how it relates to the African context. The Westphalian 
model is one of the most contested concept in IR with some scholars referring to it as a mere 
myth while others acknowledge it as being significant to the contemporary understanding of 
the state system. Despite some scholars referring to the model as a myth or an outdated 
concept, there are several arguments to demonstrate the significance of the concept in 
contemporary IR. The current commonly accepted liberal values and norms which explain 
the relationship between and amongst states can arguably be attributed to the document 
signed at Westphalia, that is, it led to the contemporary constitutional arrangement of state 
system with its associated concept of sovereignty. More importantly, any critical analysis of 
contemporary state system and sovereignity can not bypass an engagement (either directly or 
indirectly) with the Westphalian model. In other words, the model provides the basis for a 
better understanding of the concepts of state and sovereignty.  
The African state is generally considered to be an appendage of the western state system. 
Some have argued that the process of establishing the African state system (including the 
concept of sovereignty) was flawed because it was imposed by colonialists hence it is 
irrelevant. One of the physical manifestations of the state is international borders and some 
argue that state borders in Africa are artificial hence concepts of sovereignty and state do not 
apply. This study joins other scholars who argue otherwise. Specifically, the chapter 
highlights that political boundaries are not arbitrary but emerge as a rational response to the 
political needs of those in power. In the past they served the interests of colonialists and now 
they serve the interest of local leaders. The chapter starts by highlighting the relevance of the 
model and later it sums up with further discussion of the concepts of state, soveregnty and 
their relevance in Africa. 
  
2.1 Westphalian model and its relevance 
 
Strik (2012: 641) argues that “the Westphalian model is one of the most widespread and 
widely accepted reference points in the study of International Relations” but at the same time 
Werner and de Wilde (2001) argue that the Westphalia model is grossly misunderstood. It 
was meant to achieve the opposite of what is commonly being said. According to these 
scholars, as a starting point, the model actually accepts that the state borders are porous and 
that there is need for interdependence of states. The process of mutually recognising borders 
were based on negotiations and reaching consesus on common norms of statecraft. 
Consequently since the model was born out of negotiations and consensus amongst states, it 
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implies interdependence. Although Werner and de Wilde don‟t use the word 
„intersubjectivity‟,  it is actually a process akin to constructivist perspective of shared ideas 
and norms. 
 
2.1.1 Factors making the model influential 
 
Some of the reasons why the model has become influential over the years include: Firstly, the 
concept is popular in IR due to its simplicity. Although Krasner (1996: 115) is a critic of the 
concept, he acknowledges that the model‟s elements which are based on, inter alia, principles 
of autonomy and territory “offer a simple, arresting, and elegant image”. Secondly, modern 
nation-states had the task of legitimising as well as accepting the responsibility of providing 
security, economic welfare and cultural identity of its citizenry and the model became an 
ideal frame of reference to this end (Axtmann2004:260-61). Consequently, this appealing and 
arguably theoretical frame facilitated a grand scale application of the model (Gross 1948:27). 
Thirdly, the preceding major and influential international treaties, charters and conventions 
such as those emanating from the League of Nations and United Nations have further 
supported its principles (Axtmann2004:262 and Gross 1948)- but as will be discussed later, 
the same international treaties and charters are perceived a challenge to the model. Fourthly, 
its principles captivated some statesmen‟s long term quest for a united world political order. 
In this case, Gross (1948:20) mentions that it is traditionally regarded as “being the first of 
several attempts to establish something resembling world unity on the basis of states”. In this 
case, Hill (1925, in Gross 1948:25) argues that the model enabled Europe to receive what 
could be labelled as an international constitution. Finally, it became associated and gained 
support of leading scholars such as Grotius, a leading international law scholar, and thus 
according to Gross (1948:26), it facilitated the development of international law and other 
related studies.  
 
Subsequently, students of international relations and law had to regard the Westphalian 
model as a significant event with “outstanding lasting value” (Gross 1948:26-27). Sindjoun 
(2001:220) supports this argument by pointing out that historically, it is only through the 
perspective of Westphalian model‟s state that IR as a discipline emerged. Suffice to mention 
that Buzan and Little (1999:89) contend that the Westphalian model has over the years been 
conferred “iconic status” in IR which led to a major transformation in the analysis of the 
international system. It is no wonder, therefore, that Engel and Olsen (2010:7) emphasize that 
in contemporary period the Westphalian perspective among political scientists is still “very 
strong”.  
 
Ironically, the influence of the concept goes hand in hand with its dismissal by the same 
political scientists. In some cases the model has been either applauded or criticized at the 
same time by the same authors. That is why Straumann (2008:174) observes that the 
Westphalian model has been “lauded on one side and blamed for all sorts of flaws on the 
other”. The problem with the Westphalian model, according to Okhonmina (2010: 179), is 
that “it is divisive, disrupts social processes, reifies power, de-emphasizes social relations and 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
distorts social reality”. Some emerging scholars are admitting that the model has limitations 
but they are not willing to dismiss it as irrelevant in describing contemporary state systems 
(e.g. Haque and Burdescu 2004:240, Christensen 2002, Straumann 2008, Valaskakis 2000:2, 
& Kayuni 2011). For example, although Haque and Burdescu (2004: 240) agree that the 
model has over the years persevered, they are quick to note its shortfalls, hence they suggest 
that there is need to move towards a post-Westphalian model because significant changes 
have occurred in the world, which needs to be reflected in the model. Christensen (2002) also 
acknowledges the shortfalls of the model but affirms that it is still influential in defining the 
state system. In this case, Christensen (2003:1) argues that “the Westphalian paradigm …has 
served as the predominant world view and continues, although not without some debate, to 
enjoy such deference”.  
 
2.1.2 Contemporary relevance of the model 
The relevance of the model is reflected in several ways: 
  
Firstly, it has become a convenient term to express the contemporary formal state and its 
associated attributes. For instance, although Krasner is one of the major critics of the notion 
of Westphalia, he uses the term in most of his analyses because he argues that the concept 
“has so much entered into common usage, even if it is historically inaccurate” (Krasner 
1999:20). The observation of Krasner is reflected in many other authors who write about the 
state. They normally use the term to imply formal characteristics of the state and do not 
bother to problematise it. For instance, when Matlosa (2007:445) was describing the 
relevance of African state, he used the term „Westphalian state system‟ to describe the formal 
state. Okhonmina (2010), when describing the Westphalian model, uses the term as 
synonymous with the contemporary formal state system. The model raises problems at 
theoretical or conceptual level but at practical level, its significance and impact is more 
apparent. Arguably sensitive scholars who do not want to court theoretical controversies 
avoid using the concept and resort to the use of „formal state‟ or simply „state‟.  
 
Secondly, the Westphalian model is the foundation of constitutional liberal values and norms. 
Avoiding the debate on whether the model is the origin of international sovereignty, 
Straumann (2008) provides an additional perspective and treats the Peace of Westphalia as a 
constitutional document that has a bearing on international law and international affairs. The 
Peace of Westphalia came about not only to settle religious disagreements but it was meant to 
settle constitutional issues and strategic aims of the European powers. In other words, the 
religious differences and strategic aims of European powers were constitutionally expressed 
through the treaty of Westphalia; thus the Peace of Westphalia emerged as a secular 
constitutional piece with liberal values and norms which are still prevalent today. Further 
explaining the liberal constitutional argument, Sorensen (2004) emphasizes the role of the 
model to challenge other rival authorities to the state. In this regard, although Sorensen 
(2004:11) disagrees that the modern state emerged immediately after the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, he does acknowledge however that: 
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The year 1648 was, of course, a landmark in the creation of this international society; 
states confirmed their independence of religious authorities and their right to sole control 
of their internal affairs. States, so to speak, sent a message to all possible rival centres of 
authority and power- religious as well as secular- that they were in charge and they set the 
rules of the game for everyone else.   
Finally, the model‟s relevance is in its recognition by some scholars that it is the starting 
point, not only in the formation of contemporary state systems but also in analysis of the state 
itself (Sorensen 2004, Engel and Olsen 2010, Krasner 1996, Murphy 1996:87). Sorensen 
(2004:13) argues that the Westphalian model had constantly been transformed and the 
process has taken several hundreds of years. Consequently, in analysing the previous shape of 
the state so as to assess what has changed currently, Sorensen (2004:13) argues that “the 
modern, Westphalian ideal type provides such an image”. This is why Murphy (1996:87) 
states that despite its contested shortfalls, “many political theorists came to look back on the 
Peace of Westphalia as the first formal step towards the establishment of a sovereign state 
system” (emphasis added). That is why Deudney (1996:190-191) argues that the essentials of 
the Westphalian system have been “widely accepted” and also “hegemonic” in modern 
international state politics.  
 
2.2 The State 
2.2.1 Diverse notions of the state and its significance 
 
Dunleavy and O‟Leavy (1987:1-3) define the state 7  from organisational and functional 
perspectives. From organisational perspective, “it is a set of government institutions with 
rules that control and guide behaviour” while from a functional perspective, it is “a set of 
institutions carrying out specific goals, purposes and objectives”. From a Westphalian 
perspective Buzan and Little (1999:90) point out that the state is conceptualised on two 
critical issues: firstly the state has precisely defined territorial boundaries and secondly all the 
powers within this territory are centralised in a form of a self-governing unit. This has been 
the traditional way of understanding the state. According to Clapham (1996:8-12), the 
definition of state or statehood encompasses three attributes which also leads to three ways of 
looking at the concept of state or statehood. The first approach is to associate states with 
governments- which claims control over a particular territory and population. Thus “states in 
this sense are coercive and administrative institutions” which are meant to serve people in 
their specified territory (Clapham 1996:8). Having administrative institutions entails that the 
state has representatives who run affairs on its behalf and the people; through its 
representatives, it has to collect taxes and other income generating activities in order to 
finance this administrative institution. Some states have effectively been able to exert their 
influence over their territory more than others. 
                                                          
7
Despite the common usage of the term nation-state, most scholars agree that these terms are different. Vincent 
(1987:29) argues that a state can exist without nationalism but not vice versa. He goes on to add that the concept 
of state is grounded in several theories but nationalism has no adequate theories but “there may be adequate 
theories about what nationalism does”. 
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The second approach is what is referred to as „idea of state‟. In this case, states are perceived 
as constructs in the minds of those who form them as well as a good number of those who run 
them. The element of construction is important because it facilitates legitimacy. However, 
this perspective of the state has opened up a wide debate or raised questions in a number of 
areas.  For instance “why the state should exist in the form that it does… [and] why the group 
of people who rule it should have any right to act on behalf of those who are merely its 
subjects or citizens” (Clapham 1996:11). Since the „idea of state‟ is not commonly shared 
within and outside state, it may explain the reasons for many conflicts that have emerged over 
the years. 
 
The third and final approach, according to Northedge (in Clapham 1996:11), is whereby the 
state is regarded as “a territorial association of people recognised for purposes of law and 
diplomacy as a legally equal member of the system of states”. This approach focuses on the 
legal recognition from external actors. In other words, despite an internal acceptance amongst 
its population, the state needs external actors, or international community, to recognise its 
existence. 
 
Clapham refers to these three approaches as the formal or mythological attributes of the state. 
They are mythological because “very often do not actually coincide at all. There are few, 
perhaps no, states in which they are all realised in their entirety” (Clapham 1996:12).    This 
mythology of the state may in practice fail to apply due to many reasons: (a) not everyone in 
the state may have the shared view of its identity; (b) territorial legitimacy is in some cases 
contested; (c) government of a state may not have the capacity to control its territory, (d) 
some states which have control over territory and population are not recognised 
internationally. In other words, there is always a gap between the official attribute and what 
actually is happening on the ground. In Clapham‟s analysis, “in most states, and notably all of 
the African states…the gap between the myth and the reality of statehood is considerably 
greater” (Clapham 1996:12). 
 
 
Many proponents of globalisation such as Held et al (1999) argue that the state has lost its 
significance and is being replaced by international non-governmental organisations. Robinson 
(1998:571) argues that the emergence of globalisation has witnessed an “increasing 
recognition of the obsolescence of the nation-state as a practical unit. Some scholars such as 
Czempiel (1989: 132) take an even more radical view by forcefully arguing that we should 
completely ignore the state. In this case, he contends that we have to “give up the notion and 
the concept of the state as well as the terminology”. 
 
Other scholars do not agree about the demise of the state (Hirch 1995, Shaw 1997, Brown 
2006, Kahler and Walter 2006 and Krasner 2001d). Kahler and Walter (2006) contend that 
despite some shortfalls in the state due to globalisation, the state still remains the most 
influential actor through which a modern community‟s identities are constructed. In this 
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regard, Shaw (1997:497) argues that globalisation has not in any way negatively affected the 
state but it leads to “the transformation of state forms”. Krasner (2001d:13) agrees with the 
proponents of globalisation that it has merely generated changes in interconnectedness of 
states but he argues that the globalisation perspective “exaggerates the amount of change” 
(Krasner 2001d: 6). He further points out that states have remained exactly the way they used 
to be, as the most critical actors in the IR. In this case, he adds that states create international 
organisations in order to fulfil the states‟ own interests.  
 
Accordingly, from Krasner‟s perspective, globalisation is actually consolidating or 
reinforcing the state‟s role and not diminishing it. This study partially agrees with the 
argument raised by Krasner that globalisation has not seriously undermined the state 
authority. However, this study points out that the meaning attached to the state is the 
problem; hence its role as well. Being a realist, Krasner takes a hard centralist perspective of 
the state which this study disagrees with. In order to have a better picture of the state and its 
role, this study takes the perspective of the role of the state as emerging from a contested 
interaction between state and society. This conceptualisation of the state is further explained 
by Barkey and Parikh (1991). 
 
Barkey and Parikh (1991:524) argue that earlier research on state was conceptualised in a 
dichotomised manner: state-centred and society-centred approaches. The state-centred 
approach takes the Westphalian perspective of the strong state which is absolutely 
autonomous and acts as it wills. The state-society approach, on the other hand, takes an 
empirically-driven perspective that “articulates a more moderate vision of the state's role by 
embedding it in its societal context” (Barkey and Parikh 1991:525). Barkey and Parikh offer 
a third perspective in state analysis which, according to their observation, does not deny the 
central role for the state but contends that the status of the relationship between the state, on 
one hand, and society on the other, is not straightforward but contested. Barkey and Parikh 
(1991:526) aptly explain this scenario by arguing that “state-society relations are constantly 
interacting with each other; these interactions in turn reshape the nature of state autonomy 
and capacity.” This point is further supported by Sindjoun (2001) who argues that, unlike a 
realist perspective of the state, IR is a dynamic discipline and the meaning of some of its 
concepts such as state (and its role) are bound to change due to the socio-political interactions 
taking place.  
Sorensen (2004) argues that the contemporary sovereign state is presenting two contradictory 
images. On one hand, it appears to be very strong and reasserting itself; on the other hand, its 
authority is being challenged by several forces such as global market forces, regional 
institutions, international organisations, popular movements and other related forces. It is this 
contradiction which is opening up new scholarly debate on the future of the state. Sorensen 
(2004:6) further points out that much of the debate on whether the state is losing or gaining 
power/influence is based on the fallacy of generalisation due to its sole focus on the zero sum 
of “winning or losing” perspective. In this case, Sorensen (2004:6) argues that the state power 
or influence “can only be assessed in relation to specific issues or arenas”. Consequently, 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Sorensen contends that it is possible for the state to encounter forces that weaken and 
strengthen it at the same time; hence the focus should be on transformation of the state rather 
than focusing on the zero sums. He further argues that when the transformation perspective is 
considered, it is practically possible to trace and analyse the changes that states go through 
internally as well as in relation to other relevant actors.  
 
2.2.2 Relevance of State in the African context 
The application of the concept of state in Africa has raised a number of debates.  Authors 
such as Dunn and Shaw (2001), Dunn (2001), Neuman (1998), Grovogui (2002), Swatuk 
(2001), Ofuho (2000), Ayoob (1998), Malaquias (2001), Davidson (1992), Walker (2007) 
and Grovogui (2011) have all argued (though not in an identical manner) that the western 
concept of state does not apply in the African context. Walker (2007:582) also points out that 
the post-colonial state has not successfully worked in Africa because “both the popular 
imagination and scholarly inspection” show major shortfalls. Englebert (1997) claims that the 
African state is neither African nor a state. He argues that it is not African because it was 
imposed by European powers using their own yardstick of state. He also claims that it is not a 
state because it does not fulfil the role of the normal state. 
 
Events surrounding the post-World War Two heavily influenced the international political 
structure as well as the status of formerly colonized states such as those in Africa. The criteria 
which were developed in order to recognize membership into the United Nations are a case in 
point. Through United Nations General Assembly resolution 1514 and 1541 of 1960, they 
encouraged the process of decolonization by applying the principle of „right to self-
determination‟. Specifically, the right to self-determination was explained as “a territory 
which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and or culturally from the country 
administering it” (United Nations, in Clapham 1996:12).  African states were therefore 
recognized and received into the community of nations using these principles. Jackson (1993) 
argues that this move entailed that African states were recognized whilst they were internally 
weak and unable to fulfil some of their minimum requirements for a state such as the capacity 
to meet the needs of its people. In this case, Jackson (1993) introduced the concept of "quasi-
states" or states that cannot function without receiving assistance from outside yet they are 
legally recognized by the international community. The far reaching implication is that “the 
rulers and would-be rulers of weak and fragile states had a set of objectives…first, and most 
important, they had to establish themselves as the internationally recognized representatives 
of internationally recognized states” (Clapham 1996:22-23).  Furthermore, the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) which was established in 1963 went ahead to also recognize the 
borders which were drawn by their colonial masters. 
 
According to Clapham (1996) the state in third world countries, such as Africa, is normally 
taken for granted in international relations and erroneously analysed in a conventional 
manner like any other normal state. The African state rulers are concerned about their 
survival and they control the state in a manner that would facilitate achievement of their 
personal goals. One of the ways in which they do this is creation of what is referred to as the 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
“shadow state”. The shadow state could be described as a state “in which the rulers used 
formal statehood merely as a façade, behind which to conduct what became essentially 
personal survival strategies” (Clapham 1996:5). 
 
Several authors have argued for the viability of the African state (Herbst 1989, Brown 2006). 
Herbst (1989) contends that to argue that the borders of African states are artificial is not 
right because all political borders are merely constructs and not natural. The question to be 
asked is for whose purposes they were created. If this criterion is used, we may conclude that 
the existing African political boundaries are not arbitrary because they are a product of a 
rational response to the political needs of the colonialists at that time. Just as the borders 
served their interests to the colonialists, the same borders have been serving the interest of 
post-colonial leaders - hence they have been maintained (Herbst 1989:692). Brown (2006) 
has produced a considerably comprehensive analysis in support of the African state as an 
entity. In relation to artificiality of the African state, Brown (2006:123) argues that the 
African state is neither an imposition nor artificial. He points out that the process of 
decolonisation which led to independence involved Africans as actors and not merely 
spectators (Brown (2006:128). This observation supports Bughart‟s (1984:102) similar 
observation in Nepal where although the concept of nation-state was introduced by Western 
Powers, “the formation of this concept also occurred in an intracultural context that cannot be 
separated analytically from Nepal‟s intercultural field of relations.” Isaacman and Peterson 
(2003) also discuss the creation of the Chikunda ethnic group in Mozambique after African 
contact with the Portuguese. Although the Portuguese initiated the process of creating the 
Chikunda, it was not imposed but evolved through an inter- and intra-cultural process. 
Another counter argument is that calling for development of theories and concepts that are 
specific for Africa is, according to Brown, erroneous. He protests that that there is nothing 
special about Africa in the modern world that renders its concept of the state irrelevant even 
though it is western in origin (Brown 2006:128). He points out that creating theories of the 
state which are only relevant to Africa would risk further marginalisation of the African 
continent from mainstream IR scholarship. More importantly, Brown argues that the critics of 
African state use the neo-realism theory in order to explain Africa- a theory which is fraught 
with numerous shortfalls. He however argues that there is “potential relevance of other 
approaches within IR once one moves beyond the constraints of neo-realism” (Brown 1996: 
120). 
 
Whilst not completely dismissing the contributions of aforementioned critics on the 
applicability of the state in Africa, this study agrees with the assertion by Brown (2006). 
Brown is calling for a different conceptualisation of the state so that it may capture African 
elements that may not be identified through the neo-realism perspective. In this case, he is 
advocating a move from the elemental to a relational state perspective. However, the 
mainstream theories are still relevant because “theoretical approaches from within IR remain 
useful starting points for analysis of Africa‟s international relations” (Brown 1996:129). 
Taking such a perspective may lead to an agreement with Nkiwane‟s (2001: 287) observation 
that “the state may derive its power from a variety of sources, and in the context of Africa 
what may appear to be a loss of central state power may in fact be its reconfiguration”. This 
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is another hypothesis which this study is investigating: that the state is still relevant in Africa. 
Brown (2006: 124-125) aptly mentions that “I see no reason to doubt its continuing relevance 
in either the African or global context”. 
 
2.3 Sovereignty 
2.3.1 Diverse perspectives of sovereignty 
The Westphalian perspective of sovereignty has drawn a number of critics. Among other 
issues, it has been argued that it “constitutes a myth”8  (Beaulac 2004:181), “limps into 
obsolescence” (Valaskakis 2001:65), has been “progressively losing its monopoly” (Sindjoun 
2001:223), and “is largely imaginary” (Osiander 2001:251). The most well-known definition 
of sovereignty is provided by Hinsley (1986:26), who described sovereignty as “the idea that 
there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community… and no final and 
absolute authority exists elsewhere”. Potter (2004) argues that sovereignty can be looked at as 
a right as stipulated in the Westphalian model (non-interference in internal matters of a state) 
and as a responsibility (providing a minimum acceptable standard of living for its people) as 
highlighted in international conventions. In other words, as a right or responsibility, 
sovereignty explains the relationship between the state and its people as well as its 
relationship with other states. 
 
Stirk (2005:167) points out that “Sovereignty is the key „Westphalian‟ concept”. Whether 
sovereignty is still relevant or not is not very important but what is important is to draw 
distinctions of sovereignty which goes beyond the traditional perspective of internal and 
external sovereignty. The distinction should however be between the formal status and summa 
potestas or factual power. According to Ivan (2012:92), sovereignty can be “understood in its 
simplest form as the capacity of the state to exercise authority over a given territory and 
population”.  This view is also reinforced by Hurd (2008:1) who points out that “a state can 
be sovereign only when it is seen by people and other states as a corporate actor with rights 
and obligations over territory and citizens (and they act accordingly)”.  Werner and de Wilde 
(2001:284) refer to sovereignty as “state‟s autonomy and ability to rule”. Sovereignty has 
over the years been interpreted differently to imply the constitution/law of the land, the 
people/citizenry or office of rulership and not necessarily the person in office. Sovereignty is 
generally regarded as a critical element of the Westphalian model (Croxton 1999). In this case 
Beaulac (2004:181) rightly suggests that Westphalia put to the fore the notion of „state 
sovereignty‟ and became a “cornerstone” in the actual treaty of Westphalia. Consequently, 
from a Westphalian perspective, Axtmann (2004:260) points out that state sovereignty meant 
that legally and politically the state had absolute authority “not accountable to anyone but 
itself”. In relation to trans-border control, Krasner (2001d:28) states that sovereignty implies 
the capacity to control or ability to regulate trans-border movements as well as those within 
                                                          
8
Beaulac (2004:181) explains that “The truth of the matter is that mythology constitutes one of the ways that 
society may explain itself to itself. Society can use aetiological myths (that is, origin myths) to explain its 
genesis to itself, thus building a belief-system about the whens, wheres and hows of its becoming and its being”. 
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the boundary of the state. Part of this perspective of sovereignty which implies the capacity to 
control or ability to regulate trans-border movements have been adopted by this study. 
 
Werner and de Wilde (2001) point out the contradiction that exists in international relations 
and legal practice. Werner and de Wilde claim that an exceedingly great number of scholars 
argue that sovereignty is obsolete and factually inaccurate yet the concept dominates the 
international relations dicipline. According to Werner and de Wilde, this contradiction 
emanates from the scholars‟ „descriptive fallacy‟.  In relation to the concept of sovereignty, 
„descriptive fallacy‟ denotes the “erroneous assumption that there must be something in 
reality corresponding to the meaning of the term sovereignty” (Werner and de Wilde 
2001:285). When scholars observe that there are numerous activities which challenge the 
actual power being exercised within a state, they conclude that either sovereignty is declining 
or it does not exist at all. Werner and de Wilde (2001) aptly argue that the corresponding 
word for sovereignty doesnt exist in common usage hence for us to understand it better, we 
should not  look for what corresponds to it but rather we should reconstruct it. In other words, 
the question should not be which situation of state affairs corresponds to sovereignty but inter 
alia the question should be: “In what context is a claim of sovereignty likely to occur?” In 
this regard, for us to know more about sovereignty, we should look for “conditions in which 
an authority is legitimate and of the place, men and institutions in which it resides” (Werner 
and de Wilde 2001:285). 
 
According to Ivan (2012), two important markers of the sovereign state are territory and 
political community. A political community is equivalent to the notion of a nation hence 
defined as a group of people who share a common culture, language and history while 
territory is geographical make up of a state which is defined by physical markings. Territory 
and political community are significantly connected to each other but “territory is the 
foundational basis of sovereignty” (Ivan 2012:76). Frontiers have for many years been the 
most visible limits of state sovereignty and have been used by the state to control those 
crossing so that the state should ably establish “cohesiveness of the political community” and 
in the process the state has been re‐instituting sovereignty. In other words, whatever the state 
does in relation to territory has been done in order to consolidate its political community.  
Due to globalization and other factors, the state has lost control of controlling its borders and 
where possible it is erecting more „formidable‟ external borders or “symbolic, internal ones, 
aimed at clearly delimiting the domestic from the international space, and the political 
community (ʹusʹ) from the strangers (ʹthemʹ)” (Ivan 2012:76). In other words, the internal 
symbolic borders are reinforced by appealing to what makes them  a nation, such as issues of 
a common culture, history and language (reinforcing the „us‟ from strangers „them‟). In order 
to enhance control of its political community, the state has initiated a range of symbolic 
narratives. In this narrative, “the state presents itself as the sole authority capable of 
safeguarding this separation between a safe domestic space and a dangerous foreign 
environment, and it can only do this by maintaining very precise separation lines between 
inside and outside” (Ivan 2012:77-8). Ivan (2012:84) argues that the state controls 
immigration precisely to ensure that it re‐affirms its sovereignty. According to Ivan (2012:81), 
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the state has also ensured that there is “a centralized political apparatus and an educational 
system that promotes the official culture that is subsequently embraced by all the members of 
the nation”. The assumption is that for people to unite politically, they must have a common 
cultural basis. 
 
 
Werner and de Wilde (2001) argue that when a state‟s ability to rule internally is not being 
questioned and its relationship with external forces is harmonious, sovereignty is not 
important. However, when the opposite is true, that is when sovereignity becomes an issue. 
Werner and de Wilde provide an example of Denmark in 2000 when it was debating on 
whether to join the Euro or not. During the referendum debate, Sovereignty was a concept 
which was repeatedly mentioned (those who were against the Euro) but after the referendum 
it lost its importance. In other words, the perception was that state sovereignty was under 
threat as the political community was going to be undermined through external forces. Illegal 
immigration issues also bring to the fore the debate on the issue of soveverignity. 
 
Probably a more detailed analysis of sovereignty is provided by Krasner in several of his 
works (1996, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, and 2005), hence his works need 
comprehensive discussion. He argues there are three aspects
9
 or elements of sovereignty: 
international legal sovereignty (international recognition and territorial independence): 
Westphalian-cum-Vattelian sovereignty (states should avoid intervening in each other‟s 
internal affairs), and domestic sovereignty (focus on authority structures within a given state 
and to their actual capacity) (Krasner 2005:70-71).  According to Krasner (2005) a state may 
have more of one type of sovereignty and less of another. 
 
Krasner‟s (1996) major argument is that it is wrong to say that sovereignty is currently 
declining due to globalisation because it has always been compromised or violated 
throughout history. This compromise and violation does not mean that it is declining either. 
According to him, the violation and persistence of sovereignty has always been a permanent 
feature of the international system. He also argues that the Westphalian model was not the 
source of sovereignty but it should just be treated “as a reference point or convention that is 
useful in some circumstances” (Krasner 1996: 150). In other words, by mentioning that it “is 
useful in some circumstances”, he is not completely dismissing sovereignty and the model 
itself. It is the value attached to the model and the argument that sovereignty is declining that 
he is against. Although most of the elements of Krasner‟s arguments seem plausible, this 
study does not fully agree with his view. However,  it does agree with the idea raised by 
Smith (2001) who provides a critique to Krasner‟s arguments. From a constructivist premise, 
Smith‟s (2001) arguments point to the fact that sovereignty is not static - it can and has been 
changing over time and we can only determine its composition through empirical research 
within a specific context. This is the hallmark of this study on the element of sovereignty.  
                                                          
9
In his earlier work (Krasner 2001a:6) he identifies four usages of sovereignty which are interdependence 
sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty 
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Some scholars have argued for the relevance of analysing sovereignty from a constructivist 
perspective (Sindjoun2001, Lake 2003, Biersteker and Weber 1996). Sindjoun (2001:223), 
for instance, aptly captures the essence of sovereignty from a constructivist approach by 
arguing that: 
 
When one takes into account sovereignty as it is (empirical sovereignty) and not 
sovereignty as prescribed by the Treaty of Westphalia (normative sovereignty), current 
changes are perceived as normal: sovereignty is not an essence; neither a definitive 
substance… Globalization reminds us that sovereignty is relative and dynamic. 
Meanwhile, it is excessive to proclaim the end of sovereignty; sovereignty still makes 
sense in international relations through new meanings and specific uses (emphasis 
added). 
 
From a constructivist perspective sovereignty is socially constructed and dynamic - and this 
“potentially opens up new avenues for understanding international politics” (Lake 2003:308). 
Biersteker and Weber (1996) arguably present a more persuasive and detailed analysis of 
sovereignty from a constructivist‟s approach. According to Biersteker and Weber (1996), 
sovereignty is a socially constructed concept and it is tied to a specific historical concept. In 
this case, it is an outcome of the actions of the powerful and the resistance to the actions of 
the powerful by those who perceive themselves to be on the margins of power.  
Castells explains that even authoritarian regimes still need a certain level of legitimacy for 
their own survival. In other words, there is a constant mediation between the state and society 
and it is this mediation that determines the balance or political stability. Furthermore, striking 
the balance doesn‟t always mean relying on the formal process of governance but the 
informal mutual understanding between state institutions and society (Castells 2004:361).  
2.3.2 Relevance of sovereignty in Africa 
According to Clapham (1999), Third-world countries, which include Africa, had the 
Westphalian form of sovereignty imposed on them, but after their independence, especially 
after the Second World War, they became the strongest supporter of the Westphalian 
sovereignty in the international state system. The need for a study of sovereignty in Africa 
critiquing the Westphalian perspective is emphasized by Weber and Biersteker (1996:285) 
who aptly argue that: 
 
As a focus of on-going social constructivist research, we must continue to weave into our 
understandings of international relations forgotten histories of colonial territories and 
post-colonial states… Such construction provides us with an approach that enables us to 
investigate how and why Westphalian state sovereignty is privileged in international 
relations theory and practice. 
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Apart from the applicability of the notion of African state, several debates have raged 
concerning whether the African state possesses sovereignty or not; below is a discussion 
concerning this debate based on selected trans-border studies
10
:  
 
Some of the authors who have conducted trans-border as well as multiple country studies and 
argued that African states lack a bona fide sovereignty include Englebert (2009) and Kehinde 
(2010). Although Englebert‟s work does not specifically focus on trans-border per se, his 
findings do provide insights especially on the debate of „artificiality‟ of African borders. 
Englebert builds on several other previous scholars such as Herbst (1996 and 2001) and he is 
very critical of African sovereignty. He argues that most African countries still exist because 
of the international recognition bestowed on them by the international community. 
Specifically he argues that the legal sovereignty rendered to African states by the 
international community has allowed the oppressive ruling elites to translate that into internal 
legitimacy. In this case, his suggestion is that the international legal sovereignty bestowed 
upon African states should be withdrawn; the colonial boundaries should also be discarded 
and re-drawn. In other words, African states should have their “sovereignty revoked” 
(Englebert 2009:252). The shortfall with Englebert‟s work is that he is providing a one-
source-directional-analysis of the problems of Africa by excessively lumping blame on the 
colonisation process and its aftermath (i.e. state sovereignty). Various works have clearly 
demonstrated that Africa‟s social political challenges emerge from diverse sources. 
Consequently, this study rejects Englebert‟s perspective. 
 
Kehinde (2010) focused his study on the geo-cultural space of the Yoruba ethnic identity 
along the Benin-Nigeria international border. Specifically, he was examining the impact of 
state boundary partitioning on the Yoruba ethnic identity and group relations. Benin is a 
former French colony while Nigeria is a former British colony. The colonial powers used 
different approaches in order to govern these territories. Using a multidisciplinary approach 
based on a historicised case-study of the Yoruba border communities, Kehinde finds that 
contrary to the findings of wider literature, the colonial boundaries (and later consolidated 
through the post-colonial state) have not affected the Yoruba ethnic identity and its related 
socialization processes. He argues that the governments of Nigeria and Benin actively pursued 
different national policies and the border was one of the instruments used to re-assert their 
control over the territory. Despite the efforts, these states had failed to effectively assert their 
control over the areas. Specifically, Kehinde (2010:271) argues that “state weakness, 
characterized by defective structures, bad governance, corruption and poor geography, is 
essentially responsible for the failure of these states to assert their authorities over territory”. 
This state failure according to Kehinde was fully taken advantage by the Yoruba to have 
unrestrained cross-border movements which ultimately sustained and enhanced the cross-
border Yoruba identity and solidarity. The major weakness of Kehinde‟s work is that although 
he used the structuralism and functionalism perspectives as frames of analysis, his conclusion 
is mainly drawn from structuralism and in the process, he almost completely ignores the value 
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The study has deliberately avoided the failed state debate. John (2010:10) argues that the measurements of 
state failure are misleading because they do not appropriately take into consideration “wide variations of 
capacity across state functions within a polity”. 
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of functionalism. In other words his interpretation of state weakness could also be seen in 
another perspective: it could reflect on the state‟s flexibility and responsiveness to the needs 
of its citizens- the sovereign- and not necessarily a demonstration of its weakness. 
 
Several trans-border and multiple country studies have also demonstrated that the African 
state has actually not lost its sovereignty. In this regard, some of the studies include those 
conducted by Boone (2003), KCK (2005) and Maclean (2010). Boone‟s (2003) work is 
essential for understanding variations in African state formation and sustenance especially at 
local rural level. Her work is based on a comprehensive empirical research conducted in West 
African states of Cote d‟Ivoire, Senegal and Ghana.  She ably demonstrates that contrary to 
the view that the state is weak and not influential (especially in the rural areas), state power is 
actually far more entrenched in rural societies. In other words, her work focuses on power 
and political capacity in rural sub-Saharan Africa or the variations in distribution of power 
between centre and rural local areas.  
 
In 2005, Kituo Cha Katiba (KCK) conducted research in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya in 
order to document citizens‟ experiences when confronted with challenges related to threats 
and constraints in addressing citizenship and identity. Whilst acknowledging several 
challenges towards meaningful achievement of a common political citizenship, the KCK 
report mentions that informally the cross-border communities have already started the 
process. Specifically, the report states that: 
 
The ordinary people are ahead of the politicians and are already federated without the 
formal legal process. This is demonstrated through their ability to visit relatives across the 
borders, without a hassle, organized around the principle of Good Neighbourliness or 
UjiraniMwema… All border communities are basically integrated and speak one 
language and have been described as true “East Africans.”… In fact for the Nyamwanga, 
one chief rules in both countries and is expected to have a wife in both countries (KCK 
2005:33-34). 
 
Based on their findings, KCK does not argue that the informal trans-border movement is a 
challenge to the formal state, but that it actually strengthens the state by making it more 
relevant. 
 
 
The third perspective is drawn from Maclean (2010).  In this case Maclean (2010) explores 
the Akan tribe which stretches across the contemporary Ghana-Cote d‟Ivoire border. In pre-
colonial period, the Akan were under one kingdom but were split due to the colonial 
demarcation of the community. The Akan in Ghana were under the British administration 
while the Akan of Cote d‟Ivoire were under the French administration. According to Maclean, 
the Akan villages on both sides of the border claim that they are one family because they had 
one common pre-colonial culture, history and politics. However, contrary to these claims, 
Maclean noted significant differences between the Akan in Ghana and Cote d‟Ivoire in 
relation to informal institutions of social reciprocity and local understanding of citizenship. 
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Specifically in relation to reciprocity, she claims that in Ghana, reciprocity was much lower 
amongst the Akan as compared to the Akan of Cote d‟Ivoire. In relation to citizenship, the 
Ghanaian pattern of citizenship led to a community-oriented notion while the Ivoirian 
villagers tended to pursue an “individualized, entitlement-based sense of citizenship”. Based 
on her findings, Maclean (2010:32) audaciously claims that:  
 
I reject the notion that the African state is uniformly weak or failed, and that informal 
institutions are the only rules that matter on the ground. I also reject the idea that the 
colonial state barely touched African societies or is no longer relevant to African cultures 
today. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has extensively discussed the concept of Westphalia, and how it fits in the 
contemporary state analysis. The chapter also discussed the Wesphalian concepts of state and 
sovereignty, as well as how they may be applicable in the African context. From the literature 
reviewed, it emerges that although the Westphalian model has been discredited over the years, 
it is still valuable for the study of state systems in Africa and elsewhere.  Although Africa 
presents some unique qualities in relation to state systems, the study does not agree that there 
is a significant African exceptionalism. Consequently, concepts of state, sovereignty and 
citizenship are being examined with the Westphalian model as the starting point, and the 
study suggests the state-society perspective in the context of constructivism theory. The next 
chapter extends the analysis of state, sovereignty and citizenship by discussing emerging 
studies on politics of representation in the context of traditional authorities, ethnic identity and 
cultural nationalism in the African context.  
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CHAPTER 3 
POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION, ETHNIC IDENTITY AND CULTURAL 
NATIONALISM 
 
3.0 Introduction 
Although the previous chapter engaged with the concept of state and sovereignty in general, 
in an African context, issues of ethnic identity and traditional authority are significant in 
providing an explanation of certain political dynamics at play. That is why this chapter 
focuses on the relevance of traditional authorities in the context of ethnic identity and the 
notion of cultural nationalism in an African state. One of the current debates on traditional 
authority has the undercurrent question of who has authority and legitimacy between the state 
and traditional institutions. The tussles for control of grassroots communities, who are the 
subjects, are the hallmark of politics of representation in this debate. When the second wind 
of change blew across Africa in the 1990s, the general expectation was that formal 
institutions of governance would be strengthened but no one expected the revival of informal 
traditional authorities. These traditional institutions have now become more assertive and 
they are increasing their stake in the running of formal state institutions. Unlike formal state 
institutions, traditional institutions operate within the ambit of ethnic and cultural national 
groupings. This has implications on the quest for unity and absolute authority that the state 
yearns for. More importantly, the politicization of the ethnic-cultural groupings further 
complicates the scenario for the state as it may lead to sectarian violence and quest for 
autonomy- a direct challenge to state sovereignty. It is within this context of the uniqueness 
of the role of traditional authorities in an African state that this chapter examines the issue of 
politics of representation. Is the role of traditional authorities compatible with contemporary 
democratic ethos of the African state? To what extent can the formal state embrace and co-
exist with traditional authorities? This chapter agrees with the view that traditional authorities 
are compatible with contemporary democratic state systems. Firstly, however, this chapter 
provides the contextual background of traditional authorities in Africa followed by politics of 
representation and winds up with a discussion on the notions of ethnicity and cultural 
nationalism. 
3.1 Contextual underpinning: Revival of traditional authorities in Africa 
Writing on the revival of traditional authorities and ethnic identities in South Africa, Oomen 
(2005) states that it seems to be a contradiction when considered that during the apartheid era 
the state consistently used the so-called traditional system to control the black population. 
Most of the resistance leaders during the apartheid era, who are currently supporting the 
traditional system, resented the traditional systems because they were perceived as a tool 
towards suppression of the black population and sowing the seeds of division. Oomen 
(2005:3) explains that this revival of traditional system should be understood from 
developments occurring in the global system which are “the fragmentation of the nation-state, 
the embracing of culture, the applauding of group rights”. She further explains that in the 
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contemporary world the use of „culture card‟ (or cultural movement) as a way of bringing 
attention to traditional systems of governance, has become popular.  
In agreement with Eriksen (2002), Oomen points out that there is a link between globalisation 
and the rise in traditional authorities as well as ethnic identity. In other words, the rise in 
traditional authorities is synonymous with the rise in the use of the „culture card‟ and ethnic 
identity. Eriksen (2002) and Oomen (2005) further point out that there are several reasons 
why the culture card with its associated ethnic identity and traditional authorities has become 
popular. The culture card has become popular because of its convenience as a political tool. 
For instance, it is now popular for indigenous groups who feel suppressed such as the Maori 
and Aborigines in New Zealand and Australia respectively to use the „culture card‟ when 
demanding group rights. For instance, after the Second World War, indigenous groups such 
as Eskimos, Lapps, American Indians and Aborigines have been politically organising 
themselves and asking for state recognition and protection of their ethnic identities, 
traditional institutions and interests. This call for recognition and protection has recently 
intensified in their respective countries.  
As already explained, another reason is the inability of states to address all the needs of its 
citizenry. Consequently, ethnic identities reflected in traditional authority become a 
seemingly realistic way of expressing and addressing their needs. This view is aptly argued 
by Eriksen, who states that: 
It has been said that the nation-state is too small to accomplish certain tasks and too big 
to accomplish others - too big to give people a sense of community, too small to solve 
the problems facing humanity- and this entails the continued relevance of the analytical 
concern with identification and group cohesion, but also suggest the necessity for new 
frameworks (Eriksen 2002:166). 
Another reason, according to Oomen, for popularity of traditional authorities is their ability to 
address the human inward quest for authenticity. As society is transforming, there is often 
that inward quest to search for one‟s identity as individuals feel lost in the changes around 
them. Precisely, in this globalised world, tradition and ethnic identity has emerged as “one of 
the prime ways in which to engage with a fast-changing world” or “a means by which to 
assert „authenticity‟” (Oomen 2005:8-9). Some of the problems that tradition and ethnicity 
address are not confined to economic needs but social-psychology such as “questions of 
origins, destiny and ultimately, the meaning of life” (Eriksen 2002:44). Ethnicity and 
tradition become much stronger when it is threatened by societal and cultural changes. Thus 
the expression of ethnicity provides a psychological assurance that despite the rapid social 
and cultural changes, one is still in keeping with one‟s ancestors and continuity with the past.  
There is even a strengthening of the relationship between culture and other wider political 
and economic processes; for instance, it is common to see traditional dances being performed 
for tourists as well as the development of indigenous internet sites or indigenous food stores 
(Oomen 2005:9).   
 
 
 
 
53 
 
The debate on traditional authorities
11
 in Africa has mainly focused on whether they are 
compatible with a democratic system or not. Implicitly, the debate is whether state 
sovereignty is undermined or not when traditional authorities are allowed to operate. This is 
the case because according to the Westphalian model, the state is the only entity that 
individuals are supposed to pay allegiance to, but traditional authorities are seemingly 
„parallel structures‟ to which arguably most Africans pay allegiance. In other words, 
traditional authorities also put into question the relevance of state citizenship. Several authors 
have argued for (Logan 2008, 2009 and 2011, Williams 2011) or against (Ntsebeza 2006, 
Mamdani 1996, and Englebert 2002) the role of traditional authorities in African state 
governance. This section focuses on some of the selected reading and most relevant scholars 
who have comprehensively discussed the issue.   
3.1.1 Categorising debates on the role of traditional authorities 
According to Logan (2008: ii), the debate on the role of traditional authorities in Africa can 
roughly be categorised into two: the „traditionalists‟ and „modernists‟. According to this 
categorisation, traditionalists “regard Africa‟s traditional chiefs and elders as the true 
representatives of their people, accessible, respected, and legitimate, and therefore still 
essential to politics on the continent”. On the other hand, the modernists regard traditional 
authority as “chauvinistic, authoritarian and an increasingly irrelevant form of rule that is 
antithetical to democracy”. A little bit different from Logan‟s (2008) categorisation, Ntsebeza 
(2006) brings in the citizenship perspective and identifies three schools of thought that 
prescribe on the future of traditional authorities: (a) those who argue for a common 
citizenship perspective, (b) those who argue that it should be mixed or co-exist with the 
formal governance system and, (c) those who argue for integration of the traditional system 
and call for adoption of certain values and practices in the formal governance system.  
Those who argue for a common citizenship contend that the existence of traditional 
authorities is another extension of the colonial tactic of divide and rule. It seems that 
communities in the rural areas who are subjected to traditional authorities do not exercise 
their citizenship and are therefore subjects whilst those in the urban areas enjoy citizenship 
rights. Their idea is to completely dismantle the traditional authority system because it is not 
compatible with contemporary democratic principles. The mixed or co-existence model 
argues that the traditional system doesn‟t normally compete with the state; hence their role 
should be advisory and ceremonial. In some cases their role is in maintenance of social order 
and community mobilisation. The conditions for fulfilment of this model are that the roles of 
the political and traditional authorities should be clarified and that the traditional authorities 
should accept that their role is subservient to political roles. Finally, the integration model 
builds on the mixed model but goes on to argue that the traditional system has certain 
elements which are compatible with the liberal democracy; hence these elements need to be 
integrated. Consequently, “there is also a strong assumption in this model that the institution 
of traditional leadership can be transformed and democratised” (Ntsebeza 2006:32). 
                                                          
11
Unless otherwise stated, the study interchangeably uses the concepts of traditional authorities, 
chiefs(chieftaincies) and traditional leaders. 
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Logan (2008) identifies another growing school of thought which she labels the pragmatic-
traditionalists. Some of the scholars in this school of thought are West and Kloeck-Jenson 
(1999), de Sousa Santos (2006), Lund (2006) and Eggen (2011). This school of thought takes 
a middle ground in the modernity/ traditionalist debate. Firstly, it acknowledges that 
traditional authorities are not currently weakening: the institution will still exist even if  
democracy gains strength. Secondly, the pragmatic-traditionalists also recognise the core 
weaknesses of the institution but argue that there are so many elements which can be 
strengthened for the benefit of communities. In this case, the pragmatic-traditionalists focus 
on “ways in which the institutions of traditional authority can be effectively blended with the 
needs of the state and the principles of democracy” (Logan 2008:7). The sections below 
discuss in detail the specific tension that exists amongst these schools of thought by focusing 
on political legitimacy which forms the centre piece in politics of representation. 
 
3.2 Politics of representation: The tension between state and traditional 
authorities 
Emanating from the discussion on the categorisation of debates on traditional authorities in 
Africa, this section specifically discusses the prevailing debate on whether traditional 
authorities should have legitimacy or not. 
3.2.1 Opposing  traditional  authority’s  legitimacy:  the  ‘subjects’  vs  ‘citizens’   
perspective 
Taking a position of rejecting the role of traditional authorities in Africa and building on the 
work of Mamdani (2006), Ntsebeza (2006) explores the contemporary governance authority 
of traditional authorities in rural Eastern Cape Province of South Africa by focusing on their 
role in land administration. Ntsebeza‟s work builds on Mamdani‟s (2006) work which argues 
that traditional authorities who operate in the rural areas have suppressed the rights of the 
rural people hence they are „subjects‟ (non-participatory communities dictated by traditional 
authorities). On the other hand, in urban areas where traditional authorities do not operate, the 
inhabitants are „citizens‟ who freely enjoy their social and political rights. 
Specifically, Ntsebeza (2006) attempts to examine the question: why have traditional 
authorities retained their apartheid-era rural governance authority despite South Africa 
adopting the liberal democratic form of governance? He argues that traditional authorities 
survived the colonial and apartheid era because these autocratic systems relied on traditional 
authorities in order to effectively control the rural African majority. Using the political-
economic argument of globalisation, he continues to argue that the contemporary African 
state is weak at local level (due to the neo-liberal capitalist approach) but strong at the 
national level (as it possesses instruments of coercion). This weakness is defined as the 
inability of the state to deliver services and development at local level. It is in this context 
that traditional authorities have found an opportunity to reassert themselves and reclaim the 
past authority by continuing to work as an extension of the state for rural development at the 
expense of elected local councillors. The problem in this case is that traditional authorities, 
who are not elected by the people (hence technically not directly accountable to them), are 
given more sensitive responsibilities such as land allocation. According to Ntsebeza (2006), 
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core issues of human rights, justice and democracy cannot be attained in such a scenario, 
besides the fact that those in the urban areas, who do not have chiefs, are not subjected to the 
same treatment. In other words, those in rural areas are being treated not as full citizens but 
subjects (under their undemocratically bestowed local chiefs) while those in urban areas 
enjoy citizenship rights through accountable leadership. Consequently, he argues that this is a 
case of “democracy compromised”. However, it may be argued that many people in cities 
have ties to local communities and therefore are both citizen and subject, depending on where 
they are at a given time- It is not always one or the other. Ntsebeza suggests that if the 
traditional authorities have to be retained then they should “abandon their hereditary status 
and subject themselves to election by their people, bringing along with them the participatory 
element embedded in traditional democracy” (Ntsebeza 2006: 33). 
As already alluded to, Ntsebeza subscribes to the common citizenship model and heavily 
criticises the other integration and mixed model. He argues that since the institution of 
traditional authority does not conform to liberal democratic principles, there is no way it 
would be compatible to the liberal democratic principles. Historically, the institution has 
always collaborated with autocrats and the way it is structured does not encourage popular 
participation of decision making of a large majority of the population such as the youth and 
women. He also argues that whilst it is important to retain some indigenous values in African 
democratic systems, the institution of chieftaincy cannot claim to be the “sole bearer of these 
values” (Ntsebeza2006:33). 
3.2.2 In  support  of  traditional  authority’s  legitimacy:  ‘Popular  relevance’  perspective 
 
In what might be termed as the „popular relevance‟ perspective, traditional authorities are 
deemed as relevant because they are widely supported by the people- however this 
perspective does acknowledge the shortfalls of the traditional institution. This perspective 
does not see any problem in allowing traditional authorities to express their authority within a 
democratic system of governance. In other words, this perspective is highly critical of 
Mamdani and Ntsebeza. This study agrees with the view that traditional authorities are 
compatible with contemporary democratic state systems. 
 
Although not completely supporting all aspects of traditional authorities in local governance, 
Williams (2010) takes a sympathetic analysis of traditional authorities in Africa. Williams 
(2010) conducted his empirical study in the Kwazulu Natal Province, among the Zulu ethnic 
group, in order to explore the tension between state and traditional leaders on political 
legitimacy in the rural areas. His findings show that there is overwhelming support for 
continuation of traditional leadership in their area. According to his findings, the relationship 
between traditional leadership and the Zulu society is mainly based on unity and the 
traditional leader reinforces this unity through the principles of the maintenance of order; 
community consultation and participation in decision-making; impartial and unbiased 
decision-making rulers; and promotion of community welfare before individual gain. When 
respondents were asked why chieftaincy should continue, they said that “chieftaincy provided 
discipline, dignity, and respect for the community and that there would be „disorder‟ without 
the chieftaincy” (Williams 2010:26). He also added that “the notion that the people are bound 
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together with the chieftaincy and that the chieftaincy gives meaning to the identity of the 
people is an extremely powerful idea that might be difficult for many to take seriously” 
(Williams 2010:26, emphasis added). 
 
Using the Afrobarometer survey data, Logan (2008, 2009 and 2011) takes a critical view of 
Ntsebeza (2006) and Mamdani (1996) but shares most of the views of Williams (2010), thus 
presenting a different perspective. Logan (2008, 2009 and 2011) points out that there is an 
overwhelming positive attitude among Africans towards traditional leaders and that these 
traditional leaders are actually not only compatible with democratic institutions of 
governance but that both institutions rely on each other. Although these two institutions seem 
incompatible, she argues that African societies seem to have found their own way of 
integrating these in order to address their concerns. The Afrobarometer survey results also 
show that being modernised does not significantly affect perception of traditional authorities. 
In other words, those in urban areas who might be regarded as not interested in traditional 
authorities also indicated positive sentiments towards the institution.  
 
 
Based on Round 1 of the Afrobarometer survey (for selected southern African countries), 
Logan (2008) created a Perception Index for traditional leaders and elected officials ranging 
from 1 to 5. According to this Perception Index, 1 is equivalent to very negative perceptions 
whilst 5 for very positive perceptions, with 3 reflecting a neutral attitude. Again, as compared 
to elected officials such as President, Members of Parliament and Local government officials, 
traditional authorities were rated higher than all the elected officials, except in Namibia and 
Lesotho where they respectively became second or paired with the highest. More importantly, 
with the exception of South Africa where the respondents showed a neutral attitude 
(Perception Index3), the other countries‟ perception was much higher (ranging from 3.2 to 
3.9). More details of results of this Perception Index are provided in figure 1 below: 
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Figure 1: Perception Index of leaders 
 
 
Source: Logan (2008: 16) 
 
In other words, analysing the seven-country mean, traditional leaders have a mean of 3.4 
which is better when compared to elected officials who score as follows: local government 
councillors (mean of 3.0), members of parliament (mean of 3.0), and the president and 
executive branch (mean of 3.1). Specifically, in relation to her earlier work, Logan (2008:1-2) 
aptly summarises her arguments as follows: 
 
In fact, far from being in competition with elected leaders for the public‟s regard, 
traditional leaders and elected leaders are seen by the public as two sides of the same 
coin. Overall, popular perceptions of traditional leaders are slightly more positive than 
those for elected leaders… thus, the sharp contrast often drawn between “modernist” and 
“traditionalist” approaches may reflect a false dichotomy … it seems that democracy and 
chiefs can indeed co-exist. 
 
These findings were further reinforced through Logan‟s (2011) analysis of later rounds of 
Afrobarometer surveys. For instance, in the Round 4 survey, respondents were asked the 
question: “Do you think that the amount of influence traditional leaders have in governing 
your local community should increase, stay the same, or decrease?” Interestingly, an 
overwhelming majority of respondents (58%) responded that their role should increase. 
Actually, if this figure is added with those who wanted the traditional leadership influence to 
stay the same (28%), it means that the total percentage of Africans who responded to the 
survey and support traditional leadership is actually 78%. This large percentage of support for 
traditional authorities cannot simply be ignored.  
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Logan‟s (2011) work is quite pivotal as it is addressing a number of issues which may be 
outlined as follows: 
 
Modernisation in African society will have no negative impact on traditional leadership. 
Similarly, contrary to most people‟s assumption that traditional authorities undermine the 
status of women in society; survey results show that women themselves are highly supportive 
of the institution.  
 
States that are considered more legitimate by the citizenry are the ones which have strong 
support for traditional leaders. The findings challenge the African state status arguments as 
explained by Englebert (2002) and Mamdani (1996). They argue that African states and 
customary institutions compete for popular legitimacy. The Afrobarometer survey results 
show that this relationship does not exist. Mamdani‟s (1996) thesis that traditional authorities 
have no popular legitimacy and their existence derives from the state is also challenged. The 
findings, however, show that the legitimacy of traditional leaders and that of the state seems 
mutually reinforcing. In this case “If the state is perceived as legitimate, then all of the 
leaders in it – even traditional leaders who may have a limited or purely informal role – are 
also perceived as more legitimate, and states likewise benefit from the legitimacy of 
traditional leaders” (Logan 2011:17). Although individuals who tend to identify themselves 
with their ethnic group more than national identity and who are likely to support the 
strengthening of traditional leadership, those who feel that their ethnic group has been treated 
unfairly are also very unlikely to support their chiefs. In other words, this finding “suggests 
that the link between ethnicity and the chieftaincy may indeed…be a relationship built 
primarily upon a positive reinforcement of cultural and communal identity, rather than 
around the more negative aspects of inter-group competition and conflict” (Logan 2011:18). 
The argument that the performance failure of the central and local level state institutions 
forces Africans to align themselves with traditional leadership needs to be interrogated. 
Logan‟s analysis of Afrobarometer survey shows no association between state failure (local 
or central) and citizens‟ growing support for traditional leadership. 
 
Logan‟s findings also challenge Ntsebeza‟s (2006) functional claim that Africans are forced 
to subscribe to traditional governance due to their control over land. The findings clearly 
show that Africans willingly subscribe to the traditional leadership and it is not the functional 
element that derives legitimacy but the intrinsic values that they bestow.  
 
Finally, Logan‟s findings also show “no evidence of any association – positive or negative – 
between commitment to democracy or a preference for elections, and support for traditional 
leaders. There is no support for the claims that allegiance to chiefs arises out of either a 
rejection of democracy or a dissatisfaction with how it functions in Africa, or disappointment 
in the quality of elections” (Logan 2011:20, emphasis in the original). Interestingly, if the 
citizens feel satisfied with democratic processes such as elections there is stronger support for 
traditional authorities.  
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In most cases, ethnic identity or formation in Africa centres on the role of traditional 
authorities. In other words, there is a link between revival of traditional authorities and 
development of ethnic identity. The following section expounds on this notion of ethnicity. 
 
3.3 Notion of Ethnicity 
According to Eriksen (2002:4), the word „ethnic‟ originally comes from the Greek word 
ethnos which meant „heathen‟ or „pagan‟ but in the English language it was initially used to 
refer to racial characteristics. Jenkins (1997:9) adds that ethnos may also be translated to 
mean „people‟ or „nations‟. In this case, Eriksen points out that during the Second World War 
period in the United States, the term was used by those of British descent as a polite way of 
referring to other races (new immigrants) which were considered inferior. By 1960s, the 
words „ethnic groups‟ and „ethnicity‟ had become popular in the academia but very few 
scholars who used these words showed interest in defining them (Jenkins 1997: 11; Eriksen 
2002:4).  It is against this background that in common parlance the term ethnicity refers to 
minority group issues or race relations (Jenkins 1997). In this case, Eriksen (2002:7) argues 
that “The term ethnicity refers to relationships between groups whose members consider 
themselves distinctive and these groups may be ranked hierarchically within society”. 
Ethnicity is also developed according to the historical, political and economic conditions of 
that particular geographical area (Braathen et al 2000). In the academia, the term „tribes‟ is 
now not popular but „ethnic groups‟ is, because the former word has the connotation of being 
traditional or primitive societies. Eriksen (2002:19) effectively describes ethnicity as a social 
contact in which there is an “application of systematic distinctions between insiders and 
outsiders; between Us and Them. If no such principle exists there can be no ethnicity”. 
Braathen et al (2000) and Eriksen (2002), however, caution that ethnicity is not the only 
identity that people or societies carry. It is in this context that Werbner (2006:4) argues that 
understanding of postcolonial Africa is being threatened by focus on ethnic differences. 
According to him, ethnicity is just a “small fraction” of multiple identities currently 
manifesting in Africa.  Therefore the central argument is that we all have different identities 
and sometimes they do overlap and the way we choose to define ourselves depends on 
beliefs, values and perceptions that we possess over time -“the important issue is therefore 
not the notion of ethnicity, but why and how it is used politically” (Braathen et al 2000: 5). In 
some cases or situations, it is possible that “ethnicity does not matter” (Eriksen 2002:31).  
The common issue in all ethnic groups is that there is a „metaphoric or fictive kinship‟; thus 
groups “tend to have myths of common origin and they nearly always have ideologies 
encouraging endogamy” (Eriksen 2002:13). Cultural symbols and history can be deliberately 
manipulated so as to create ethnic identity and organisation, thus producing a consciously 
constructed ethnic identity. The creation of ethnic identity through new historical narratives 
may not always be a problem because “discussion of history relates not to the past but to the 
present” or more precisely “history is not a product of the past but a response to requirements 
of the present” (Eriksen 2002:73). 
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Castells (2004:8) points out that identity analysed outside its historical context is 
meaningless. This does not imply that historical accounts are inventions, not to be taken 
seriously, but if we take into consideration the process of developing these accounts as 
highlighted above, we will appreciate that historical accounts are and should be contested. 
This is why ethnic claims have always been contested and reinvented despite their claim to 
the past. Castells (2004:7) also cautions that scholars find it easy to agree that all identities 
are constructed but “the real [challenge] is how, from what, by whom, and for what”. 
Consequently, he adds: “who constructs collective identity, and for what largely determines 
the symbolic content of this identity, and its meaning for those identifying with it or placing 
themselves outside it”. In other words Castells (2004:7-8) contends that social identity 
construction takes place in the context of power relationships which should be critically 
analysed. The construction of ethnicity is largely associated with the notion of cultural 
nationalism. In relation to ethnicity, Handelman (1977: 200) argues that culture is a critical 
aspect of ethnicity and should not be ignored. The next section explores this notion and how 
it applies to this study. 
 
3.4 Notion of cultural nationalism 
Although Abizadeh (2005) argues that the German political thinker, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 
was the founder of the modern notion of cultural nationalism, others argue otherwise.  
According to the classic work of Schmidt (1956) the 18
th
 and early 19th Century German 
philosopher, Johann Gottfried Herder, can rightly be said to be the father of modern-day 
cultural nationalism. Herder used rational philosophical arguments to convince the German 
nationals of why pursuing their national culture was significant. Schmidt further argues that 
through Herder‟s arguments, the philosophy of cultural nationalism evolved. In this case, 
Herder was focusing on nationalism not as a way of portraying ethnic superiority but 
discussed it within the ambit of the state. In addition, his arguments of cultural nationalism 
were neither at highlighting military achievements nor tracing dynasties. In other words, his 
attention was on the non-aggressive and liberal form of cultural nationalism. However, the 
problem with his philosophy is that it “was at inceptive stage hence fragmented and not 
systematic as was expected” (Schmidt 1956:412). 
In theory and practice there are two varieties of nationalism, political nationalism and cultural 
nationalism (Patten 2005, Hutchinson 1987). Political nationalism argues that nations should 
be self-governing and be granted some significant level of autonomy if they are in a 
multinational state. In other words, it focuses on “relations between an ethnic group and the 
state, or between two or more ethnic groups” (Berman et al 2004:5). Cultural nationalism, on 
the other hand, argues that the state should ensure that it promotes some national culture 
(Patten 2005:1). In other words, political nationalism and cultural nationalism have different 
notions of a nation; they also have different organisational as well as political strategies 
(Hutchinson 1987). In this case, in the context of culture, political nationalism is about 
drawing political boundaries while cultural nationalism is about the state‟s exercise of power 
and authority within the boundaries (Patten 1999:1).  
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3.4.1 Politicisation of ethnicity or cultural nationalism 
The transition from cultural (or cultural ethnicity) to political nationalism (or politicised 
ethnicity) has generated several closely related perspectives. Loosely, we might identify four 
schools of thought:  
a) Some scholars consider cultural nationalism as another option of political nationalism; 
b) Another group considers these as independent notions but depending on certain 
factors, cultural nationalism might take the form of political nationalism;  
c) The third group considers cultural nationalism as inherently political, hence a cultural 
or political nationalists movement pursues both agendas all the time but may, 
depending on circumstances, lean more to one agenda;  
d) The fourth group considers cultural nationalism as an elite construct with mainly the 
interest of pursuing their political interests.  
In the firstgroup, Hutchinson (1987) argues that cultural nationalism can be an option of 
political nationalism. He argues that cultural nationalism is a critical ideological force but has 
largely been ignored by scholars; scholars have tended to focus on political nationalism as an 
important movement of social mobilisation. According to Hutchinson (1987:483), cultural 
nationalism can also be “a political option against the state”. Referring to modern Ireland, 
Hutchinson (1987) demonstrates that the revival of cultural nationalism, spearheaded by 
intellectuals, has been an option to political opposition of the state. Thus the revival has been 
a way of rejecting the hegemonic English state values and expressing the Irish way of life. In 
this case, pursuing the cultural nationalism agenda was a way of community mobilisation 
which was not overtly aggressive and „acceptable‟ to the English. Smith (1998:74) aptly 
argues in this context that “where political nationalism fails or is exhausted, we find cultural 
nationalists providing new models and tapping different kinds of collective energies, thereby 
mobilising larger numbers of hitherto unaffected members of the community.” 
The second group argues that cultural nationalism may take the political dimension and this 
happens when mainly the state has failed to equally address the various concerns of 
communities. According to Klingemann and Fuch (1995:3), democratic processes have an 
inherent character of generating some levels of dissatisfaction amongst the citizens. This is 
the case for two reasons: “first, because the resources available to any government to 
implement its policies are limited and, secondly, because implementing a particular policy 
necessarily rules out others”. Klingemann and Fuch further argue that the state is almost 
always a recipient of demands which exceed its capacity to address them all. The general 
view is that this is more prevalent in Africa and developing countries. Taking into 
consideration that in Africa, since the colonial period, the institution of the state has been the 
main factor for control and distribution of resources, this scenario has brought great 
competition for control of state apparatus. Political nationalism or ethnicity represents the 
competitive aspect of ethnicity as each group tries to outdo one another in the fight for “the 
material resources of modernity” made available through the state (Berman et al 2004:5). 
Irrespective of the outcome to the other ethnic groups or the state as a whole, the group which 
attains control of state apparatus will have the maximum power to make resources available 
to themselves. In this case “at the heart of ethnic politics is the use of historical and cultural 
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resources of past and present in a struggle for control of the future and definition of the terms 
of social change” (Berman et al 2004:5). The interaction between cultural/moral ethnicity and 
political ethnicity leads to an intricate process of ethnic definition and identity. Based on this 
school of thought, in excess, political nationalism may destabilise the nation-state. For 
instance, Ajala (2006) argues that the Yoruba cultural nationalism aggravated social tensions 
against the Nigerian state which is not in tandem with principles of cultural nationalism. 
Ajala (2006) points out how the O‟odua Peoples‟ Congress (OPC), a socio-cultural Yoruba 
organization, moved from being a cultural nationalist institution to a radical militant political 
nationalist organisation demanding political hegemony. This is where the issue of hot and 
cold ethnicity applies. The debate of cultural and political nationalism relates to the concept 
of hot and cold ethnicity. The distinction between hot and cold ethnicity is mainly in relation 
to the social importance and emotional intensity of the membership (Eriksen 2002:33). In this 
case, membership to the group might be „hot‟ at the time when the group offers protection 
from perception by rivals and „cold‟ when its members are only concerned about their 
common ancestry. In other words, the social situation determines the relevance and 
importance of ethnic identity and organisation. Political leaders however, can manipulate or 
take advantage of prevailing social, economic and political factors to create a perception that 
ethnic identity is significant for their survival; hence individuals‟ ethnic identity becomes an 
overriding identity.  
There are other scholars in the third group who directly link ethnic and cultural nationalism to 
political nationalism, irrespective of what each one of them intends to achieve. According to 
these scholars, there is no clear boundary between cultural and political agenda of the said 
concepts hence every cultural or ethnic activity or mobilisation is basically political. For 
instance, Cohen (1974) views ethnic organisations as political organisations and even 
mentions in the preface of his book that “political man is also symbolic man”. In this case 
ethnicity is a tool used to acquire the scarce resources hence ethnic groups that do not offer 
practical solutions do not thrive. Gellner (1983:1) argues that “[cultural] nationalism is 
primarily a political principle”.  Weber (1922/1978) supports this argument when he pointed 
out that a common ethnicity is inspired by the political community. Barth (1987) simply says 
that ethnicity is a matter of politics. Patten (1999:1-2) argues that in practice these differences 
are blurred and as “cultural nationalism leads to political nationalism”. Patten (1999:2) 
continues to argue that an analysis of the connection between these two notions is “one of the 
most pressing tasks of any normative theory of nationalism”.  
The final fourth group is related to the third group‟s argument but the difference is that they 
consider the whole cultural agenda as political:  to serve the interests of the elite (Sklar 1967, 
Mafeje 1971, Tangri 1985). In the case of Africa, the notion of elite playing this role of 
constructing political nationalism is forcefully argued by Ekeh (1975) in his classic “two 
publics” thesis. In trying to explain the nature of African politics and state, Ekeh introduces 
the concept of „Two publics‟. The public and private realm, as understood in the Western 
society, operates under the same moral expectations; in other words, what is deemed wrong 
in the public realm is also regarded so in the private realm. Contrary to Western societies, 
Ekeh argues that African societies have two public realms which do not share a common 
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moral base and this ultimately explains and characterises some of the problems in African 
politics. These two publics are primordial public realm and civic public realm. According to 
Ekeh, primordial public realm is characterised by traditional attachments and affinities which 
influence how an individual behaves in the public realm. In this case, the primordial public is 
moral and has a common moral base as the private realm. The civic public realm is associated 
with the colonial period structures of governance and is amoral and does not have the same 
moral requirements that guide private behaviour. Africans find themselves operating in both 
realms but they tend to be more committed to the primordial publics and demonstrate less 
commitment to the civic public realm. In this case, he states that: 
Most educated Africans are citizens of two publics in the same society. On the one hand, 
they belong to a civic public from which they gain materially but to which they give only 
grudgingly. On the other hand they belong to a primordial public from which they derive 
little or no material benefits but to which they are expected to give generously and do give 
materially. Their relationship to the primordial public is moral, while that to the civic public 
is amoral (Ekeh 1975:108). 
Ekeh further argues that voluntary associations are created especially in urban centres by 
educated African elite and assume a civic public appearance but have an underlying 
primordial public identity. The African elite create and support primordial voluntary 
association as a way of securing their status in the civic public realm.  Ekeh concludes that 
these two realms are rivals and the “civic public is starved of badly needed morality” (Ekeh 
1975:111). In this case, the lack of morality in civic public is partly the source of most of the 
problems in African politics, such as corruption and tribalism. 
Based on Ekeh‟s thesis, several issues can be deduced in relation to this study. Firstly, the 
African elite are behind the creation and sustenance of primordial voluntary associations (or 
ethnic movements). These ethnic organisations (primordial voluntary organisations) guide 
their motives and decisions in the politics realm. In other words, political participation is 
defined and interpreted through the ethnic perspective, thus politicisation of cultural 
nationalism. Secondly, and more importantly, since Africans are operating in both realms 
simultaneously, it is difficult in practice to create proper boundaries between these two 
realms of cultural and political. 
Among several critiques of Ekeh‟s perspective of the role of elites, Smith (1998) has ably 
interrogated this elite notion. Smith (1998:129) explains that the perspective that tradition is 
invented by the elite raises some critical questions such as: “what does it mean to say that the 
nation is a social construct and consists largely of invented tradition? Why do the elite select 
this particular construct? Why does this type of discourse (of nationalism) resonate with „the 
masses‟?” In this case, Smith (1998:130) points out that to refer to them as invented traditions 
leaves out some key and complex issues “in which these, and other ceremonies, were 
reconstructed and reinterpreted”. He further explains that for this so-called invention to 
become successful, it was based on some pre-existing cultural networks which are relevant 
and make sense to the immediate community. Attributing this invention solely to the elite is 
therefore, misleading. He also adds that the term invention implies fabrication which is not 
entirely true (Smith 1998:131). Osaghae(1994:225) challenges the elite thesis by contending 
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that “‟bottom-up‟ frameworks have revealed that the assumption of an omnipotent elite, 
always impacting upon others through manipulation, and always succeeding, is no longer as 
valid as it used to be thought”. In disassociating the role of elites, Castells (2004) brings in 
what he regards as the contemporary form of nationalism. Castells (2004:32-33) contends 
that contemporary nationalism has several attributes such as (1) its main objective and result 
is not always creation of nation-states; (2) it is not limited to modern nation-states; (3) it is 
not essentially an elite phenomenon- though the elite tend to manipulate it so as to further 
their own personal interests; and finally (4) it is “more reactive than proactive, it tends to be 
more cultural than political, and more oriented towards the defence of an already 
institutionalised culture than towards the construction or defence of a state”. Castells (2004: 
33) further adds that contemporary nationalism can aptly be described as “defensive trenches 
of identity, rather than launching platforms of political sovereignty”. This perspective 
concurs with that of Yoshino (1992). According to Yoshino (1992:1) “Cultural nationalism 
aims to regenerate the national community by creating, preserving or strengthening a 
people‟s cultural identity when it is felt to be lacking or threatened”. 
Citing the works of McEwen and Lecours (2008), Jeram (2012: 152) argues that when 
confronted with ethnic groups which are demanding statehood within their borders, there are 
three options available to the state targeted at appeasing these ethic groups: “nurturing loyalty 
to the state-nation, providing voice at the centre, providing voice at the periphery, and 
symbolically recognizing the presence of multiple ethnicities within the state”. According to 
Jeram, states may not necessarily rely on only one option but may employ all of them or 
emphasise some of these options depending on the situation (mixture of strategies). Although 
Jeram is referring to ethnic groups which are demanding statehood, these options can also be 
applicable to the general management of ethnic groups in a modern state. In other words, it 
can be argued that these are some of the strategies that states employ in order to reduce 
politicisation of cultural nationalism. By providing the case of ethnic minorities in Nicaragua 
(Indian ethnic group) and Senegal (Diola ethnic group), Jeram (2012) argues that the 
Senegalese state failed to provide a voice when required and this led to emergence of ethnic 
tension and violence in the country. However, in the case of Nicaragua, the Diola ethnic 
group was managed using the proper mix of the above mentioned strategies. In a nut shell, 
Jeram (2012) reasons that although democracy might actually open up ethnic tensions, it also 
has the capacity to achieve the opposite; specifically, he states that “Democratization can 
reduce the capacity of ethnic separatist movements to mobilize a broad coalition of popular 
support because democracy can provide the voice” for the aggrieved ethnic groups and more 
importantly “combining all of them is the most effective way to alleviate the grievance” 
(Jeram 2012: 152). 
3.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has examined the politics of representation through various contending views on 
the role of traditional authorities in Africa. The chapter has argued that the rise of traditional 
ethnic movements is a reaction to global trends emanating from social and psychological 
dismantling of the nation-state and the desire for individuals to search for an authentic 
cultural identity. Several views have emerged concerning the relevance of traditional 
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authorities and their compatibility to the formal state system of governance. This study agrees 
with the view that traditional authorities are compatible with contemporary democratic state 
systems. The chapter has also explored the concepts of ethnicity and cultural nationalism. 
The chapter has argued that traditional authorities do not operate in isolation but their 
authority is expressed within the realm to the general ethnic identity and cultural nationalism. 
The chapter argues that every cultural movement is political but the extent of politicisation is 
dependent on several factors. The higher the level of ethnic politicisation the more likely it 
leads to problems with the state. Taking further the debate  on the role of traditional 
authorities or politics of representation in Africa, the next chapter discusses the politics of 
representation in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia as well as the influence of democratic 
transition on contemporary traditional authorities in the said countries. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION IN MOZAMBIQUE, 
MALAWI AND ZAMBIA:  INFLUENCE OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
The tension emerging from the politics of representation between state and traditional 
authorities is not always the same everywhere in Africa. The historical and social-political 
environment largely determines the extent to which the state accommodates traditional 
systems of governance. Since this study focuses on the three countries of Mozambique, 
Malawi and Zambia, it is important to critically examine the state-traditional authority 
dynamics within each country in order to have a proper understanding of its implications on 
the trans-border Chewa movement. The traditional authorities in the three countries of 
Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia had been profoundly affected by historical factors. Zambia 
and Malawi were under the British system and their policies towards traditional authorities 
were similar, but in the case of Mozambique, they were influenced by the Portuguese who 
had a slightly different approach. In Mozambique, traditional authorities were banned after 
independence whilst Malawi and Zambia retained them. It is only recently that the 
Mozambican government has revived traditional authorities. The civil war (which Malawi 
and Zambia did not experience) has also had an impact on the nature and operation of 
contemporary traditional authorities in Mozambique. Despite these differences there are 
many commonalities as well. Based on Afrobarometer data, there is a clear indication that 
traditional leaders are respected and trusted in all the three countries. The trend also shows 
that there is low enthusiasm for ethnic identity in these countries. Historically, political 
relations amongst the three countries have not always been cordial. Specifically, Malawi 
under Dr Banda had pursued foreign policies that were not always in tandem with African 
nationalism aspirations and this put the country at loggerheads with its neighbours. Despite 
this problem, the relations improved in the 1980s and stayed the same until recently. All in 
all, despite some social-political differences among these countries, the chapter argues that in 
all these countries, the state has managed to accommodate traditional authorities inorder to 
fulfil the interests of both parties. As the state in the three countries has managed to sustain its 
relations with traditional authorities, politicisation of ethnic identities has not succeeded. 
Before the actual contemporary status of traditional authorities is discussed, a brief social-
political history of Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia is discussed so as to provide contextual 
background. Afterwards, the chapter discusses the politics of representation by analysing the 
political transitions from colonial times to the contemporary with special emphasis on the 
impact of these transitions on traditional authorities as well as ethnic identity.  
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4.1 Contextual background: A brief socio-political history of Mozambique, 
Malawi and Zambia 
4.1.1 Mozambique 
Mozambique was formerly ruled by the Portuguese but got its independence on 25
th
 June 
1975, after a long armed-struggle between the colonialists and the rebel Mozambican 
independence movement called Frelimo. Although the country is listed as one of the least 
developed in the world, it is generally recognized that its economy is making steady progress 
(Astill-Brown and Weimer, 2010). Apart from the official language, Portuguese, there are 
several languages spoken by numerous ethnic groups in the country such as Makonde, 
Swahili, Makuwa, Sena, Yao, Lomwe, Ndau, Chewa (Nyanja) and several others. Soon after 
independence in 1975, the country was engulfed in a bitter civil war between Frelimo and 
South African backed Renamo, which ended in October 1992 after signing the Rome-Geneva 
Peace Accords. The first multiparty elections after the end of the civil war were held in 1994 
and Frelimo emerged as the winner, followed by Renamo and other smaller parties. The 
situation has remained the same in the subsequent elections.  
According to Cumbe (2010), about 5% of the chiefs were former African colonial 
administrators who were appointed by the colonial authorities to the position of régulos as a 
reward for their loyalty. During the armed struggle for independence (1962-1975), traditional 
authorities either supported Frelimo fighters or collaborated with the colonial masters. In the 
areas that Frelimo controlled, traditional authorities were recognized and given 
responsibilities of co-ordinating transportation of military equipment and collection of food 
for the fighters. As will be discussed later, this relationship was, however, terminated when 
Mozambique attained independence in 1975. 
The ethnic problem that plagued Frelimo has a historical link, “Mozambicans from the 
central and northern regions of the country have a bias against those from the south” (Cabrita 
2000:21).  Those who are called southerners are found in the area south of Save River and are 
generally referred to as the Shangaan. This does not necessarily mean that the Shangaan are a 
homogeneous ethnic group but the name refers to various ethnic groups which are followers 
of or were influenced by Soshangane, a traditional chief who settled in the area from 
Kwazulu-Natal in South Africa in the 17
th
 Century. In this case, “the people living to the 
north of the Save River, the „southerners‟, call them the Chigondo, the outsiders or the people 
from afar.”  Ethnic gap was reinforced by the Portuguese when they established schools in 
the South and incorporated most of the people from this area in its colonial administrative 
structure (Cabrita 2000:23). Consequently, when Frelimo was established it was dogged by 
the same problems. Most of the highly educated in the party were from southern regions; 
hence they ended up occupying the political leadership positions while those from the north 
composed the rank and file of the military wing or „foot soldiers‟. This scenario was 
constantly highlighted by those who defected from the organisation. Many years later, when 
Frelimo was fighting against Renamo which was led by a northerner, it was frequently said 
by some people that the war was between the north against the south. In an interview 
conducted by Cabrita (2000:208) with a former government soldier, he said that Samora 
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Machel (a southerner) “regarded the Renamo issue merely as an ethnic dispute between 
Ndaus and Senas [northerners] on the one hand, and the Shangaan [southerners] on the other, 
over which tribe ruled the country”. Many analysts, however, explain that the problem in 
Mozambique is not the ethnic issue but regional; which is reinforced by the socio-economic 
imbalance (Shenga 2008). This study agrees with this perspective. 
4.1.2 Malawi 
According to the latest National Population and Housing Census of 2008, Malawi has a 
population of 13.07 million (NSO 1998) and over 80% of the population live in rural areas. 
The economy is largely agro-based.  There are a number of ethnic groups in the country, such 
as Ngoni, Yao, Tumbuka etc. but the Chewa comprises the largest percentage share of the 
population (47%). Politically, Malawi became independent from British colonialism on 6
th
 
July 1964 with Dr Banda of the Malawi Congress Party as the country‟s head and the country 
adopted a constitution which recognised one party system of governance with Dr Banda as 
Life President. His reign ended in 1994 when Malawi embraced the multiparty system of 
governance after a referendum which showed an overwhelming majority advocating change. 
Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF) became the next president of the 
country under a newly drafted constitution which limited presidential terms to two terms of 
five years each. After his third term bid failed, he appointed his successor, Bingu wa 
Mutharika, who managed to win the 2004 presidential elections under the UDF ticket, but 
later resigned from the party to form his own Democratic People‟s Party (DPP) after 
experiencing an internal party power struggle with the former president. In the 2009 
elections, Bingu had a landslide victory with his party retaining a majority number of seats in 
parliament. Soon after winning his second term, Bingu fell out with his Vice President, Joyce 
Banda, and she was fired from the ruling party but she could legally not be fired as Vice 
President; she later formed her own party, the People‟s Party (PP). On 5th April 2011 Bingu 
died and Joyce Banda succeeded him as President to complete the remainder of his term and 
practically her party became the ruling party. 
The political dynamics in Malawi can roughly be explained along ethnic lines, which 
manifest in regional blocks. Except for the 2009 elections, presidential candidates have been 
voted mainly on the basis of their ethnic background or region. The major political regions 
are northern, central and southern regions with the Tumbuka as the major ethnic group in the 
north, Chewa in the central, Yao, Lomwe and Sena in the south. 
4.1.3 Zambia 
There are numerous ethnic groups in Zambia but the major ones are Nyanja-Chewa, Bemba, 
Tonga, Tumbuka, Lunda, Luvale, Kaonde, Nkoya and Lozi. The population of Zambia is 
12,935,000 (World Health 2011) with a relatively significant percentage of the population 
living in urban centres. It being a former British colony, English is the official medium of 
communication while Nyanja/Chewa and Bemba are widely spoken in the Capital city, 
Lusaka. According to Phiri (2006), the country was originally colonised through two separate 
processes. North-Western Rhodesia was mainly under the Barotse (Lozi) chief and came 
under the control of the BSA (British South African) Company in 1888 when it obtained 
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mineral rights in the area from the chief. North-Eastern Rhodesia was mainly under the 
Ngoni chief Mpezeni who was defeated and accepted a peace treaty in 1897 which saw the 
area being controlled by BSA
12
. 
Following elections in January 1964, United Nation Independence Party (UNIP) became 
victorious and Kaunda became the Prime Minister of Zambia and on 24
th
 October 1964, 
Zambia attained independence with Kaunda as President of the new nation. In 1967 Kaunda 
declared his policy of 'humanism' which is a peculiar mixture of Christian ethics and African 
socialism. 
The Lozi people have constantly felt that they are a state within a state; they have great 
respect for their King and even have strong feelings about how he is officially addressed. An 
example of this is explained below in an official complaint:  
 
Lozi elders in Livingstone have protested at the use of "Mr" in Press titling of the Litunga 
of Western Province. The Press, especially the Government-owned Zambia Daily Mail, 
has referred to the tribal leader as 'the Litunga of Western Province, Mr. Mbikusita 
Lewanika.' But an angry president of Livingstone‟s local court, Mr. K. Makumba, said 
the correct title should be: "The Litunga, MbikusitaLewanika." The use of "Mr" showed 
disrespect, he said (van Binsbergen 1987: 175). 
 
Interestingly, Kaunda went further and provided chiefs with more political influence in the 
country by engaging them in political decision making structures. In 1983 during the annual 
ruling party‟s (UNIP) annual Conference at Mulungushi (22-29 August), the most prominent 
Zambian Chiefs were co-opted into the most politically powerful body: UNIP's Central 
Committee (van Binsbergen 1987:142). By the late 1980s, it became clear that the humanism 
policy was not working hence the economy was under serious strain. In the 1990s, the 
country witnessed several riots and calls for multi-party democracy. Kaunda declared 
multiparty elections in the country and in October 1991, Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy (MMD) won 125 out of 150 seats and its leader, Fredrick Chiluba, became 
president of the country. 
4.2 Contemporary status of traditional authorities in Mozambique 
During its campaign for independence, Frelimo garnered the support of rural traditional 
leaders but once the colonialists were removed from power, Frelimo no longer considered its 
partnership with the traditional leaders. Taking a Marxist approach, Frelimo felt that to 
enhance rural productivity, there was need to destroy the existing villages which had deep 
attachment to traditional past and resettle its people in newly created communal villages. As 
former president of Mozambique, Samora Machel, once said, “for the nation to live, the tribe 
must die” (in Berman et al 2004:8). Traditional leaders and their subjects who resisted this re-
location were arrested and sent to the so-called re-education camps, and if they continued to 
resist, they were tortured or executed. The government efforts were not achieved as “rural 
Mozambicans became even more entrenched in their traditions, and developed an even 
                                                          
12
 The Hilton Young Commission of 1929, which was commissioned by the British government to recommend 
the future of its Central and East African colonies, recommended that North Eastern Province of Zambia should 
be part of Nyasaland (Malawi) but due to disagreements within the commission, this was never implemented. 
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greater sense of hostility towards Frelimo” (Cabrita 2000:119). By taking party officials from 
southern Mozambique to central and northern parts of the country so as to take over the roles 
that were previously handled by traditional authorities, the gap between central government 
and grassroots people further widened and also threatened to enhance the northern-southern 
ethnic rivalry. 
During the civil war between rebel Renamo
13
 and the government Frelimo movement, 
Renamo developed a more coherent policy agenda which included restoration of traditional 
leadership in the rural areas. Consequently in each and every area of its influence, it 
reinstated traditional chiefs who assisted in the local administration and providing of food to 
the rebels. The link between Renamo with traditional chiefs and local people can be 
explained as follows: 
Before Renamo established a base, permission was as a matter of course sought from the 
local medium. This was normally arranged through the area‟s traditional chief. 
Samatenje, a medium influential in the Gorongosa area, blessed Andre Matsangaice 
himself. Traditional chiefs spoke at length about the customs and beliefs of their areas, 
which were supposed to be strictly adhered to by Renamo‟s rank and file. John Kupenga, 
a Renamo guerrilla from Manica, stressed that failure to adhere to local traditions could 
upset the spirits who then punished the transgressors severely (Cabrita 2000:159). 
The civil war came to an end in 1992 and one of the challenges that the post war 
Mozambique faced was how to establish a viable decentralised system of governance in rural 
areas. Hence the debate on the role of traditional authorities in Mozambique came to the fore 
in the context of how to effectively implement a decentralisation policy (Cau 2004). A piece 
of legislation known as Decree 15/2000 was implemented, which witnessed the recognition 
of traditional leaders and secretaries of sub-urban quarters or villages who were called 
„community authorities‟ (Buur and Kyed 2005:5). Although it is assumed that the Frelimo 
government completely incapacitated the traditional systems of authority during the civil war, 
this is not really the case. According to the observation by Buur and Kyed (2005: 8) 
“institutions based on kinship and hereditary succession continued to exist, and many post-
colonial local state officials relied unofficially on day-to-day collaboration with chiefs” 
(emphasis added). Buur and Kyed (2005:10) aptly observe how the state came to recognise 
chiefs: “In rural Mozambique the war had created a situation of „decentralisation by 
default‟… Against this background, state recognition of chiefs came to be seen as a solution 
to the problem of meagre state presence and contested legitimacy”. 
 
The 1994 and 1999 general elections witnessed popular support of Renamo in rural areas of 
Mozambique
14
. Frelimo wanted to ensure that there should be reversal hence after the first 
                                                          
13
Renamo was formed in 1976 by the former Frelimo independent fighter Andre MathadiMatsangaiceDyuwayo 
but was killed in action in October 1979 and his position was taken over by AfonsoDhlakama who has remained 
its leader to this day. 
14
In 1994, Renamo won 45% of the parliamentary seats while Frelimo won 55% (Lloyd 2011). In 1999 total 
tallied provincial votes showed that Renamo got 57% while Frelimo 43% but due to certain complexities of the 
electoral system in Mozambique, this huge increase in number of votes for Renamo did not imply larger number 
of seats in parliament (Lloyd 2011). In 2004, Renamo heavily reduced its number of parliamentary seats from 
90 to 51 seats while FRELIMO increased its seats from 160 to 191 (Vaux et al 2006). 
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general elections for instance, the president and other leading Frelimo leaders spent most of 
their time campaigning in rural areas where they proclaimed that they were in partnership 
with the aspirations of chiefs.  
 
Prior to the implementation of the Decree, there was, among other things, a process of 
identification of true traditional authorities (defined as the one which existed during the pre-
colonial period) and their sub-chiefs (chefe do grupo and chefe da povoação) by their 
communities, official recognition of the identified traditional leaders through signing of the 
contract and acceptance of national flag, uniform and state emblems by the traditional 
authorities to be displayed at their residence. The state constructed offices for the said 
traditional authorities and in some cases, roads, which reached to the house of the recognised 
traditional authority. However, Buur and Kyed (2005) are quick to point out that the process 
of identifying the true traditional authorities was not as straightforward as it might be 
assumed and also created several potential future problems. In this case Buur and Kyed 
explain that due to many changes that have occurred in the Mozambican society from the 
colonial and the civil war period, the identification was beset with numerous problems. 
Cumbe (2010:17) mentions that “in some areas the process of recognition and legitimization 
of the community leaders is mostly influenced by the two main political parties that 
participated in the civil war (Frelimo and Renamo)”. As one Renamo member complained in 
parliament: “Linette Olofsson [Renamo] complained that in Chimuara, elections had been 
held for „community leaders‟. „Since when in African tradition have there been elections for 
chiefs to occupy their legitimate places?‟” (Mozambique News Agency, 24th April 2002). 
 
According to Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa (OSISA) (2009:152), the impact of 
traditional authorities has been in the following areas:  
 
a) Land management and administration as well as other natural resources. 
b) Local citizen mobilization in national campaigns.  
c) Facilitation of local citizen participation in national and local development 
programmes. 
d) Encouragement of local citizens to participate in elections. 
e) Providing administration of traditional justice (of non-formal justice). 
 
Apart from the language factor, ethnic groups in Mozambique are also recognised and 
organised mostly through their respective traditional authorities. According to Vaux et al 
(2006), they argue that despite the fact that Mozambique has 16 major ethnic groups, this has 
never led to tensions in the country. Specifically, they observe that during the previous wars, 
ethnicity was not the driving factor. This is against the background whereby during the 
colonial rule the Portuguese tried to divide the communities through ethnic and intra-group 
conflict. 
 
In contemporary Mozambican academic discussion, it is actually language which is 
associated with ethnic identity (Virtanen 2005:227). According to Alpers (1974), the 
Portuguese propaganda during the fight for independence tended to align themselves with the 
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Makua-Lomwe in order to discredit the Frelimo which was mainly dominated by Makonde 
and southern ethnic groups. This was, however, not successful at that time. Vaux et al (2006) 
acknowledge the current perception widely held in the country that Southern ethnic groups 
have better opportunities as compared to the central and northern ethnic groups. Even in 
relation to political parties, Frelimo mainly draws support from the Shangana-Ronga and 
Makonde ethnic groups, while opposition parties draw support from the Ndau, Sena and 
Makua ethnic groups. However, according to Vaux et al (2006:10) these differences “revolve 
around regional differences and relate to economic factors rather than around the social issue 
of ethnicity but there remains a possibility that ethnicity could be mobilised during a 
desperate political struggle”. This observation is also supported by Lloyd (2011:7) who states 
that, as compared to other African countries, ethnicity is very low but the north/central and 
southern region divide is prevalent. According to Lloyd, the tension is mainly between 
Frelimo and Renamo as political parties but not ethnic groups per se. 
 
Taking into consideration that Renamo is now weak and Frelimo has consolidated its power- 
to the extent that Mozambique is almost a one party state (Lloyd 2011; Sumich 2010; Vaux et 
al 2006) - it is unlikely that some of its current policies such as those on traditional 
authorities will soon be reversed. Specifically, it might even be argued inter alia that the 
increased support enjoyed in the previous elections could be Frelimo‟s campaigns of reaching 
out to the rural communities through its positive policies towards traditional authorities. The 
current picture emerging is that the re-introduction of traditional authorities in the rural areas 
has arguably usurped some of Renamo‟s power, hence the party‟s recent frustrations with the 
ruling party. For instance, Renamo has even started threatening war as captured in the 
following newspaper excerpt: “Dhlakama has warned that „I am training my men up and, if 
we need to, we will leave here and destroy Mozambique‟” (Mozambique News Agency, 20th 
November 2012). 
 
4.3 Contemporary status of traditional authorities in Malawi 
Traditional authorities were recognised and in some cases instated by the British in the 
colonial era and Dr Banda continued supporting them as long as they were not threatening his 
authority. Several Acts were passed in parliament to strengthen traditional authorities but at 
the same time ensuring that they were subservient to state authority. 
Cammack et al (2009:5) aptly summarises the status of traditional authorities during the 
Banda era as follows:  
The Banda period proved to be a double-edged sword for chiefs. On the one hand, the 
powers that chiefs had accrued during colonialism were seriously depleted... On the 
other hand, Dr Banda embraced the symbols of „tradition‟ and the hierarchy of 
customary authority constructed under colonialism.  
Dr Banda was removed from power in the first multi-party elections since the introduction of 
one party system of governance in the 1970s and the United Democratic Front (UDF), led by 
Bakili Muluzi, emerged winner. The UDF-led government introduced the Local Government 
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Act of 1998 and Malawi Decentralisation Policy of 2000 which saw the re-introduction of local 
governance with a democratisation focus.  Although Chiefs still retained some of their functions, 
their politicised traditional courts were abolished and their role in the newly constituted local 
assemblies was largely non-influential. Despite losing some of their powers the re-
introduction of democratic decentralisation has seen the role of traditional authorities being 
even more significant at implementation level (Chiweza 2007; Chinsinga 2005; Kayuni and 
Tambulasi 2011). It is almost impossible to carry out any project at local level without 
involving them. The scenario continued even under the presidency of Bingu wa Mutharika of 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (from 2004 to 2011) and Mrs Joyce Banda (from 2011 
to the present). Since local government elections were only held once in 2000, the absence of 
these representatives when their term expired in 2005 meant that the role of traditional 
leaders remained prominent. The absence of MCP local officials after the introduction of 
multiparty system of governance entailed that chiefs became the remnant of hope for social 
stability and order at grassroots level. They are involved in mobilising their subjects for 
development projects as well as other duties such as community „gate keepers‟ (Eggen 2011). 
More importantly, almost all the regimes have heavily relied on traditional chiefs to garner 
political support at local level to the extent that some experts have voiced their concerns that 
the office of chieftaincy has increasingly become politicised. The perception that the role of 
traditional authorities is increasingly becoming politicised is growing in the country and 
essentially puts into question their future relevance and role. As one analyst mentioned in the 
Sunday Times of 4
th
 March 2012 during the Bingu reign- the use of chiefs for campaign 
purposes was undermining their relevance: “It is politicians and educated Malawians who 
have reduced the structures of traditional governance to the moribund, unchanging state they 
are in today” (Sunday Times, 4th March 2012). 
For instance, merely twenty days after taking over as president on 25
th
 April 2012, Joyce 
Banda met over 200 chiefs and immediately elevated Chief Kyungu to Paramount Chief 
Kyungu. Apparently, Chief Kyungu had been at logger heads with the previous regime of 
Bingu wa Mutharika so this move was aimed at consolidating her political support at 
grassroots level. Specifically, Joyce Banda has continued what her predecessors used to do 
by, for instance, promising free fertilisers and elevations. Being politically non-partisan has 
largely been interpreted as supporting the ruling party. 
4.4 Contemporary status of traditional authorities in Zambia 
After independence in 1964, traditional authorities were regarded as important in society. For 
instance, writing more than 25 years ago during the Kaunda era, van Binsbergen (1987:140) 
points out that “anyone who has intensively and over an extended period of time participated 
in post-independence Zambian society cannot help to be aware of the great importance still 
attached to chiefs”. The importance of chiefs or traditional authority can be understood from 
the fact that in late 1960s Kaunda noted that his political power was declining hence one of 
the strategies was to use traditional authorities to enhance his political base.  Zambia 
established the House of Chiefs which consists of 27 members over a three-year-term rotating 
membership. This was modelled after the UK‟s House of Lords. This house had no legislative 
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function, in other words, it did consider bills but not block their passage. Interestingly, the 
house was under the Ministry of Local Government. 
In order to diversify the economy and avoid over reliance on copper, the government in 1971 
enacted the Village Registration and Development Act. Through this act additional 
administrative structures were created which gave more responsibilities to chiefs and village 
headmen. Apart from the rationale of diversifying the economy, the idea of the Act was also 
to enhance Kaunda‟s political base in the rural areas.  Informally, the chiefs became powerful 
at local level in various ways. For instance, during this period, chiefs assumed “on their own 
initiative responsibilities” which were under the realm of the central government such as the 
fight against the rise in crime, expelling illegal immigrants and implementation of health 
regulations (van Binsbergen 1987: 163). 
When Fredrick Chiluba took over from Kaunda in 1991, through the Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) party, he did not really transform the traditional leadership 
structures. He continued Kaunda‟s policies to ensure that his political base was fully 
entrenched. In 2001, Chiluba was succeeded by Levy Mwanawasa who also won through the 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Although the MMD won the presidential 
election it significantly reduced its number of seats in parliament. It won sixty nine seats 
(through a constitutional mandate of nomination, its number was increased to seventy seven 
seats) but the opposition had eighty one seats (Phiri 2005) 
 
The Local Government Act (1995) provides for representation of chiefs at the council level. 
According to this Act, it specifically mentions composition of “two representatives of the 
Chiefs, appointed by all the Chiefs in the district”. Although the Lands Act (1995) still 
bestows all authority of land in the President, who is supposed to authorize the sale, transfer 
or assignment of any land, traditional authorities are required to be consulted on all matters of 
customary land. Currently, approximately 94% of Zambia‟s land is customary; hence the 
influence of chiefs is becoming enormous through this Land Act clause. 
After his victory in 2001, Levy Mwanawasa‟s reign was also reflected in several programmes 
aimed at enhancing his relationship with the traditional authorities such as (House of Chiefs 
2009):  
a) House of Chiefs, which is highlighted in the constitution of Zambia, was practically 
closed and ignored for close to twelve years but the president in 2003 directed that it 
should be re-opened. 
b) Under his direction, the president also ensured that the chiefs‟ palaces should be 
electrified at government expense. Depending on what was feasible, this 
electrification project was mainly through national grid, kinetic energy or solar power. 
c) During the Constitution Review Commission (CRC) process chiefs were provided 
with a special platform to get their input. Specifically, eighteen chiefs took up 
positions on the National Constitutional Conference as representatives of the House of 
Chiefs. 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
d) In order to ease mobility of key chiefs in the country, government bought 150 motor 
vehicles for them under a special loan scheme. This programme was highlighted as 
the first of its kind in the history of the country since independence in 1964. Initially, 
36 motor vehicles were planned for the scheme but the president directed that the 
number should be increased to 150. 
e) In another unprecedented move, chiefs were also encouraged to invest in the mining 
sector hence those interested in this undertaking were provided with mining licenses.  
f) When the House of Chiefs was re-opened, chiefs were receiving a salary, which is 
called subsidy, of K200,000, but has subsequently been raised to K1,000,000. 
After the death of Levy Mwanawasa in 2008, he was succeeded by Rupiah Banda of MMD 
whose relations with the chiefs were not always cordial. Rupiah lost the presidential elections 
to Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front party who became president on 23
rd
 September 2011. 
Soon after taking over the leadership of the country, President Sata ensured that he should re-
connect himself with traditional authorities. During the campaign period, most chiefs sided 
with the ruling party MMD. Consequently, for the first time in the history of the country, Sata 
established the Ministry of Chiefs and Traditional Affairs. He also went on to ensure that he 
amended his relations with key chiefs in the country. For instance, when meeting chiefs, his 
language was always of reconciliation. The article from Lusaka Times (29
th
 August 2012) 
captures one of such kind of sentiments expressed by the President: “President Sata has urged 
traditional leaders to forget the differences they had with the Patriotic Front (PF) when it was 
in the opposition and make a fresh start…„We are Africans and we need to respect and 
uphold this dignified institution of chieftaincy,‟ President Sata said‟‟. 
Despite this appeal, the relations with the government are not ideal. For instance, in a 
newspaper article entitled “South Chiefs rubbish lies that they told Sata to ignore HH” there 
is a clear indication that not everything is well between the government and the traditional 
authorities. The Tonga dominated Southern Province chiefs rejected his proposals to re-align 
the southern province districts. They also refused the idea of disowning an opposition 
political leader who hails from the southern province. This is aptly captured as follows: 
“Chief Mukuni said the traditional leadership from Southern Province did not disown UPND 
leader Hakainde Hichilema during the meeting held with President Sata. „How do we disown 
our child?‟” (Zambian Watchdog, September 21, 2012). 
In a more serious turn of events, the Lozi people of Barotseland have gone a step further to 
start agitating for autonomy in their territory.  In 2011, two people were killed during the 
Lozi protests in which they were calling for succession. Apparently during the campaign 
period, Sata had pledged to honour the 1964 Barotseland agreement which would ensure that 
the area enjoys political autonomy. Since Sata‟s government had not shown interest in 
honouring this agreement, there have been calls for secession as captured in the media: “The 
Barotseland royal household in western Zambia has demanded independence... who accuse 
the government of ignoring the region, which remains one of the poorest in the country” 
(BBC News, 29
th
 March 2012). According to the various reports, the succession call came 
after a two day meeting of a group of traditional Lozi leaders which calls itself the 
Barotseland National Council, and it issued the following declaration: “We, the people of 
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Barotseland, declare that Barotseland is now free to pursue its own self-determination and 
destiny. We are committed to a peaceful disengagement with the Zambian government." 
(BBC News, 29
th
 March 2012). 
4.5   A comparative analysis of status of traditional authorities and 
ethnicity in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia 
The contemporary roles and practices of traditional authorities in the three countries are not 
exactly the same. There are several reasons for the said differences which include socio-
political experiences, colonial and post-colonial policies and level of engagement between 
traditional authorities and the community. Similarly, the nature and levels of ethnicity are 
also different. Despite these differences, there are some similarities which are common to all 
these countries. Relying mainly on several Afrobarometer data sets, the sections below 
highlight these commonalities and differences as well as their possible significance.  
4.5.1   The  status  of  traditional  authorities  in  Malawi,  Mozambique  and  Zambia 
The status of traditional authorities in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia will focus on issues 
of trust that the citizens have in the institution, perception of citizens on traditional 
authorities‟ influence in governing local councils, and their independence from government 
whilst receiving a salary. 
In relation to trust in the institution of traditional leadership the Round 2 (2002-2003) and 
Round 4 (2008-2009) Afrobarometer survey asked the questions: “How much do you trust 
each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?” The results for these 
three countries show that when compared to the Police and President (for those who 
responded “Somewhat & A lot”), Traditional Leaders are almost on a par with these formal 
institutions in relation to peoples‟ trust. For instance, the level of trust in the three countries 
improved from an average of 60% in 2002/2003 to 67% in 2008/2009 (an average 
improvement of 7%). The Police improved by an average of 7% whilst that of the President 
improved by 10% (see Table 3). This demonstrates that the institution of traditional 
leadership, despite its informality and consolidation of democratic governance institutions in 
the three countries, is still relevant. Table 2 below is a full summary of the perception of 
Malawians, Zambians and Mozambicans in relation to trust of the institution of traditional 
leadership: 
Table 3:  Public trust in the institution of traditional leadership in Malawi, Mozambique and 
Zambia in 2002/2003 and 2008/2009 
Year Response Police President Traditional Leaders 
Malawi Mozq Zambia Malawi Mozq Zambia Malawi Mozq Zambia 
2002-
2003 
Not at all 12% 18% 20% 18% 9% 13% 9% 10% 17% 
Just a 
little 
22% 27% 36% 30% 13% 37% 19% 19% 29% 
Somewhat 
& A lot 
64% 50% 42% 48% 74% 46% 68% 61% 51% 
2008-
2009 
Not at all 13% 15% 27% 8% 9% 29% 9% 17% 10% 
Just a 
little 
16% 19% 22% 11% 9% 27% 16% 15% 14% 
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Somewhat 
& A lot 
69% 59% 51% 79% 77% 43% 73% 59% 69% 
 
Source: Author‟s own calculation of Round 2 and Round 4 Afrobarometer data sets (excludes Don‟t 
Know and Missing codes) 
Another indicator of significance of traditional authorities is the people‟s perception of their 
influence in the governing of their local community. Round 4 (2008-2009) survey asked 
respondents the question: “How much influence do traditional leaders currently have in 
governing your local community?” The results show that the perception of respondents is that 
in all the three countries, traditional authorities have significant influence in the governance of 
their local communities. When considering the „Some and A great deal‟ responses, in Malawi, 
this perception is relatively higher (73%) than Mozambique and Zambia which is at 58% and 
51% respectively (see Figure 2 below). 
 
Figure 2:   Perception of the influence of traditional leaders in governing local communities 
in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia  
 
Source: Author‟s own calculation of Round 4 Afrobarometer data sets (excludes Don‟t Know and 
Missing codes) 
Another aspect investigated in the Afrobarometer study was independence of traditional 
authorities. Some analysts have complained that since most traditional authorities receive 
government salaries, they are then not independent and serve the interests of government and 
not the communities they represent. However, the Round 4 (2008/2009) results show that the 
majority of Malawians, Mozambicans and Zambians have no problem with traditional 
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authorities receiving a salary from government. In this case, respondents were asked the 
questions: 
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or 
Statement 2. Do you agree or agree very strongly?  
Statement 1: To best serve their people, traditional leaders must remain independent of 
the government. They should not receive government salaries.    
Statement 2: Traditional leaders serve their communities and the government, and they 
should receive a salary from government for their work. 
Table 4:  Perception of traditional leaders independent of government versus receiving of 
salary by country     
Response Malawi Mozambique Zambia 
Agree with 1 or Agree very strongly with 1 13% 15% 26% 
Agree with 2 or Agree very strongly with 2 86% 73% 67% 
Agree with neither 1% 1% 3% 
Source: Author‟s own calculation of Round 4 Afrobarometer data sets 
As indicated above in Table 4, most of those who agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement that government should provide salaries to traditional leaders were from Malawi 
(86%) followed by Mozambique and Zambia at 73% and 67% respectively. Although in 
Zambia the support was not overwhelming, it is still significant because it is well above half 
and closer to 70%. 
4.5.2 Ethnicity in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia 
The status of ethnicity in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia will be analysed and compared 
at three levels: the extent to which individuals trust people from other ethnic groups, the 
extent to which individuals trust members within their own ethnic group, individual‟s 
perception of their ethnic group‟s influence on political affairs of their country, respondent‟s 
ethnic group‟s perception of influence in politics over other groups in his/her country, how 
often the respondents feel their ethnic group is treated unfairly by government and finally, the 
respondents choice of nationality or ethnic group identity. 
The Round 3 (2005/2006) Afrobarometer survey also asked respondents to indicate their 
level of trust for other ethnic groups within their country
15
. The results for Malawi, 
Mozambique and Zambia show that for those who indicated „Not at all‟, the percentage is 
low (between 17-19%) and there  are some striking similarities across the three countries at 
this level. For those who indicated „Just a little‟ and „Somewhat & A lot‟, the similarities are 
mainly between Malawi and Mozambique while in Zambia the levels are quite different. 
While 55% indicated „Somewhat and a lot of trust‟ for other ethnic groups, in Zambia it was 
only 35% (See Figure 3 below). 
 
                                                          
15
The question in the Round 4 (2008/2009) survey was not included hence impossible to compare. 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
Figure 3:   Respondent‟s trust of people from other ethnic groups by country 
 
Source: Author‟s own calculation of Round 3 Afrobarometer data sets (excludes Don‟t Know and 
Missing codes) 
Assuming the measure of trust across ethnic groups is considered, the results show that there 
is a higher level of ethnicity in Zambia as compared to Malawi and Mozambique. However, 
the other question that respondents were asked gives an interesting picture for Zambia. The 
same Round 3 survey asked respondents to indicate the level of trust they had for members of 
their own ethnic group. Again the results as shown in Figure 4 below show that Zambia had 
different results while Malawi and Mozambique had similar responses. 
Figure 4:   Respondent‟s trust of people of their own ethnic group by country 
 
Source: Author‟s calculation of Round 3 Afrobarometer data sets (excludes Don‟t Know and Missing 
codes) 
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Slightly less than half (47%) of Zambian respondents had trust from members of their own 
ethnic groups. This may mean that the levels of ethnicity may not be as high as expected 
because if the levels of trust were high within an ethnic group while at the same time having 
less trust with other groups, it would have been an indication of higher levels of ethnicity in 
the country. In Malawi and Mozambique there are higher levels of trust within ethnic groups 
and significantly less for members of other ethnic groups (difference of 18% and 8% for 
Malawi and Mozambique respectively). All in all, despite an indication of some improvement 
in Malawi and Mozambique for those who indicated „Somewhat and A lot of trust‟ in  other 
ethnic groups is not really satisfactory when compared to trust within ethnic groups. There is 
a possibility of ethnic tension but not a serious one. In relation to ethnicity in Zambia, a 
Zambian professor admitted the problem and added that:  
Ethnicity is not a problem at provincial level. For instance, in Eastern province people 
are largely mixed but at national level ethnicity manifests because each province 
competes against another (Telephonic Interview, Lusaka, 7
th
 February 2013). 
In Round 3 and 4 of Afrobarometer survey, respondents were asked to think about the 
condition of their ethnic group and respond to the question “Do they have less, the same, or 
more influence in politics than other groups in this country”. As the two figures below 
(Figure 5 [a] and [b]) show, there has not been a significant proportional difference between 
2005/6 and 2008/9 survey results for the three countries except for Mozambique where those 
who indicated „Less and Much less‟ increased from 18% in 2005/6 to 24% in 2008/9. This 
might entail a rise in dissatisfaction within certain ethnic groups in Mozambique in relation to 
the amount of political influence enjoyed which might lead towards an increase in ethnic 
tensions. 
Figures 5:   Respondent‟s ethnic group‟s political influence by country 
a- Round 3 (2005/2006)    b- Round 4 (2008/2009) 
 
Source: Author‟s own calculation of Round 3 and 4 Afrobarometer data sets (excludes Don‟t Know 
and Missing codes) 
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However, 33%, 24% and 22% for Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia respectively (2008/9) 
shows no major difference amongst these countries and it can also be deduced that very few 
in these countries feel that their ethnic groups have political influence in their countries. 
Respondents were also asked to indicate how often they think their ethnic group is treated 
unfairly by the government (in 2009 and 2012). The results as indicated in Table 5 below 
show that  in 2009 almost half (49%) of the respondents in Malawi and Zambia felt that their 
group was never treated unfairly while a quarter (about 25%) showed that their ethnic group 
was sometimes treated unfairly. Although in Mozambique only 37% indicated that their 
group was treated unfairly, very few (18%) indicated that the government „often and always‟ 
treated them unfairly. Over all, the 2009 data shows that the problem of discontentment with 
government on an ethnic group is not serious but it does show that Mozambique is somehow 
different as compared to Malawi and Zambia.  
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Table 5:    How often ethnic group feels treated unfairly by country (2009 and 2012) 
Response Malawi Mozambique Zambia 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Never 49% 52% 37% 60% 49% 78% 
Sometimes 24% 21% 18% 16% 26% 13% 
Often & Always 21% 22% 18% 17% 11% 7% 
Source: Author‟s own calculation of Round 4and 5 Afrobarometer data sets (excludes Don‟t Know 
and Missing codes) 
When the 2009 and 2012 data is compared, it shows an overwhelming increase in 
Mozambique (37% to 60%) and Zambia (49% to 78%) for those who indicated „never‟. In 
Malawi there is also an increase but it is not significant (49% to 52%). This implies that for 
all the three countries, those who feel that their ethnic group is unfairly treated is reducing 
hence arguably reducing some levels of ethnicity within these countries over the specified 
period. 
Finally, concerning the question respondents were also asked “Let us suppose that you had to 
choose between being a nationality and being an ethnic group. Which of the following 
statements best expresses your feelings? 1-Ethnic ID only, 2-Ethnic ID more than national, 3-
National and ethnic IDs equal, 4-National ID more than ethnic and 5-National ID only” 
The results as shown in Table 6 are somehow mixed. In 2009 the only common trend 
amongst the three countries was that about 12% to 15% mentioned that they would opt for 
Ethnic ID only and Ethnic ID more than national. Those who indicated equality between 
national and ethnic identity were low in Malawi and Mozambique (29% and 34% 
respectively) but very high in Zambia (63%). For opting for national ID were high in Malawi 
(56%) but low in Mozambique and Zambia (34% and 24% respectively). 
Table 6:   Choice of National or Ethnic identity by country (2009 and 2012) 
Response Malawi 
 
Mozambique 
 
Zambia 
 
 2009 
2012 
2009 
2012 
2009 
2012 
Ethnic ID only & Ethnic ID more than 
national 14% 
13% 
15% 
14% 
12% 
6% 
National and ethnic IDs equal 29% 
45% 
34% 
36% 
63% 
59% 
National ID more than ethnic & National 
ID only 56% 
42% 
34% 
47% 
24% 
34% 
Source: Author‟s own calculation of Round 4 and 5 Afrobarometer data sets (excludes Don‟t Know 
and Missing codes) 
When comparing the 2009 and 2012 data sets, the results show that although Malawians were 
more interested in national over ethnic identity in 2009 when compared to other countries, 
this went down in 2012 (from 56% to 42%) whilst in Mozambique it increased from 34% to 
47%. Although in Zambia it is still low (from 24% to 34%), it is clear that it is only Malawi 
which has faced a reduction in those who value national identity at the expense of ethnic 
identity. All in all, the question of what people in these countries value between national and 
ethnic identity is mixed but it is very clear that those who value ethnic identity only or ethnic 
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identity more than national are very low in all the three countries. In other words, national 
and ethnic identities are equally valued or national identity alone. 
 
4.6 Post-colonial political relations between Malawi, Zambia and 
Mozambique 
Relations between Zambia and Mozambique had always been cordial due to the former‟s 
support for the liberation struggle in the region. Zambia facilitated and hosted the crucial 
talks between Frelimo and the Portuguese in Lusaka which ultimately led to Mozambique‟s 
independence. More importantly, Zambia facilitated the demise of one of Frelimo‟s main 
rivals, ComiteRevolucionario de Mocambique (Coremo), by detaining its members and 
closing its headquarters in Lusaka in 1974. Zambia and Mozambique were also very active 
members of Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) which was 
formed by frontline states and aimed at finding a way to become economically independent 
of apartheid South Africa. Unlike Zambia and Mozambique, Malawi was an ally of South 
Africa and did not express much willingness to participate in the block. 
After Mozambique gained independence in 1975, it was clear that Malawi and Mozambique 
were going to have a foreign policy clash. Mozambique took a strong pro-liberation 
movement ideology and so provided support to Southern Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) ZANU 
movement as well as the African National Congress (ANC) movement of South Africa. This 
was the stand taken by most southern African countries such as Tanzania and Zambia. 
Specifically, ZANU liberation camps were mainly based in Mozambique under the protection 
of the Frelimo led government. However, since Malawi had taken a stand of supporting the 
white-ruled Southern Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa, a huge suspicion developed 
between these countries. The Mozambican government sheltered some of Malawi‟s rebels 
such as Dr Attati Mpakati who was leader of League of Socialist Malawi (Lesoma). Mpakati 
was subsequently assassinated by Dr Banda‟s agents in February, 1979, in Maputo. The 
Malawi government also provided a safe haven to some Mozambican rebel movements such 
as PartidoRevolucionario de Mozambique (PRM), which was formed in 1976 and led by a 
former Frelimo member Amos Sumane. President Samora Machel consistently blamed 
Malawi of hosting Renamo bases within its borders. Although the Malawi government did 
provide some political support for Mozambican rebels as well as safe passage whenever the 
rebels were going abroad, the involvement in the conflict was extremely limited (except in 
allegedly rare cases whereby the South African Air Force used the Malawian airports to 
supply the rebels). However, Machel seriously believed that Malawi hosted the rebels to the 
extent that in October 1986 he planned with Robert Mugabe an invasion of the country so as 
to remove Dr Banda from leadership (Cabrita 2000). His plans were, however, never 
implemented due to his sudden death in an air crush a few days later on 19
th
 October 1986. 
His successor, Joaquim Chissano, abandoned the invasion plan and went on to establish 
closer relations with Dr Banda‟s regime. A defence and security pact was signed a month 
after Chissano‟s inauguration and the pact is still in operation today. 
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Despite some of the above stated political and historical commonalities between 
Mozambique and Zambia, Malawi‟s socio-political history is closer to Zambia than 
Mozambique. In relation to traditional authorities, there is a general complaint of 
politicisation of the institution. Citing examples from Malawi, Uganda and South Africa, 
Muriaas (2009) ably points out that democratic governments tend to emphasise neutrality of 
traditional leaders when in actual fact they mean that traditional leaders should support the 
ruling party. Traditional leaders are forced to support the ruling party due to their dependency 
on them for their personal survival 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at discussing the politics of representation within the context of 
traditional authorities in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, as well as the extent of ethnic 
identity in the said countries. The traditional authorities in all the three countries had been 
profoundly affected by colonialism. After independence Mozambique banned traditional 
authorities while Zambia and Malawi retained them. Although they were retained, the 
governments of Malawi and Zambia provided a platform for traditional authorities that were 
meant to deliberately subject them under the formal state institutions. Despite banning 
traditional authorities after independence in Mozambique, the institution still thrived in areas 
controlled by the rebel movement Renamo. After the end of the civil war in Mozambique, the 
government restored traditional authorities mainly with the aim of trying to win the support 
of rural masses in opposition-led areas. After restoration of traditional authorities in 
Mozambique, there are strong commonalities of their current operation in all the three 
countries. The state has managed the relationship in such a way that it recognizes their 
significance for political reasons. Based on Afrobarometer data, there is a clear indication 
that traditional leaders are respected and trusted in all the three countries. When national 
versus ethnic identities are compared, the trend in each country (in 2009 and 2012) shows 
that there is either an equal value for both or an increase in national identity. In other words, 
there is low enthusiasm for ethnic identity. Over the years, political relations amongst the 
three countries have improved. All these factors have created a conducive environment for 
revival of the trans-border Chewa ethnic movement. A further discussion on traditional 
authorities is provided in the next chapter which specifically focuses on the Chewa Kingdom. 
In this case, the next chapter discusses the contemporary organisation of the Chewa 
Kingdom. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CHEWA KINGDOM:  FACTORS INFLUENCINGITSREVIVAL, THE 
ROLE OF THE KING AND ITS EFFECTS ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
5.0 Introduction 
The revival of Chewa identity did not just emerge but several factors contributed to it. From a 
spatial, symbolic and demographic perspective, this chapter demonstrates that the countries 
of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia are significant in the expression of Chewa trans-border 
identity. The Chewa trans-border ethnic identity is not complete if one nation is isolated. 
However, Malawi is central to the understanding of dynamics within the movement because 
the largest population of the Chewa are Malawi, and it is also the headquarters of the 
movement‟s secretariat. Most significantly, the most important actors in the revival of the 
movement are also from this country. The chapter also discusses the centrality of Gawa 
Undi‟s trans-border authority and how it might have a bearing on state sovereignty. Although 
the revival of the Chewa trans-border movement can be regarded as the product of some 
social-political elitist, this chapter argues this role of „elites‟ need not be overemphasized. 
Contrary to the view that the cultural elite may actually be challenging the formal state 
sovereignty, what has actually happened is that the cultural elite are seemingly bringing the 
formal states of the three countries together in an informal kind of regionalism. Gawa Undi is 
also critical in this trans-border ethnic revival because symbolically he represents the views 
and aspirations of the Chewa ethnic group. The revival of the Chewa in the 1990s is the one 
which has seen the restoration of his authority on almost all the Chewa dominated areas of 
Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. His conduct has to be analysed in order to determine 
whether he leads the Chewa towards challenging state sovereignty or not. The CHEFO, 
which is headquartered in Malawi, is also another important institution for mobilisation of the 
Chewa. As with Gawa Undi, the rationale for the establishment of the institution has a 
bearing on how it may relate to the state. In other words, some of the questions that can be 
put to the fore, which this chapter is addressing in relation to CHEFO are: Who established 
the institution? What were the motives? What are the implications on Chewa-state relations?  
 
5.1 Significance of individual states of Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia to 
trans-border Chewa ethnic identity 
Although the lowest numbers of the Chewa are based in Mozambique, this does not imply 
that Mozambique is not significant to Chewa trans-border ethnic identity. As explained in the 
previous chapter, Kalonga Gawa Undi‟s first headquarters after moving away from Malawi 
(during a succession dispute) was based at Maano in Mozambique. According to CHEFO 
Chairperson, the total number of Kalongas who reigned in succession while based at Maano 
in Mozambique is more than those who were based at the former headquarters of 
Mankhamba in Malawi and the current Zambian headquarters (see Appendix 17). In other 
words, Mozambique carries the longest historical and symbolic value of the Chewa ethnic 
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identity. As one traditional chief in Mozambique stated concerning the significance of 
Mozambican Chewa to the trans-border identity;  
 
Popanda ife aku Mozambique kutenga nawo mbali pazochitika zachikhalidwe chathu, 
ndiye kuti uChewa wake ulibe tanthauzo” [without involvement of Mozambican Chewas 
in traditional events, the genuine Chewa identity is incomplete] (Key informant 
interview/chief, Angonia, 28
th
 May 2012).  
 
Politically, although the Chewa are a minority in Mozambique, the politics of Mozambique is 
not necessarily ethnic-based but regional so their minority status is not a significant 
disadvantage. 
 
Malawian Chewas are also significant in contemporary identity. Although the King of the 
Chewa is not based in Malawi, as discussed in subsequent chapters, Malawi is central to 
trans-border Chewa ethnic identity. The largest numbers of Chewas are based in Malawi and 
the headquarters of the movement, CHEFO, is also based in Lilongwe, Malawi. Historically, 
it is acknowledged that the first headquarters of the King was based in Malawi at 
Mankhamba. Arguably, some of the most important key stakeholders in the establishment 
and revival of the Chewa trans-border movement such as Chief Kaomba and Dr Justine 
Malewezi are also based in Malawi. Being the largest ethnic group in the country, the Chewa 
also have a significant potential political power in the country. Due to these and other factors, 
Malawi may probably be described as the „hub‟ of Chewa trans-border ethnic identity. 
 
It may be argued that since the Chewa are demographically a minority within Zambia, then 
the whole movement should not be looked at as a trans-border but a Malawian phenomenon. 
However, this may not fully be the case; the Chewa throne in Zambia is relatively influential 
(socially and politically) in that country. A critical analysis of the Zambian context shows 
that Kalonga Gawa Undi‟s throne has had some credible political and social influence in the 
country, mainly due to:  the role of the previous Kalonga Gawa Undi in Zambia‟s fight for 
independence; the historical heritage of the pre-colonial Chewa/Maravi Empire; the 
credibility of its current leadership and, finally, the co-ethnic factor.  The previous Kalonga 
Gawa Undi was one of the key local chiefs who worked with the African political parties to 
bring independence to the country. Unlike some local chiefs who openly sided with the 
colonialists, Kalonga Gawa Undi X, who reigned from 1953 to 2004, was well known as an 
African nationalist; an identity which he successfully carved for himself during the fight for 
independence and created a popular and credible legacy for the throne (Kalusa 2010). 
Another point giving credence to the Chewa throne in Zambia is that the pre-colonial Maravi 
Empire is still remembered as a historically important institution. In this case, since Gawa 
Undi is perceived as a direct descendant of such a great empire, spanning through three 
contemporary states, this leadership carries with it much prestigious honour. As van 
Binsbergen (1987:141) points out: “As a Paramount Chief, Chief Undi ranked among the 
handful of Zambian Chiefs whose immensely prestigious title still carries, even at the 
national level, strong connotations of pre-colonial régal splendor and powerful statehood”. 
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Continuing the legacy of previous Kalonga Gawa Undi leaders, the current Gawa Undi is also 
regarded as one of the most reliable traditional authorities in Zambia when compared to his 
contemporaries. According to the Zambian historian: “In Zambia, Gawa Undi is highly 
respected by the political leadership...He is certainly an influential traditional political leader 
in Zambia” (Telephonic interview, Professor Phiri, Lusaka, 7th February 2013). The recent 
Zambian Watchdog (1
st
 January 2013) newspaper article entitled “Gawa Undi gives us hope” 
ably articulates the Kalonga‟s credibility, and what has been stated in the article was also 
corroborated by various other interviewees (see Appendix 10 for full text of the article). 
Finally, there is also the issue of co-ethnics that has to be considered in the case of Zambia. 
Although the Chewa are in the minority, there are several ethnic groups which politically and 
socially align with the Chewa, such as the Senga, Nsenga, Tumbuka and other Zambia‟s 
Eastern Province ethnic groups. This alignment adds to the prestige and influence of Gawa 
Undi‟s throne (Key informant interview/Local government official, Chipata, 18th May 2012). 
5.2 Cultural elite interests, Chewa identity formation and state sovereignty 
Through empirical evidence this section discusses Ekeh‟s (1975) view that the educated elite 
create or sustain traditional institutions. If the view by Ekeh is taken then this might pose as a 
challenge to state sovereignty because it can be deduced that the elite determine policy 
direction instead of the bona fide official state machinery. This becomes even more 
significant if these cultural elites have trans-border interests, because their loyalty to state 
systems would be highly compromised. In other words, if the trans-border cultural elite have 
ethnic political interests and motives which are contrary to the main-stream state system of 
governance, they may pose as a challenge to the state. In this case, the section below 
investigates and discusses the key individuals behind the formation and running of the 
contemporary Chewa movement. It goes on to determine their possible motives as well as 
implications of these motives for state sovereignty of the three countries. 
 
5.2.1 Chewa Heritage Foundation (CHEFO) as a product of convergence and divergence of 
cultural elites’ trans-border interests 
Trans-border identity is a complex and delicate affair that needs a higher level of leadership 
qualities which must be characterized by a reasonable level of support and respect at 
grassroots and top level of political hierarchy. It will be worth explaining briefly the 
leadership of the Chewa movement to project the characters behind it as well as how these 
personal attributes contributed to the rise and success of trans-border movement. It is within 
this context that the extent to which the movement is a convergence of cultural elites‟ 
interests could be analyzed. 
 
According to Senior Chief Kaomba of Kasungu in Malawi, the current Chewa trans-border 
movement was initiated by himself. This claim is to some extent supported by other 
independent respondents who, however, differ from Kaomba on the reasons why he was 
interested in reviving the movement as well as some other arguments he raised. Senior Chief 
Kaomba is a nephew of the former President of Malawi Kamuzu Banda and unlike most 
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traditional rulers in the region, he is a graduate of the University of Malawi. His purported 
role in the revival of the Chewa trans-border movement is something that he cherishes as he 
mentions that he is the one who actually started the whole process. He argues that during the 
reign of Dr Banda, he did not want the Chewa to recognise the authority of the Kalonga 
purely on political grounds. Hence when he became chief he started organising Chewa trips 
to Zambia for national and cultural ceremonies and was assisted by the Chewa Cultural 
Committee of Kasungu [home district of Chief Kaomba]. When the organisation of the trips 
became too expensive, CHEFO came in later to asssit with food, accommodation and 
transport. Consequently, according to Kaomba, CHEFO was established by local Malawian 
Chewa chiefs to solely handle these logistics. Thus chaired by Dr Justine Malewezi, CHEFO 
was responsible for fundraising for Kalonga trips and other related things (Interview with 
Senior Chief Kaomba, Kasungu, 16
th
 June 2012). 
 
Based on the explanation of Dr Malewezi on how the institution came about, there are some 
differences when compared to Chief Kaomba‟s narrative. Specifically, Malewezi claims that 
the Kalonga infomed him that he was coming to Malawi for a visit and he was tasked to form 
a committee that would organise logistics for his trip. After the Kalonga‟s visit in 2005 [see 
Appendix 13], he was very impressed with the committee‟s organisation of the whole trip and 
asked Malewezi to take a step further and assist Chewa chiefs on how to handle emerging 
issues on gender, HIV/AIDS, governance and many other related matters. According to 
Malewezi, “This was the birth of Chewa Heritage Foundation. So when we came home we 
said how do we translate this? So we had lawyers and we got advice and agreed that it must 
be recognised by government; in other words it must be registered, to register it you must 
have a constitution…so that is what we did. … that is how Chewa Heritage Foundation 
started”(Interview with Dr Malewezi, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012). 
 
According to Kaomba, the committee chaired by Malewezi was only mandated by the King 
to draft a constitution (thus outlining the institution‟s objectives) and also pursue official 
registration with the government of Malawi. He further claims that Dr Malewezi‟s group was 
supposed to hand over the draft constitution to a committee of Malawian Chewa chiefs who 
were supposed to produce the final version- which had to be vetted by King Gawa Undi of 
Zambia. Apart from organizing King Gawa Undi‟s trip, Dr Malewezi‟s committee was also 
supposed to raise funds for the Kulamba ceremony. In this case, Chief Kaomba argues that 
Dr Malewezi produced the final version of the constitution and directly consulted King Gawa 
Undi without input from local chiefs. He also claims that the constitution was, however, 
drafted in such a manner that the Chewa chiefs were sidelined and it is only Dr Malewezi 
who has all the powers to run the institution with King Gawa Undi as its patron. Kaomba 
pointed out that he doesn‟t understand how Dr Malewezi, a technocrat and not in the Chewa 
royal family, should speak and represent the Chewa in the country. He specifically said that: 
“CHEFO started to disagree with me. They made the institution to directly link itself with 
Kalonga Gawa Undi of Zambia while side-lining us, the chiefs of Malawi. I said no.” 
(Interview with Senior Chief Kaomba, Kasungu, 16
th
 June 2012). 
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When Dr Malewezi‟s and Chief Kaomba‟s narratives are compared to other independent key 
informant interviews, it emerges that what actually happened is that Kaomba had indeed 
initiated a move towards a formal trans-border link with the previous Zambian Kalonga. The 
death of the previous Kalonga led to Kaomba‟s diminishing influence and his place was taken 
over by Malewezi who continued the formalization of trans-border linkage by taking a 
leading role in the formation of CHEFO. 
 
 
One of Chief Kaomba‟s supporters is Paramount Chief Lundu of Chikwawa district of 
Malawi. What is interesting is that Chief Kaomba, as well as Lundu, have been putting 
forward the formal state argument to prove that CHEFO should not solely focus on Kalonga 
Gawa Undi. In other words, their view is that CHEFO should respect the Malawi state 
authority first before directing attention to Gawa Undi (see Appendix 14). They claim that 
Kalonga‟s role in the organization should merely be ceremonial and not be regarded as King 
of the Chewa in Malawi and Mozambique. Lundu went on to say that “The main problem 
with CHEFO was the role played by Malewezi; he had a political agenda and that is why we 
ended up being at loggerheads with Kalonga Gawa Undi” (Interview with Paramount Chief 
Lundu, 14
th
 June 2013). This view is also reinforced by Kaomba, who said that by directly 
working with Kalonga Gawa Undi of Zambia, it implies that they have to follow the Zambian 
system. He argued that he has to work with the government in Malawi and the country has a 
Constitution as well as the Chief‟s Act which guide on such matters. (Interview with Senior 
Chief Kaomba, 16
th
 June 2012). 
 
Paramount Chief Lundu‟s lack of full recognition in Malawi is a result of his weak bona fide 
Chewa power base. Although he is, according to the Malawi official hierarchy of traditional 
leadership, the most senior Chewa chief, his area of authority is in the southern region of 
Malawi where there are very few Chewa people but most of his subjects are Mang‟anja and 
Sena ethnic groups. As one Malawian political analyst explained: 
 
The tricky part is that paramount chief of the Chewa in Malawi is Lundu who stays in 
southern region of Malawi and is more Mang‟anja and Sena „contaminated‟ but he is 
Chewa. The majority of the „hard core‟ Chewa are in central region as a result, the 
Chewa of central region have not fully accepted Lundu. Since the Chewa of central 
region had no supreme authority, now the rise of Gawa Undi of Zambia fills that vacuum 
and you can now see that the Chewa of the central region are more organised, they have 
an umbrella authority and they are trying to exert it as much as possible. It is because of 
this thinking or mentality [that Gawa is supreme] that they were able to question people 
like Kaomba, people like Lundu and those guys [Lundu and Kaomba] cannot make a 
mistake of thinking that they will successfully oppose the Kalonga Gawa Undi 
lineage[sic] (Key informant interview/Political analyst, Lilongwe,11
th
 May 2012). 
There are a number of issues that might be deduced from this formation of CHEFO and the 
subsequent internal differences which might expose some of the motives in relation to Chief 
Kaomba: 
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Firstly, Senior Chief Kaomba is a relative of the former President Dr Banda. In tandem with 
the earlier observation, the departure from power of Kamuzu might have led to Kaomba 
feeling his personal loss of influence in the country so he started mobilizing the Chewa as a 
way of replacing the political power with cultural influence. Secondly, it could also be that 
the departure of Kamuzu, who proudly talked about his Chewa roots, led Kaomba to feel that 
the Chewa cultural relevance was under threat hence the link with the Chewa of Zambia as a 
way of consolidating the Chewa roots. Thirdly, the motive for Kaomba‟s role in the revival of 
the movement could be related to the legitimacy of his chieftaincy. According to Dr 
Malewezi, Kaomba‟s chieftaincy was created by the Kamuzu regime so that the former 
president should be regarded as having a royal Chewa heritage (Interview with Justine 
Malewezi, Lilongwe, 10
th
 May 2012). Consequently, according to Dr Malewezi, Kaomba‟s 
chieftaincy lacks the bona fide Chewa royal mandate.  The departure of Kamuzu therefore 
might have led Kaomba to feel insecure of his legitimacy amongst the Chewa. Consequently, 
he might have been seeking a way of filling up this lack of legitimacy through demonstration 
of leadership by initiating trans-border movements. This is more evident in the fact that 
Kaomba had emphasized that the CHEFO should be controlled by local chiefs and follow the 
Malawian Government‟s Chiefs Act of 1967. The control of CHEFO by Dr Malewezi and the 
subsequent delinking of his line of communication with the custodian of Chewa powers 
(King Gawa Undi) led to loss of power for him, hence the frustration. 
 
Whatever the theories or motives behind the initiation of the Chewa trans-border movement 
might be, the idea that those behind the creation of the movement are cultural elites in the 
modern sense of the word, is apparent. In this perspective, it may be argued that the 
movement was born out of the interests of key cultural elites: King Gawa Undi, Dr Malewezi 
and Senior Chief Kaomba. A brief description of their „elitism‟ and their probable interests 
illuminates the politics of meaning-making at play. From a social constructivist perspective, 
the role of individual agency and ideas is essential in constituting what is often taken for 
granted or deemed the (inevitable) outcome of historical forces. 
 
The movement took a serious trans-border dimension under the current King Gawa Undi. 
Different from most local chiefs and, like Kaomba, the king is a highly educated individual 
with a Master‟s degree in Engineering. As one Chewa chief stated, the King strongly 
encourages that Chewa leaders should be educated. This exposure to a higher level of 
education, has, arguably enabled him to encourage, appreciate and embrace the trans-border 
vision of the Chewa movement. His idea of establishing the CHEFO as a registered 
institution running parallel to the royal Chewa traditional structure is evident of his capacity 
to understand the value of working and tapping from technocrats of modern institutions. 
Uneducated Chiefs might have looked at CHEFO as a threat to their authority. His foresight 
of ensuring that the headquarters of the institution should be in Malawi, where the majority of 
the Chewa are based, whilst his royal headquarters is in Zambia, is a further manifestation of 
his ingenuity of consolidating the movement as a trans-border institution. The interest of 
Gawa Undi is clearly to enhance his movement beyond Zambia, where his influence might be 
insignificant. 
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Dr Malewezi is, as already stated, a former Vice President of Malawi who served the nation 
from 1994 up to 2004. Prior to this, Dr Malewezi served in various capacities in the Malawi 
Public Service, under Dr Banda, up to the position of Principal Secretary. Although his first 
degree was in sciences, he also studied African Anthropology, which later became ideal in his 
role as chair of CHEFO. From his public service and vice presidency experience, Dr 
Malewezi had become endowed with multiple social-political opportunities, respect and 
status which could assist him to be welcomed not only in Malawi but Mozambique and 
Zambia. The public sector and political networks he had amassed over the years had been 
helpful in linking the organization and his role across borders. His anthropological training 
had also been critical in understanding and managing Chewa cultural affairs. Although it is 
difficult to establish Dr Malewezi‟s interests, it is likely that, after the loss of political status, 
he still wants to maintain a key position of influence by being close to the centre of Chewa 
power, Gawa Undi himself. The trans-border movement, through CHEFO, therefore, 
enhances his status. 
 
As stated, Chief Kaomba is a graduate of the University of Malawi and, during the Dr Banda 
regime, he was politically well-connected. After Dr Banda, Kaomba had been very effective 
in re-inventing himself and had been close to almost all the subsequent Presidents of Malawi 
(who had always used him as a way to penetrate the former president‟s political stronghold). 
For many years, after Dr Banda‟s regime, he also served as Chairman of Traditional Chiefs in 
the country. A summation of Chief Kaomba‟s interests could be sustenance and consolidation 
of his chieftaincy which can, among other ways, be enhanced through a trans-border 
movement.  
 
At grassroots level, it seems all the Chewa now subscribe to the CHEFO ideology as 
articulated by Dr Malewezi. There are a few exceptions of course, especially amongst the 
Chewa of Lundu and Chief Kaomba; in this case, roughly more than 95% of Malawian 
Chewa chiefs (based on the author‟s own estimates) recognize and accept the authority of 
CHEFO as well as Gawa Undi. The reason for CHEFO‟s influence amongst the grassroots 
Chewa, as opposed to the Kaomba camp, is that King Gawa Undi officially recognizes the 
institution and it also organizes or coordinates the Kulamba Ceremony for all Chewas in 
Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. In other words, it is generally perceived by state 
authorities, and other key stakeholders, as a bona fide platform to articulate, organize and 
disseminate Chewa interests. Any Chewa group outside CHEFO fails to identify a 
„legitimate‟ space as well as resources to mobilise. CHEFO, with the leadership of Dr 
Malewezi, has from time to time been called upon to resolve some queries related to cultural 
interpretation and other related matters in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. Dr Malewezi 
has also been in the forefront to ensure that there is synchronization in the process of 
installation of Chewa chiefs.  In some cases, Dr Malewezi has become more prominent than 
CHEFO itself. For instance, in Chanje‟s area in Zambia, some FGDs participants were not 
very familiar with CHEFO, but they knew Dr Malewezi. Apart from the organizational 
importance of CHEFO to the welfare of the Chewa cultural interest, one Male FGD 
participant in Zambia mentioned that Dr Malewezi had been instrumental in ensuring that 
three key Chewa chieftaincies in Zambia should be filled (the chieftaincies had fallen vacant 
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after the death of the incumbents but they were not filled for a long time due to internal 
arguments). 
 
5.2.2 Critical analysis: Is the cultural elite convergence a challenge to state sovereignty? 
It can be inferred that despite the differences that the cultural elite behind the movement 
might possess, their interests converge on the quest to strengthen trans-border ties. Although 
Chief Kaomba of Malawi has been emphasizing the Malawi Chiefs Act and respecting 
Malawi as a sovereign nation in the setting up of the CHEFO, this was mainly in relation to 
consolidating his own position. His ultimate aim was the creation of the greater trans-border 
Chewa ethnic movement in which he would retain his influential position. In this entire 
scenario, the Chewa ethnic movement can be deduced as an elitist project but not necessarily 
with a conscious intention to challenge state sovereignty.  
 
In relation to the role of the elite in the formation of the movement, it can also be deduced 
that internal politics amongst the cultural elite was central to minimal external political 
influence. And so the movement can, in this case, be regarded as an elitist project with 
minimal implications on political nationalization. Although the dynamics of national politics 
contributed to the creation of the movement, there is no indication that the motives of the 
cultural elite was to pursue Chewa regional autonomy. Normally, the sovereign state feels 
endangered if the movement takes a political dimension of identity. While pursuing the 
political nationalism seems not to be the conscious objective of the cultural elite, they 
confirm Ekeh‟s (1975) thesis of the elite being behind the creation and sustenance of 
voluntary ethnic organizations.  
 
Although the Chewa movement can be regarded as an elitist movement, this study also agrees 
with the observation of Smith (1998), who argues that sometimes the role of the cultural elite 
is overemphasized. Smith (1998:130) points out that for the cultural elite to be successful, 
their base for mobilization must be “on pre-existing social and cultural networks. This makes 
them resonate with the masses”. In other words, the cultural elites‟ influence should not be 
seen in isolation from other „pre-existing social and cultural networks‟. The cultural elite, in 
other words, took advantage of the already existing trans-border social, cultural and historical 
linkages amongst the Chewa. These pre-existing linkages were not a challenge to state 
sovereignty and the cultural elite seem not to have deviated from this path either. 
 
Contrary to the view that the cultural elite are challenging the formal state sovereignty, what 
has actually happened is that the cultural elite are seemingly bringing the formal states of the 
three countries together in an informal kind of regionalism. Irrespective of their individual 
motives, the trans-border aspect of the movement has been seen as well as received by the 
state apparatus.  
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5.3   Factors influencing the formation of the contemporary Chewa trans-
border movement 
Before analysing the nature of the Chewa identity, it would be worth-while to discuss some 
of the factors that may have led to the emergence of this trans-border movement as this has 
an implication when discussing the issues of state sovereignty and citizenship. Based on 
interviews and secondary data, the study found that some of the factors leading towards the 
emergence of the Chewa trans-border ethnic movement are as follows: 
 
5.3.1   The  Chewa  asserting  themselves  as  a  great  ethnic  group 
Taking into consideration that the largest population of the Chewa is found in Malawi, the 
development of the Chewa ethnic movement might also be understood from complex ethnic 
related political dynamics within Malawi itself. Kamuzu Banda, a Chewa, is said to have 
created Chewa hegemony during his thirty-year dictatorship which contributed in part to the 
legitimization of his regime (Forster 1994, Moyo 2002, Chirambo 2005 and Chirambo 2009). 
While claiming that he was against tribalism, Dr Banda clearly promoted his own ethnic 
identity, Chewa, and even imposed it (Chichewa) as the official local language for the 
country. His emphasis on African tradition almost always focused on the Chewa values 
(Forster 1994). The Chewa ethnic identity therefore became the politically dominant group in 
the country for many years. The departure of Dr Banda from the political scene, with his 
successor Bakili Muluzi (a Yao) taking over the leadership, Malawi witnessed the decline of 
Chewa cultural hegemony. The new president encouraged the teaching and learning of other 
languages and did not rely on culture to consolidate his reign.  
 
According to the views of political analysts, the Chewa ethnic movement is coming in at a 
time when the Chewa, as an ethnic group, is losing influence in the nation of Malawi. In this 
case one political analyst said that: 
 
The Chewa as an ethnic group is the largest in the country and Kamuzu Banda the 
former President was a Chewa. When he lost power, it was as if the Chewa had lost 
influence politically and culturally, hence the need to preserve their culture…this 
trans-border mobilization somehow compensates on the felt marginalization of the 
community (Interview with a political analyst, Zomba, 12
th
 June 2012). 
 
By taking a cultural mobilisation platform, the Chewa ethnic mobilisation is avoiding the 
highly politicised tensions and divisions associated with political movements, but it still 
retains the ability to assert itself as a great nation.  
 
5.3.2     Credibility associated with trans-border movement 
Apart from the fact that the Chewa are found in three countries,  the trans-border aspects of 
the mobilisation ensures that it creates a more credible image which would generate respect 
among the key stakeholders. Another advantage of trans-border mobilisation is that the 
current state boundaries are not volatile as is the case in other African countries. The CHEFO 
chairperson elaborated on this by mentioning that “Trans-border mobilisation helps to 
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standardise customs, encourages integration of the countries and gives economic 
opportunities in trade and tourism. Generally, the concerned countries live peacefully 
together because of common bonds” (Interview with Dr Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe, 6th 
December 2012). 
 
If the current state borders were solely determined by ethnic groupings, the situation would 
have heightened trans-border conflict as the boundary between „outsiders‟ and „insiders‟ may 
have been apparent (Interview with political analysts, Zomba, 12
th
 June 2012). It may be 
argued that currently there is room for trans-border ethnic identity because individuals 
constantly get reminded of or consider it as another credible alternative identity whenever 
they interact with other ethnic groups within their nation-state. The Chewa movement is 
likely to become more vibrant because it is being encouraged by developments happening in 
other ethnic groups. Specifically, it is not only the Chewa who are searching for their trans-
border roots but the Lomwes (Malawi/Mozambique), the Ngoni (Malawi/Zambia), Yao 
(Malawi/Mozambique), Tumbuka (Malawi/Zambia) and several others. All these groups have 
arguably a „competitive‟ approach to demonstrate that they have a trans-border identity which 
is dominant and well organized (Interview with political analysts, Zomba, 12
th
 June 2012.  In 
this context, the „competition‟ will drive the Chewa to continually assert themselves in a 
trans-border model for a considerable period in the future. As one male FGD participant in 
TA Change, Zambia, mentioned before this mobilization, people thought the Chewa were 
few but now they respect them because they know that the Chewa are all over the region 
(Male FGD, Zambia, 17
th
 May 2012). 
 
5.3.3   New leadership in the post-liberation period 
The politics in the region have now changed so that Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia have 
embraced multiparty systems of governance. The District commissioner in Chipata, Zambia 
emphasised this point by stating that the significance of the Chewa movement [Chewa] came 
in after the multiparty system of governance in the region. In this case, ethnic groups felt that 
they should re-organise themselves and trace their base. He continued to explain that society 
became more open after multiparty but before that “even when you wanted to organise a 
small thing, governments used to be suspicious hence the openness itself has been one of the 
most important conditions. There has been the emergence of civil society -whether religious 
or ethnic based- mainly after 1994 and beyond” (Interview with the District Commissioner, 
Chipata, 18
th
 May 2012). 
 
Another point is that this trans-border movement is emerging now due to a „new breed‟ of 
political leaders in the region which is inclined towards a closer working relationship. Africa 
is now in the post-liberation period; as a result, the mistrust and misunderstanding amongst 
political leaders have almost disappeared. During the liberation period, Zambia and 
Mozambique used to host some individuals who were sworn enemies of Dr Banda‟s regimes 
such as Yatuta Chisiza and Dr Mpakati, respectively. It is also alleged that Malawi used to 
provide logistical support to the Mozambican Renamo rebels. These situations were 
somehow responsible for strained relations, especially between Malawi and Mozambique. 
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Several potential crises between Malawi and Mozambique had emerged in the past. For 
instance, on 6
th
 November 1987, the Malawi plane was shot down by the Mozambique 
government killing eight key Malawian individuals who were in the plane. The Mozambique 
government claimed that the plane had strayed into their territory and was suspected of being 
a rebel plane. Malawi-Mozambique relations were also in the spotlight when President 
Samora Machel‟s plane crashed in October 1986 killing almost all the passengers on board. 
The South African government, which is alleged to have shot down the plane (this has never 
been proved), said that they had found documents in the plane which showed that the 
Mozambican president was planning an invasion of Malawi (Sagawa 2011). The reason for 
the invasion according to the South African government was Malawi‟s alleged support of 
Renamo rebels. The crisis in the Zambia-Malawi relations occurred when Dr Banda 
emphasised that part of Zambia belongs to Malawi (Chiume 1982). Dr Banda‟s argument was 
that the Eastern part of Zambia comprises several Malawian-based ethnic groups, especially 
the Chewa and Ngoni. Specifically, he argued that contemporary Malawi is part of the former 
Maravi Kingdom which extended as far as the Eastern part of Zambia; hence the boundary of 
Malawi should be extended to include this area. This claim by Dr Banda raised a lot of 
criticism and strained relations between Malawi and Zambia. Although the situation 
improved over the years, the suspicion and mistrust never diminished completely (Sagawa 
2011). 
 
More damaging to the relations between Malawi and its neighbours, especially Zambia and 
Mozambique, was its foreign policies (Chiume 1982 and Sagawa 2011). After independence, 
Malawi established diplomatic relations with Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) and 
apartheid South Africa. According to Dr Banda, these relations were established so as to 
ensure that the country would be able to sustain economic development. The Malawi 
government did this despite strong opposition from the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU). This led to Dr Banda alienating the country from all liberation movements and other 
African countries.  In his epic speech delivered at an OAU conference in Cairo in July 1964, 
he refused to support a resolution to cut off economic and diplomatic links with Portuguese 
East Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, arguing that: 
 
In my own state of Malawi, for example, the colonial geography makes it impossible 
for me to cut off all relations with Portugal, diplomatic, commercial, cultural and 
otherwise, because colonial history and colonial geography have denied it a port of its 
own…I do not want to be a hypocrite, I do not want anyone to accuse me of hypocrisy 
after I leave this room, because it is impossible for me to accept any such resolutions 
(GoM 1964).  
 
Malawi established trade and labour relations with South Africa and also received massive 
aid from the same. Dr Banda also amazed other African leaders by establishing diplomatic 
relations with apartheid South Africa in October 1967. Malawi benefited from South Africa‟s 
loan to the tune of 8 million Rands for the construction of the new Capital City in Lilongwe 
(Potts 1985:188). Zambia hosted the African National Congress and other Mozambican and 
Zimbabwean liberation movements and so looked at Malawi with suspicion. Similarly, when 
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Mozambique got its independence in 1975, Malawi‟s lack of support for the liberation 
movement was not completely forgotten. 
 
The departure of Dr Banda from political leadership in 1994 created an atmosphere of 
renewed hope and trust. More importantly, the new government of Malawi, led by Bakili 
Muluzi, was keen to move Malawi out of the three decade isolation and earnestly pursued 
policies that would bring the country closer to the international community. In this regard, 
amending relations with Malawi‟s neighbours became one of the government‟s priorities.  
 
5.3.4 Creation of Chewa Heritage Foundation 
The creation of CHEFO has been significant to the Chewa movement in several respects. 
First, the organization enhances unity of the Chewa as a community. Although CHEFO is 
under the authority of King Gawa Undi, it is, practically speaking, CHEFO which articulates 
the vision and values of the Chewa in touch with modernity. In this case, CHEFO acts like an 
overarching institution which operates above the chieftaincy. Consequently, the internal 
Chewa leadership squabbles and tensions are deflected by the institution as it does not pose 
as a leadership competitor. It also articulates or defines the differing viewpoints of the 
„authentic‟ Chewa traditions promoting consensus on potentially conflicting issues. For 
instance one Chief during interviews mentioned that as a young traditional leader, when he 
wants to learn more about how to initiate traditional practices in his area, it is CHEFO staff 
who guide him (Key informant interview/chief, Lilongwe 11
th
 May 2012). Similarly, another 
lady chief stated that before she became chief, she did not know that the Chewas came from 
Congo, but through CHEFO she is now knowledgable on the matter (Key informant 
interview/Chief, Lilongwe, 11
th
 May 2012). 
 
Secondly, being a registered institution, it has created several opportunities that go along with 
registered institutions such as the legal mandate to solicit funds (see Appendix 12) and 
government recognition. For instance, CHEFO has been instrumental in raising funds for 
specific Chewa functions. 
 
Thirdly, the organization ably conducts research and keeps modern records of Chewa chiefs 
and traditions across the three countries of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. For instance, 
the Chairperson mentioned that with democratic goverments established in Mozambique, 
Malawi and Zambia, there was now that freedom to visit these countries and establish the 
number of Chewa chiefs in these countries. He claimed that they now have a record of all 
Chewa chiefs and ably communicate with them (Interview with Dr Malewezi, CHEFO 
Chairperson, Lilongwe, 10
th
 May 2012). 
 
Finally, CHEFO has educated office bearers who are able to articulate, protect and promote 
the Chewa people‟s interests using the modern systems of communication and influence. In 
this regard, a pre-colonial Chewa historian mentioned that “most traditional institutions have 
not yet realized the potential of using educated and respected individuals and modern systems 
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to advance their interests as CHEFO has done” (Key informant interview/Historian, Zomba, 
28
th
 April 2012). 
 
5.3.5 Geographical advantage 
With the exception of the Lomwe ethnic group, the replication of the Chewa movement is 
unlikely to successfully occur amongst other ethnic groups in Malawi, Mozambique and 
Zambia due to the geographical situation. Unlike other major trans-border ethnic groups (in 
Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia) such as the Yao, Tumbuka and Ngoni, the Chewa- 
dominated areas are within a wide and single geographical area. This favourable geographical 
proximity allows them to easily link and transact. The other major trans-border ethnic groups 
are, geographically speaking, more like „patches of identities‟ across several isolated areas. 
This point is reinforced by an observation made by one chief in Mozambique who mentioned 
that the unique part of the Chewa Kingdom is that it is almost continuous with only a few 
pockets of other ethnic groups such as the Ngoni and Yao (Key informant interview/chief, 
Angonia, 27
th
 May 2012). 
 
5.4 Contemporary status of the Chewa trans-border identity 
The contemporary Chewa ethnic group according to CHEFO official documentation 
comprises a collection of about 4 or 5 sub-groups. Some of these sub-groups are the Nyanja 
(Chewas near the Lake Malawi in Mozambique and Malawi), the Chipeta (Chewas in the 
plains of Malawi and Zambia), the Mang‟anja (those in the Southern Highlands of Malawi), 
the Senga (those near Senga Hill in Petauke, Zambia), and the Gowa (those in the Luangwa 
Valley of Zambia). UNESCO, which declared the Chewa‟s Nyau or Gule Wamkulu 
traditional dance as a significant cultural heritage, estimated that there are about 15 million 
Chewa people in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia
16
.  The highest population share of the 
Chewa is found in Malawi (about 47% of the country‟s population). Table 7 below shows 
population share (state population) of the Chewa in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique and 
the total number of districts in which they are found.  
Table 7:  Population share of the Chewa in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique 
 
Country Share of State Popn. No. of Chiefs No. of Chewa 
Districts 
Zambia 7% 42 7 
Mozambique 3% 33 5 
Malawi 47% 137 21 
Sources: Posner (2009) and CHEFO 
Traditionally, all Chewa Chiefs are subservient to Undi, their King, on all traditional issues 
governing Chiefs‟ succession, promotion, demotion or dissolution of Chieftainship. However, 
formally states have written laws giving themselves powers on such matters. Currently the 
                                                          
16
This also tallies with Posner‟s (2009) calculations based on the Joshua Project 
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practical arrangement is that the King is consulted when governments have to make critical 
decisions on Chewa chieftaincy. Whenever the King visits Malawi and Mozambique he is 
accorded the VIP treatment just like formal government officials. The Chewa Heritage 
Foundation (CHEFO) was established during the reign of Kalonga Gawa Undi X1 to act as a 
Secretariat for the King and the chiefs in the three countries. It is headquartered in Malawi 
and the current Chairperson
17
 of the Foundation is the former Vice President of Malawi, Dr 
Justine Malewezi. Specifically, in the contemporary situation, according to Banda (2008:105) 
and CHEFO Chairperson, the Chewa Kingdom is governed through three administrative 
organs which are Chewa Royal Establishment (now called CHEFO), the Royal Family and 
the Undi Chewa Traditional Council. Membership to the first and second institutions is 
through appointment whilst for the Royal family it is through the royal bloodline. According 
to Banda (2008), one of the most important individuals in the Royal Family is Nyangu, the 
queen mother. These administrative organs highlighted above are not necessarily duplicated 
at chiefdom and village levels (Banda 2008). Figure 6 below shows the extent of the Chewa 
Kingdom.  
 
Figure 6:  Map showing the Chewa Kingdom with its extension in Malawi, Zambia and 
Mozambique 
 
 
                                                          
17When the study was being carried out, the Chairperson was Dr Malewezi but as from April 2013, the new Chairperson is 
Professor Kanyama Phiri. 
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KEY: 
 
X       Approximate site of principal chewa chiefs and tributary chiefs 
------   Approximate boundaries of chiefdoms/kingdoms and tributary chiefdoms 
  Approximate boundaries of Undi, Chulu or Lundu chiefs 
 
U        Various capital sites of Undi within his kingdom of Mano 
NOTE: Although the boundaries occasionally changed during the pre-colonial period, the map depicts an 
almost present status of the boundaries of the kingdom. 
Source: Kayuni (2011) 
According to Article 3.1, the mandate of CHEFO “shall be to protect, promote and preserve 
the Chewa culture under the guidance of His Majesty Kalonga Gawa Undi through his 
recognised bodies and organisations”. The specific mandates are: 
 
1. Provide strategic advice to the traditional leadership of the Chewa tribe through 
setting leadership goals and strategies for promoting and preserving the Chewa 
culture. 
2. Promote collaboration, partnership and networking between CHEFO and existing or 
future cultural organisations of other ethnic groupings inside or outside Malawi. 
3. To lobby for funds for use in the attainment of the objectives of CHEFO. 
4. To collect and receive royalties from institutions and other organisations that use and 
exhibit Chewa artefacts and materials. 
 
Similarly, under Article 4.1 “The broad objective of CHEFO is to protect, promote and 
preserve the Chewa culture”. 
 
In relation to how the organisation links with other Chewas in Zambia and Mozambique, the 
CHEFO chairperson mentioned that, although CHEFO is registered in Malawi, it links up 
with Mozambique through a committee chaired by a Mr Dimba. In Zambia, the Council of 
Royal Councillors (Nduna) is the link organization which works closely with a Committee 
called the Lusaka Chewa Committee, especially on technical matters (many members of the 
Lusaka Committee are also government officials). The Mozambican Committee is closely 
supported by the Department of Culture through District Commissioners (Interview with Dr 
Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe, 6
th
December 2012). 
 
5.4 Gawa Undi traditional authority versus state political authority: Politics 
of representation at play 
This section examines the trans-border authority of Kalonga Gawa Undi and how this affects 
or has the potential to affect state sovereignty. Specifically, the section analyses the extent to 
which there could be ethnic politicization through CHEFO, as well as the extent to which the 
various trans-border roles of Gawa Undi may be regarded as a threat to state sovereignty. 
5.4.1 General perception of ethnic politicization of the movement 
Officially, Gawa Undi is the head of CHEFO and it has been argued by almost all 
independent key informants that CHEFO is being used by Gawa Undi to enhance his view of 
trans-border ethnic politicization and not necessarily pursing a cultural agenda. All analysts 
in Malawi stated that after the 1994 democratic dispensation, the Chewa ethnic group in 
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Malawi felt that they were being politically oppressed. As pointed out by one Malawian 
political analyst, the Chewa noted that despite being “a dominant tribe but not enjoying 
political power, they felt something is wrong” (Key informant interview/Political analyst, 
Lilongwe, 11
th
 May 2012). From this perspective, the Chewa process of identifying 
themselves with their Chewa Kingship is a way of trying to consolidate their next possible 
alternative political base, whilst preparing themselves to take over the formal political 
leadership in the long run. As one key informant pointed out: 
You understand, someone used to be a ruler and finds that using the formal structures of 
power in Malawi society is weakening and they are not able to get power. Now they are 
asking themselves „how best can we exercise our muscles and get power, OK let us revive 
our Kingship‟. That is why the secretariat of CHEFO itself is in Malawi and not in 
Zambia where the King resides… it is a question of power, when you lose the formal 
power, you would always substitute it with informal power and the Chewa have proved 
that they can use the informal institutions to gain the power that they have lost formally 
(Key Informant interview/University Lecturer, Zomba, 13
th
 June 2012). 
In the 2009 elections, although Bingu wa Mutharika was not a Chewa, he amassed many 
votes amongst the Chewa of the central region and one of the arguments for his large support 
amongst the Chewa is attributed to his campaign strategy. Contrary to the previous president, 
Bakili Muluzi, who vilified Kamuzu, Bingu actually glorified him and regarded him as a hero 
of the country. Among other things, Bingu ordered the construction of a Kamuzu mausoleum 
and his statue in the capital city. However, the Chewa support for Bingu was short-lived, 
because soon after the elections he started identifying himself with the rival Lomwe group 
under an organisation called Mulhakho wa Alomwe.  
Officially, CHEFO argues that Gawa Undi and the Chewa as a tribe do not have any political 
affiliation and it is at the discretion of an individual Chewa to choose a political party of 
his/her choice to associate with. Their argument is that one cannot achieve a political goal by 
using Chewa identity but by joining a particular political party, as individuals, to express their 
political feelings or views. However, the generally held perception and accusations that 
CHEFO is a political organisation, pursuing Gawa Undi‟s political interests, has in several 
ways, reached CHEFO officials. The officials‟ reaction to these accusations or perceptions 
has in most cases been forcefully expressed. For instance, the Publicity Secretary of CHEFO 
stated that “I am sorry to say this, those who say this is a political organisation are shallow 
minded… CHEFO can never be a political organisation for the basic reason that the Chewas 
are spread across the country and have different interests…we can‟t achieve the political 
agenda” (Key informant interview/CHEFO Publicity Secretary, Lilongwe, 10th May 2012). 
These accusations are not limited to ordinary people, but even at higher levels, as observed 
by the CHEFO Chairman. In this case, the chairperson of CHEFO had strikingly similar 
observations when he mentioned that there is a danger from politicians who may feel 
politically threatened with the Chewa movement: “This I noticed when I was talking to some 
people in government somewhere, I will not mention the country” (Key informant 
interview/Dr Malewezi, CHEFO chairman, Lilongwe, 10
th
 May 2012). 
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5.4.2 Gawa Undi’s trans-border roles, authority and the formal state 
In relation to the trans-border roles of Gawa Undi, there have been several observations that 
could plausibly explain his growing political influence in the three countries. Firstly, there is 
the extra-legal official definition of Gawa Undi accorded to his chieftaincy by the state. In 
this case, the study noted that the informal authority of Gawa Undi has on several occasions 
effortlessly been transferred into formal state authority across the borders of the three 
countries. For instance, although Gawa Undi is according to the laws governing chieftaincies 
of Malawi or Mozambique, not officially recognised, he is, however, provided with official 
government reception equivalent to a government minister or head of state when he visits 
these countries.  
Secondly, the treatment that Gawa Undi receives from respected Chewa former and current 
politicians, especially in Malawi, symbolically reinforces his political influence. Related to 
this point is the reporting structure of the movement which puts emphasis on his throne. One 
political scientist even commented on how Gawa Undi is highly regarded by some of 
Malawi‟s most respected Chewa people such as the CHEFO chairperson himself, Dr 
Malewezi. The political scientist argues that the treatment they give him is symbolically a 
sign that their loyalty is not to the state of Malawi but to the informal institution of the 
Chewa. Specifically, he pointed out that:  
You might have seen the former vice-president [Dr Malewezi] kneeling in respect before 
the GawaUndi but I never remember seeing him [when he was vice president] kneeling 
before the then country‟s president Bakili Muluzi. He had problems in kneeling before the 
formal president of the country but he is free to kneel before an informal leader of an 
ethnic group. My view is that he is sending the message to say that „we cannot pay 
allegiance to the formal state but our own state‟ some kind of a symbolic protest message 
of its own (Key informant interview/Political scientist, Zomba, 12
th
 June 2012). 
Another analyst further argued that the reporting structure of CHEFO, as well as the 
Malawian former Vice President‟s role in the movement, creates a clear picture of the 
growing political influence of Gawa Undi. He argued that Gawa Undi is using the informal 
structures which ultimately affect the formal structures of the state in order to pursue his 
interests. He pointed out that “the former Vice President of the state of Malawi is head of a 
secretariat of the Chewa tribe and is answerable to a king who is based in Zambia; can you 
imagine?” (Key informant interview/Political analyst, Lilongwe, 11th May 2012). 
Thirdly, Gawa Undi has in some instances defied political authorities of Malawi so that his 
interests should be protected and respected. For instance, just before the 2009 elections in 
Malawi (during the campaign period), the government organized the installation of Chief 
Kabunduli in Nkhata Bay (a Tonga chief - a sub-group of the Chewa). King Gawa Undi 
refused to attend the ceremony citing the potentiality of politicization of the ceremony during 
the campaign period. He claimed that the government may use him for their own political 
gain and said that the ceremony should be held after the campaign period. Again, a key 
informant interviewee argues that this action “in itself sent a message that „we are an 
independent entity that does things on its own‟ and also a demonstration of the entity‟s 
power” (Key informant interview/Political scientist, Zomba, 12th June 2012). This doesn‟t 
mean that after this incident Gawa Undi was sidelined by state officials; actually when Gawa 
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Undi visits Malawi and Mozambique, he is still accorded with high-level official treatment 
such as a convoy and other VIP related protocols. He is also provided with security and 
accommodation by the state and this type of treatment is unprecedented amongst the 
traditional leaders. A year later the president of Malawi in 2010 even gave the impression that 
Gawa Undi is actually the one „looking after the people‟ when he “thanked Gawa Undi for 
coming despite his busy schedule of looking after Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia where 
he is in-charge of 15 million Chewa people” (Sunday Times, 31 October 2010, p. 2, emphasis 
added). 
 
When a newspaper reporter asked Mr Joseph Chikuta, a senior counsellor for Gawa Undi the 
question: “Can Gawa Undi remove a defiant chief from his position, for example a chief from 
Malawi, since he is in another country with its own constitution?” His response was: “Yes it 
is possible. Gawa Undi can actually remove a defiant chief. This can be done by telling the 
people whose chief is defiant to choose another chief. It must be known that though the 
Chewa are coming from different countries, their leader is Gawa Undi” (Malawi News, 17-23 
September, 2011, p. 12). Again, in another incident, Mr Chikuta Mbewe, the Kalonga‟s 
spokesperson and administrator mentioned that: “In our tradition, cases don‟t end in the court 
but at the mouth of Kalonga. Those who seek the court‟s assistance forget that the chieftaincy 
was there because of Kalonga. It is only Kalonga who has the power to accept or reject 
chieftaincy”, he said (The Nation, 17th February, 2010, p.3). 
Fourthly, it is the unexpected political support that Gawa has been receiving from the state 
which demonstrates his political influence. In the wrangle between Lundu (Paramount chief 
in Malawi) and Gawa Undi, Lundu seemed to present arguments that would strengthen the 
state by saying that Undi is not stipulated in the laws of Malawi hence there are no reasons 
for recognising his authority. Surprisingly, the government has seemingly backed Gawa- 
someone outside their domain of authority- as a legitimate traditional leader in the country. 
This is captured in the newspaper article which mentioned that “… government said it still 
recognised Kalonga Gawa Undi as the Chewa King and advised Lundu to sort out his 
differences with Kalonga himself and not government” (Malawi News, 2-8 October, 2010, 
p.1-3). Contrary to the expected norm of a Westphalian state proclamation that it has supreme 
authority within its boundary, the Minister of Local Government in Malawi actually 
consented to Kalonga‟s authority in Malawi when she said that “…there was no problem for a 
foreign king having powers over local chiefs because that shows unity” (The Daily Times, 
13
th
 October, 2010, p.2). 
Malewezi further responded to this incident by mentioning that “The King always tells his 
chiefs to work with their respective governments and obey the laws. However, on matters of 
tradition, Kalonga Gawa Undi expects that traditional rules should be followed and referred to 
the chiefs and ultimately to him” (Malawi News, 16-22 October, 2010, p. 10, emphasis 
added). The Lundu-Gawa Undi disagreement clearly demonstrated that the state of Malawi 
could not challenge Gawa Undi and the Malawian government minister even added that 
though Gawa is a foreigner, his exercise of authority in Malawi is a demonstration of unity for 
these countries.  
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In support of the King‟s cross border authority and legitimacy, the CHEFO chairperson 
mentioned that in the west they had the concept of „divine authority‟ in which they believed 
that their kingship came from God. For the Chewa, they believe that their source of 
chieftainship is Kalonga and in this case the entire Chewa chiefs have their allegiance to 
Kalonga as the person who gave them their land. The chairperson further mentioned that 
because of that there are certain ceremonies such as Kulamba to demonstrate this allegiance. 
One Zambian analyst observed that through ceremonies such as Kulamba “there is some 
discipline in the way chiefs behave because they are answerable to one authority although 
chiefs per se would say that they are answerable to the government of the day within the 
territorial borders” (Key informant interview/Local government official, Chipata, 18th May 
2012).  
5.4.3 Public challenge to states’ socio-economic policies 
It was observed during data collection that King Gawa Undi has on several occasions 
publicly challenged state authorities on issues of socio-economic governance. Specifically, 
when he meets the political leadership of the three countries he normally points out that the 
governments should address the social-economic welfare of the people because their living 
standards are not improving. For instance in an article entitled “Cotton debacle: Kalonga 
Gawa Undi talks tough” (Inside Zambia Magazine, 25th August 2012) it exemplifies some of 
the ways in which Gawa Undi has been forcefully confronting state policies. He criticized 
government policies in agriculture which had negatively affected many Zambians. In this 
regard one key informant interpreted this as a challenge to state sovereignty when he argued 
that: “In his messages Gawa Undi is indirectly saying that „I am the bona fide leader of these 
people and you political leaders are not doing your job‟. If the message was only for 
Zambians, it would not carry weight but because he speaks for 15 million people then it 
carries more weight” (Key informant interview/Political scientist, Zomba, 12th June 2012). 
5.4.4 Critical analysis: Is state sovereignty in policies and practices challenged by Chewa 
identity? 
According to Berman et al (2004:5), political ethnicity or nationalism manifests where, 
among other things, an ethnic group relates with the state. This is the case because this 
interaction presents opportunities for actors to exercise their actual and potential power or 
influence. The various interactions with the state mentioned above, provide some insights on 
whether Gawa Undi and CHEFO might be regarded as a threat to state sovereignty or not.  
 
In relation to the view that Gawa Undi through CHEFO is aiming at ethnic politicisation, 
what is interesting is that almost all the independent key informants supported this 
perspective. After carefully observing the views from both sides it was apparent that no 
plausible evidence was provided to support this assertion. In other words, although the widely 
held view is that Gawa Undi and CHEFO are aiming at Chewa trans-border ethnic 
politicisation, this study does not support this view due to lack of evidence. In this regard 
therefore, Gawa Undi and CHEFO are not necessarily a threat to trans-border state 
sovereignty. 
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The state sovereignty might be seen to be challenged by the Chewa movement when its leader 
Gawa Undi poses as another parallel arm of the state- when he challenges the policies being 
pursued by the governments of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. According to the Chiefs 
Act of 1967 of Malawi, the state, through the President, is the ultimate decision maker on the 
elevation, demotion and enthronement of traditional authorities in the country. The admission 
that Gawa Undi has a significant role to play in the affairs of the country‟s traditional chiefs is 
a direct contradiction to the role of state in such issues. In this case, it might be concluded that 
the Chewa movement is indeed a challenge to sovereignty of the state.  
 
However, by taking a constructivist perspective, this move by the state is a way of 
maximising its own legitimacy by supporting the cultural identity of its citizenry which 
demand that their cultural leader should play a role in this identity. Contrary to the centralists 
Westphalian perspective, highlighting socio-economic concerns helps the Chewa chieftaincy 
to appeal to the people whilst at the same time being recognised as the legitimate implementer 
of the said policies. It poses as „a listening government/state‟ which has even provided a 
platform for the Kalonga to speak. In this case, although the Kalonga might be seen as if he is 
in control, the reality is that the state is in control because it has provided the platform for him 
as almost all the meetings are partly funded by the state itself. As a Zambian professor stated, 
Undi may not be regarded as a threat to the state but is actually reinforcing the relevance of 
the state to his sustenance of authority, in this case it is through the platform of the state that 
his authority is recognised (Telephonic Interview with Professor Phiri, Lusaka, 7
th 
February 
2013). 
 
In relation to authority over traditional authorities, Gawa Undi‟s control is not absolute. In 
fact in the 2013 Kulamba ceremony speech, Gawa Undi complained of the excessive 
government control on chieftaincies which undermines his authority. Specifically, he stated 
that “There are instances where the government has taken decisions without consulting the 
concerned royal establishment… We would therefore like to urge the government to respect 
and adhere to these long-established norms and traditions”(Kalonga Gawa Undi‟s speech at 
the 2013 Kulamba Ceremony, 31
st
 August 2013, Mkaika, Zambia). 
 
From a constructivist perspective, the change of programmes for the installation of Chief 
Kabunduli in Malawi may not necessarily be regarded as the Chewa movement‟s challenge to 
the state but the state‟s own recognition of the importance of state-society relations for it to 
remain relevant and legitimate in the eyes of its community. This is the essence of the social 
constructivism argument that sovereignty is not static but dynamic so that it fulfills different 
uses within a particular context.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed contemporary Chewa identity by, among other things, 
highlighting the significance of the three countries in expression of Chewa ethnic identity and 
how the conflicting cultural elites‟ interests might have contributed to the formation of 
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CHEFO. The chapter also discussed the centrality of Gawa Undi‟s trans-border authority and 
how it might have a bearing on state sovereignty. Specifically,Gawa Undi‟s various trans-
border roles and exercises of his authority may demonstrate that he is a threat to state 
authority-when the state is challenged and „gives in‟ and also when the states of Malawi and 
Mozambique provide him with extra-legal official recognition. From a constructivist 
perspective, the opposite is the case. It may actually be argued from a constructivist 
perspective that this is the state‟s own recognition of the importance of state-society relations 
for it to remain relevant and legitimate in the eyes of its community. This is the essence of 
social constructivism argument that sovereignty is not static but dynamic so that it fulfils 
different uses within a particular context. The state may be seen as „giving in‟ to Undi when 
actually it is flexibly reinforcing its own existence and legitimacy so that Undi and the Chewa 
ultimately view the state as reflecting their own aspirations. It may also be argued that the 
leaders of the Chewa movement have political backgrounds and use the Chewa in some ways 
as to continue to have political influence. If they take this too far and challenge the state, they 
risk being shut down and therefore construct a non-challenging relationship with the state. In 
addition, the state allows this as long as it reinforces state legitimacy e.g. through framing the 
trans-border movement as a form of regionalism. 
 
The next chapter explores the extent to which the trans-border cultural ceremonies, such as 
Kulamba and Gulewamkulu, might be an expression of political or cultural nationalism. The 
findings are linked to their implication on the states‟ sovereignty.  
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CHAPTER6 
POLITICAL VERSUS CULTURAL NATIONALISM: THE CULTURAL 
CEREMONIES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
 
6.0 Introduction 
The contemporary Chewa of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia mainly identify Kulamba and 
Gule Wamkulu as some of their key trans-border identity activities. These cultural events 
enhance their trans-border activities but at the same time also raise some critical questions 
which have a bearing on state sovereignty. In other words, the cultural nationalism narrative 
argues that some groups will pursue a cultural agenda when they know that the situation is 
not conducive for them to pursue a political agenda. However, when the social-political 
environment becomes conducive, they take up the political agenda. Pursuing a political 
agenda is detrimental to state sovereignty. This chapter examines the extent to which these 
cultural events have the potential to challenge state sovereignty of the said three countries. 
Basically, in the colonial period, Kulamba was associated with a form of Chewa „protest‟ in 
which they were perceived as demonstrating allegiance to their informal leader and not the 
colonial state. Consequently, the ceremony was banned and never resuscitated even in the 
post-independence period. It is only after the recent „second wind of change‟ that brought in 
democratic reforms in Africa that the ceremony has been reintroduced. The banning of the 
ceremony during the colonial period and the long period that followed before its 
reintroduction implies a lot of its significance to the state authorities which the chapter 
examines.  
The Nyau or Gule Wamkulu (masked dancers reserved for Chewa initiates) has now become 
one of the most distinguishing factors of Chewa tradition in contemporary Malawi, Zambia 
and Mozambique
18.  Specifically, Nyau has “acted as a guardian of Chewa traditions and 
identity” as well as a traditional (initiation) school for the community (Banda 2008:116). 
Apart from acting as a school for young Chewas, Banda (2008:117) further adds that Nyau 
also acted as “Dance for entertainment and lately as a form of entrepreneurship, a tool used 
by the Chewa to show some subtle resistance to foreign cultures and invaders, and a teaching 
aid in solving social, moral, and spiritual problems facing the Chewa”. However, despite this 
articulated role of Gule Wamkulu, there are several other concealed roles that it is perceived 
to be playing amongst the Chewa. Basically, almost all its activities are conducted in secrecy 
and its initiates are not allowed to disclose to the non-initiates what they have learnt. Some 
have argued that the Chewa have had the potential to pursue the political agenda under the 
cover of this trans-border cultural activity. In this case this chapter examines the extent to 
which trans-border cultural ceremonies such as Kulamba and Gule Wamkulu might be an 
expression of political or cultural nationalism. The chapter argues that the Chewa movement 
has, depending on the situation, pursued both political and cultural agendas. More 
                                                          
18
It is not the intention of this study to extensively discuss the debates on the origin and practices of the 
Gulewamkulu suffice to mention that it is greatly revered amongst the Chewa. 
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importantly, the political agenda was not pursued with intention of seeking political 
autonomy as political nationalism may suggest, but it was pursued to promote and enhance 
cultural interests of the Chewa. 
 
The first part provides the context by discussing Kulamba as a central feature of Chewa trans-
border identity and the following section further discusses the Kulamba ceremony by 
expounding on the extent to which it might be regarded as a modern invention. The third 
section interrogates the politicisation element in the ceremony and this is followed by an 
examination of the link between Kulamba and Lozi‟s Kuomboka ceremony. Before 
concluding, the chapter discusses the Gule Wamkulu and the extent to which it might be used 
as a cover up for trans-border ethnic politicisation.  
6.1 Kulamba ceremony as centre of trans-border contemporary Chewa 
ethnic identity 
At the centre of the Chewa tradition is what is known as the Kulamba annual ceremony held 
at the headquarters of Paramount Chief Gawa Undi in Katete, Zambia. The Chewa word 
Kulamba literally means „to pay homage‟. This annual ceremony attracts thousands of 
people, including hundreds of Chewa chiefs and sub-chiefs from Mozambique, Malawi and 
Zambia. In this context, the Kulamba ceremony is probably one of the major annual events 
for the Chewa. It is both a Thanksgiving ceremony and a New Year celebration and it is held 
at the end of the Agricultural year (August-September). The people, led by their Chiefs, give 
thanks to Chiuta (God) for the good harvest, peace and general prosperity being expereinced. 
They also give thanks to the Kalonga Undi for his stewardship over the year and re-commit 
themselves to the Kalonga in paying homage and offering gifts.  It is said that in the pre-
colonial period each chief‟s title resembled the specific duties assigned to him so that even 
the tribute to be brought during the Kulamba ceremony had to conform to these duties. For 
instance, Banda (2008:106) provides examples of these titles and the expected tributes as 
follows: 
 
1. Kawaza (carver of tools like axes). The tributes he would bring are the carved items 
and tools. 
2. Pembamoyo (Preserver of life). He was in charge of issues related to priesthood, e.g. 
praying for rain and the offering of sacrifices. 
3. Zingalume (Even if they [bees] sting). He was in charge of forest tributes e.g. honey. 
4. Kathumba (The bag). He was in charge of tributes from the field e.g. maize, millet etc. 
5. Chikuwe (Shouter). He was responsible for publicity issues or announcer during 
ceremonies. 
6. Mbangombe (The stealer of cattle). He was responsible for animal tributes. 
7. Kalindabwalo (The overseer of a place). He was left to take charge of the land where 
Kalonga Gawa Undi left his concubine Nyanje. 
 
According to Banda (2008), this was a form of tax collection, because whatever was collected 
was re-distributed to needy people within the Kingdom.  It is widely argued amongst the 
Chewa that the ceremony had been held annually since the creation of the Undi Kingdom 
until 1934 when the British colonial government banned it - it felt that their own authority 
would ultimately be undermined in the region. This was also explained by the Chairman of 
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CHEFO who mentioned that it had been banned by the British in 1930s because they saw it 
as a threat to colonial power and the missionaries also did not like Gule Wamkulu (Interview 
with Dr Malewezi, CHEFO Chairperson, Lilongwe, 10
th
 May 2012). The subsequent post-
colonial authorities of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique extended the ban in the pretext of 
enhancing nationalism. In the 1980s, the process of restoring the ceremony was pursued, and 
in 1984 the ceremony was revived but it was mainly attended by the Chewa of Zambia. The 
reason why the governments of Malawi and Mozambique were not supporting the initiative 
then was mainly political, as the Publicity Secretary of CHEFO puts it, because the presidents 
of the two countries felt that allowing Chewas to go to Zambia from Malawi and 
Mozambique would put into question their own sovereignty. He further said that probably the 
Malawi and Mozambique leaders were asking themselves, “Why should my people leave 
Malawi to go to Zambia? Similarly why should my people leave Mozambique to go to 
Zambia? Does it mean the Zambian King and president is (sic) more legitimate than their 
country‟s?” (Interview with Mr Zilirakhasu, CHEFO Publicity Secretary, Lilongwe, 10th May 
2012). 
 
By 1994 the ceremony itself was revived at trans-border level. The restoration of the 
ceremony also witnessed high-profile visits by the King to his „subjects‟ in Malawi and 
Mozambique. One individual who had attended the ceremony aptly captures the atmosphere 
as well as the underlying integrating significance by explaining that, 
Kulamba is indeed a great traditional ceremony. It pulls together the traditional dancers 
from three countries who entertain people. And the attending people can‟t 
be distinguished as Chewas from Zambia, Mozambique or Malawi. During the period of 
the ceremony the Chewas from Malawi and Mozambique literally walk into 
Zambia without visas. They don‟t need them. It is reminiscent of the bygone era before 
British colonization. But all end up at the capital of the Chewa, Mkaika, to join 
in praising their ruler with the common „Yooh! Gawa!‟[sic] (Zambia African Safari-
Biweekly, Issue No. 19, 04 October 2006) 
The Kulamba ceremony is therefore an avenue where Chewa chiefs show their allegiance to 
Kalonga Gawa Undi as their king. The ceremony also serves as a cohesive factor among the 
Chewa and it has markedly earned a place in history as one of Southern Africa‟s largest 
displays of culture and tradition, attracting tourists from all over the world. The ceremony 
starts at nine in the morning and ends around three in the afternoon. Before the ceremony 
starts, the Kalonga sits in his Gwalada, which is a restricted place where he sits in seclusion 
with Chewa Chiefs and his guests of honour. Among others, the Gwalada serves as a place of 
prayer where, prior to the function, the Kalonga and his chiefs fast and pray, guarded by the 
Ambiri (Soldiers or Bodyguards). From the Gwalada, the Kalonga enters the Dzimbabwe in a 
procession, accompanied by his Ndunas or counsellors and chiefs, after the guests of honour 
are seated. However, before Kalonga enters the Dzimbabwe there are traditional dances from 
across the participanting countries that entertain the people and important guests, such as 
government officials and chiefs from other tribes who are escorted to their designated places 
in the Dzimbabwe by Kalonga‟s Mbumba. The Mbumba are Chewa women from Malawi, 
Zambia and Mozambique who dance in a procession as an escort and sing praise songs. 
Being welcomed by the Mbumba shows great recognition of a person‟s significance and 
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respect, as it is only Kalonga Gawa Undi‟s most honourable guests that can be welcomed by 
the Mbumba. It is the Mbumba that escort Kalonga Gawa Undi as he emerges from the 
Gwalada into the Dzimbabwe. From there, Kalonga proceeds to the Kasusu. Before he enters 
the Kasusu, he stops for a prayer and the singing of the national anthem of Zambia. After 
that, he enters the Kasusu and sits on his royal throne. When Kalonga takes a seat, the 
ceremony begins. First is his welcoming speech that is read for him by one of his Ndunas as 
Kalonga Gawa Undi does not speak in public at the Kulamba ceremony. After the speech the 
chiefs start performing the traditional Kulamba ceremony at the Kasusu escorted by their 
Ndunas who carry their gifts for the king. They sit on a traditional mat and give a brief report 
on the state of affairs in their chiefdoms as it is of interest to the Kalonga to know how his 
people are coping with life on the land that he gave them. After the report, the presentation of 
gifts follows and, before the chiefs leave, the Kasusu present traditional dances to entertain 
Kalonga. Thereafter, the guest of honour and other representative guests from the 
participating countries are allowed to make their speeches on behalf of their governments and 
present their gifts to the Kalonga. After the ceremony, the Kalonga leaves the Kasusu, in a 
procession accompanied by the guest of honour. Chewa chiefs cannot leave Mkaika the same 
day but have to remain there to bid farewell to the Kalonga the next day and do a few other 
things related to their chieftainship as they are subjects of Kalonga Gawa Undi.  
6.2 Kulamba as a modern reinvention 
Although it is widely said by the Chewa that the ceremony existed before 1934, this claim 
has to be interrogated because the ceremony doesn‟t feature in credible existing historical 
records of the Chewa. What appears in the Chewa literature is the mlira ceremony. According 
to Phiri‟s (1975:54) research, to ensure that the kingdom was still centralised in order to curb 
autonomy, Kalonga introduced what was known as the mlira ceremony. Annually, chiefs of 
the Phiri lineage were invited to his headquarters “for the ritual veneration of mlira or spirit 
of the great Kalonga who had led the „Malawi‟ during migration into the country…It was a 
cult of great ancestor worship whose major function was to bring „Malawi‟ chiefs together.” 
However, it is another ceremony known as Kulamba which has currently gained prominence 
amongst the Chewa. It is not the purpose of this study to determine the demise of mlira and 
emergence of Kulamba ceremonies, but it appears that mlira was held before the kingdom 
was divided while Kulamba was mainly introduced by Undi after he had broken away from 
the Kingdom. Whether Kulamba was really important at that time or not is not actually 
significant but what is clear is that the pre-colonial and colonial Kulamba ceremony was not 
conducted in the same way as it is done today. The current Kulamba has been modified to 
suit the current socio-political situation (Interview with Dr Malewezi, CHEFO Chairperson, 
Lilongwe, 10
th
 May 2012).  
 
In other words, the current Kulamba is a modern invention, but based on some past 
traditional practices. Apart from the Kalonga Kingship, Kulamba can also be said to be one 
of the „corner stones‟ in facilitating the reinvention of the Chewa ethnic identity. CHEFO 
played a critical role in this process of ethnic reinvention. Soon after being established as an 
organisation, apart from the promotion of Gulewamkulu, CHEFO embarked on a project of 
reintroducing Kulamba in the three countries. This is also explained by the Chairperson of 
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CHEFO who mentioned that they started informing the chiefs of the significance of Kulamba 
and “we now had to actually carry the chiefs. CHEFO itself organised transport to take the 
chiefs to Zambia…so it is CHEFO that started this revival otherwise without CHEFO this 
could not have happened” (Interview with Dr Malewezi, CHEFO Chairperson, Lilongwe, 
10
th
 May 2012). 
 
This observation and view by the Chairman of CHEFO was also supported by several other 
chiefs in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. In the case of Malawian and Zambian chiefs, 
they all stressed that before CHEFO publicised Kulamba, a few individuals would attend and 
there was no general Chewa interest in the ceremony itself. Some chiefs, especially in 
Mozambique, even went on to mention that they had never heard of the Kulamba ceremony 
or even about Kalonga Undi himself, although they occasionally visited some Chewa people 
in Zambia. This was well explained by one chief as follows: 
 
Kunena chilungamo kwa inu, ine Gawa Undi sindinkamudziwa ngakhale bwalo la 
Kulamba komwe. Ndimaziwa kuti a Chewa ku Zambia aliko ndipo ena timatha 
kuyenderana; koma Kulamba kokha ndi Kalonga Gawa Undi ine nde ndinali 
muchimbulimbuli. Komiti ya Kulamba itakhazikitsidwa kuno kudzera mwa Malewezi 
ndipamene ife timaziwa zonsezi. [To be honest with you, I personally did not know Gawa 
Undi or even the Kulamba ceremony itself. I knew that there were some Chewa people in 
Zambia and we could occasionally visit each other; but when it comes to the issue of 
Kulamba and Kalonga Gawa Undi, I personally was ignorant to these. When a committee 
was established here through Malewezi (CHEFO) that is when we knew all this.] (Key 
informant interview/Chief, Tete, 28
th
 May 2012). 
6.3 Chewa’s Kulamba and the extent of ethnic politicisation 
6.3.1 Politicisation of Kulamba and its possible threat to trans-border state sovereignty 
Ethnic politicisation poses a danger to state sovereignty as it often divides rather than 
integrates diverse communities within the state. It is imperative, therefore, to examine the 
extent to which the Chewa, through their Kulamba cultural ceremony, facilitate ethnic 
politicisation- and to determine whether doing so is a threat to state sovereignty or not.  
This section focuses on areas of funding for the ceremony, the organisation of the event, and 
the mode of participation at the event to show the extent to which the Kulamba ceremony 
might be viewed as a politicised entity through which politicians vie for publicity, as well as 
a vehicle for connecting with the grassroots communities- especially of Chewa origin. The 
discussion will focus on the banning of political party regalia at ceremonies, the possibility of 
Kulamba being a „lucrative‟ visibility platform for politicians, the ceremony‟s potentiality to 
compromise state autonomy and sovereignty, and the possibility of trans-border block voting 
threat. 
6.3.1.1 Banning political party regalia 
Each Kulamba ceremony has a special condition attached for those attending. During the 
ceremony they are not allowed to display or be dressed in any political party regalia. Even 
presidents, ministers, members of parliament and other eminent politicians are not allowed to 
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put on political party symbols. The main reason for this rule is to ensure that the ceremony, as 
well as the whole Chewa movement, is seen as apolitical. In the 2013 ceremony, the ban was 
emphasized because by-elections were taking place in the Mkaika area where the Kulamba 
ceremony is held, and general elections were also looming in Malawi. By banning the 
political party regalia during the ceremony, the Chewa movement intends, as already 
mentioned, to create the perception that it is apolitical. The argument of this study, however, 
is that this act arguably demonstrates the exercise of political power that the movement 
possesses. The 2013 ban was captured in the Times of Zambia of 20
th
 August 2013 entitled 
“Political regalia banned at Kulamba ceremony”, and reported as follows:  
The Kulamba traditional ceremony organising committee has banned political party regalia 
during next weekend‟s annual event….Kulamba secretary of invitation and publicity 
committee Lucas Phiri disclosed in Chipata yesterday that the ban of the political party 
regalia was directed at all political parties in Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique...Mr Phiri 
said the official regalia for the event is that made from „Chitenge‟ material bearing the 
portrait of Paramount Chief Kalonga Gawa Undi. He said the organising committee had 
instructed security personnel to ensure that anyone found wearing political party regalia 
was barred from the ceremony. (Times of Zambia, 20
th
 August 2013). 
This message of banning political party regalia was also emphasized on the invitation cards 
for important dignitaries as shown below in plate 1 with the words “You are kindly requested 
NOT to wear political party attire”.  
 
Plate 1: Kulamba traditional ceremony invitation card 
 
 
There are several observations in relation to the banning of political party regalia during the 
Kulamba ceremony. The central idea in banning the party regalia is to present an image that 
the Chewa movement has no political affiliation or agenda. However, being political does not 
necessarily mean having a political party affiliation only. Party affiliation might only be the 
visible element. The actual banning itself is a clear indication that the Chewa movement is 
actually politically powerful. For instance, the state officials, including presidents and 
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ministers, have to obey the command from the Chewa royal family to abandon their party 
symbols. This is not possible in most African gatherings of this nature. The ceremony itself is 
monitored by special royal family security personnel and they have the authority from the 
royal family, and not necessarily the state, to chase away those who do not conform to what 
has been stated. Another evidence of political power is that the only official cloth allowed 
during the ceremony is the one which bears the portrait of the Chewa King. In other words, 
his authority has to be visible and respected during the ceremony and in the process, clouds 
out state authorities attending the ceremony. 
 
6.3.1.2 Kulamba as a ‘lucrative’ visibility platform for politicians 
 
CHEFO normally organises fund raising events for the ceremony and in most cases this leads 
to some interest amongst politicians who vie for publicity. Specifically in Malawi, this annual 
fund raising event might arguably be referred to as a gathering of „who is who‟ in Malawian 
politics with hefty sums being donated. For instance, the then Malawian first lady, Callista 
Mutharika, donated K1 million to the foundation in 2010 (The Nation, 21st June 2010). In 2013, 
the President of Malawi donated K2million to the foundation as part of the preparation for the 
2013 Kulamba ceremony (MANA 2013). Other notable Malawian individuals who made 
contributions for the 2013 Kulamba ceremony include former first lady Callista Mutharika, 
DPP Acting President Peter Mutharika, Minister of Defence Kandodo Banda and Minister of 
Tourism, Daniel Liwimbi. Some additional influential politicians who attended the ceremony 
include the ruling People‟s Party (PP) Secretary General, DPP‟s second Vice President and 
former Presidential Spokesperson Dr Ntaba. 
 
The overall organisers themselves are also mainly politicians such as was the case in 2013; 
the main Kulamba organising committee was chaired by Deputy Minister of Tourism and 
Arts of Zambia, Mr David Phiri. Most of the Ambiri (King‟s soldiers) that surround the 
Kalonga during the ceremony are politicians in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. The 
Master of Ceremonies in most of the years had been the Publicity Secretary of CHEFO who 
in 2009 contested for the Member of Parliament seat in Lilongwe, Malawi.  
 
All in all, although the organisers claim that the Kulamba ceremony is apolitical but purely 
cultural, in practice, the finding shows that the event is actually an ideal platform for 
politicians from all the three countries to demonstrate their relevance and closeness to their 
electorate. It is in this context that the former president of Malawi, Bingu wa Mutharika, 
showed some resentment towards CHEFO and the Kulamba ceremony, as was revealed 
during an interview with Paramount Chief Lundu, who mentioned that the former president 
of Malawi, Bingu, told him personally that Kulamba and CHEFO are political hence he was 
no longer willing to patronise its events. (Key informant interview/Paramount Chief Lundu, 
Lilongwe, 14
th
 June 2013). 
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6.3.1.3 Potential to compromise state autonomy and sovereignty 
One of the issues highlighted by most independent key informants in all the three countries is 
that the Kulamba ceremony might move into a different direction if the presidents of the three 
countries happen to be Chewa and interested in promoting the welfare of their folks. In other 
words, the likelihood of undermining their respective states‟ autonomy and sovereignty 
would be very high. Although this argument is based mainly on assumptions, it is likely to be 
significant even if only two countries have Chewa presidents who are keen to promote the 
interests of the Chewa. Despite a lot of internal protests, the former president of Malawi, 
Bingu wa Mutharika, who was Lomwe by tribe, actually registered and became patron of an 
ethnic-based organisation, the „Mulhako wa a Lomwe‟. He openly showed his total support 
and devotion to this organisation to the extent that his actions heavily polarised the country 
along ethnic lines. Bingu wa Mutharika went further and started making plans to integrate 
into the organisation, the Lomwe of Mozambique, by recruiting some as teachers of the 
Lomwe language in the schools that his organisation had created. In this context, the 
possibility of simultaneously having two or three Chewa presidents in Malawi, Mozambique 
and Zambia, should not be dismissed. Assuming these two or more Chewa presidents heavily 
promote the Chewa trans-border identity, the likelihood might be high of undermining their 
respective state autonomy and sovereignty. 
6.3.1.4 Trans-border block voting threat 
The Malawi News Agency report of 10
th
 October 2013 stated that five Mozambican women 
were arrested for attempting to register for the Malawi 2014 tripartite elections. In another 
report, a Mozambican man, known as Mavuto Wenzulu, was arrested in Malawi when it was 
discovered that he had a Malawian passport which he had had in his possession since 2006 
(Mana, 11
th
 October 2013). These reports not only show the likelihood of foreigners voting 
across the border but even possessing valid identifications of a country in which they are not 
citizens. This may actually be complicated when they speak the same language across the 
borders such as the Chewa. This block voting threat is further explained as follows: 
The only problem may emerge during voting because these people are the same and they 
speak the same language.[sic] For example if I go to Mkaika now, I speak fluent 
Chichewa and I can vote and Mozambicans, Malawians and Zambians we look alike so 
you can go to Zambia and vote and also come here and vote…register as a voter here and 
as a voter there and this may have an impact…people can exploit that and this is also the 
case with the Yao around Katuli area which borders Mozambique; for them the border 
does not exist. If this is happening in this small border area of Katuli, what about the vast 
borders shared by the Chewa cross-cutting Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique [sic]? 
(Key informant interview/Political scientist, Zomba, 12
th 
June 2012). 
6.3.2 Limitations to politicisation of Kulamba 
 
Despite the above stated factors contributing towards politicisation of the ceremony, the 
study findings show some limitations towards the politicisation of the Kulamba ceremony, 
such as the trend towards commercialisation of the event, its potential to closely integrate 
rather than divide the said three states, and the openness of the event to other ethnic groups.   
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6.3.2.1 Commercialisation of the event by the Zambian state 
The overriding argument raised in this chapter is that when a cultural or ethnic group event 
incorporates commercial interests which are in line with state interests, the gap between the 
state and the said ethnic group becomes very narrow. In other words, factors towards ethnic 
politicisation of the group, becomes less likely, due to a common interest between the state 
and an ethnic group. The Kulamba ceremony has to a larger extent, demonstrated some 
interests towards commercialisation of the event so as to, among other things, attract tourism 
in Zambia. In this context, the interest of the government of Zambia in the event might be the 
commercial opportunities that the ceremony offers, so it may not be politically regarded as a 
threat to Zambian state sovereignty. Kalusa (2010) argues that Kalonga Gawa Undi X 
restored the Kulamba ceremony not only in the interest of preserving the Chewa culture but 
also to enhance regional economic development. The 2013 Kulamba main organising 
committee was chaired by Zambia‟s Deputy Minister of Tourism and Arts. This overlap 
between Zambia state interests and the Chewa Kulamba event was clearly reflected in the 
way the commercialisation drive was pursued as reported in one of the newspapers quoted 
below: 
The organising committee of the Kulamba traditional ceremony of the Chewa people is 
lobbying Government to allow it to beam video clips of previous ceremonies at next 
month‟s United Nations World Trade Organisation (UNWTO) General Assembly in 
Livingstone, to attract tourists to attend this year‟s Kulamba… (Zambia Daily Mail, 15th 
July 2013). 
In the context whereby the Zambia Tourist Board (ZTB) and the Kulamba organising 
committee (chaired by the Deputy Minister of Tourism and Arts) are engaged in negotiations 
to market the event at an international platform, it becomes an epitome of the intersection 
between state and informal group interests that reduces suspicion. 
6.3.2.2 Kulamba and regional integration of states 
The revival of the Chewa kingdom is regarded by some key informants as critical for the 
improvement of state relations among Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia. For instance, for 
the first time in history, three heads of state (Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique) attended the 
ceremony in 2007. The President of Malawi, whilst attending the Kulamba ceremony, said 
that „Presidents of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia look up to you, chief, for the social and 
economic prosperity of their countries‟ (Mana, 2007).  Irrespective of how the situation might 
be defined, the presence of the three heads of state, as well as what transpired at the 
ceremony, is an example of a unique complementarity and recognition of the role of the 
formal and informal in regionalism. As a Zambian historian puts it: 
This is a clear example of how people are integrating at grassroots level with minimal 
state influence. This is why people do not understand why they should produce travel 
documents when crossing the border because as far as they are concerned, they are one 
people  (Telephonic Interview with Professor Phiri, Lusaka, 7
th
 February 2013). 
Preparation for the ceremony is quite an elaborate procedure which is also a trans-border 
issue. The CHEFO chairperson explained that preparations for Kulamba are planned by a 
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Main Organized Committee called (Mphasa Committee), composed of chiefs from the 3 
countries and assisted by Committees in the countries. In Malawi, CHEFO acts as facilitator, 
while in Mozambique a selected committee assists their chiefs. In Zambia, the Lusaka 
Committee and the Nduna are responsible. The meetings are held at Mkaika and this is 
exclusively for chiefs. The next meetings are held on the last Saturday of April – July and are 
attended by officials as well. The meetings are chaired by Chief Mbang‟ombe of Zambia. The 
king occasionally attends the meetings. The main Organising Committee is called the Mphasa 
Committee. It is subdivided into 13 sub-committees (Follow-up interview with Dr Justine 
Malewezi, Lilongwe, 6
th
December 2012). Malewezi also mentioned that the government 
officials from the Ministries of Local government and Culture of Mozambique and Zambia 
are always available during these planning meetings. The unique part for Mozambique is that 
it is the government that gives transport to chiefs travelling to the planning meeting at 
Mkaika, including the District Commissioner of Tete who comes along with two or three 
officials. They bring their chiefs every month from March to July. But in Malawi this does 
not happen so it is CHEFO‟s job to organise transport. 
 
6.3.2.3  Kulamba not an exclusively Chewa event 
Another possible explanation why the Kulamba may not necessarily be an effective means to 
enhance Chewa ethnic politicisation is that the ceremony is not exclusively for the Chewa 
people. As the Zambian key informant also explained, “Most tribes in Eastern and other 
provinces patronise this event hence it is not really about the Chewa interests only that are 
featured” [sic] (Key informant, Zambia ). This point was also reinforced by the CHEFO 
Publicity Secretary, who mentioned that Gawa Undi patronises some cultural gatherings of 
other tribes. Other tribal leaders such as M‟mbelwa of the Ngoni also patronise the Kulamba. 
The ngoni and the Lomwe also bring their traditional dances to showcase during the Kulamba 
ceremony (Key informant interview/CHEFO Publicity Secretary, 10
th
 May 2012). 
6.4 Interrogating Chewa Kulamba politicisation through the Lozi 
Kuomboka linkage 
One pre-colonial expert claimed that the Kulamba ceremony is strikingly similar to the Lozi 
Kuomboka ceremony and the likelihood that the Chewa Kulamba is a copy of the Lozi is 
very high. According to his argument, “The Chewa ceremony is very recent and clearly 
shows striking similarities to that of the Lozi. That is why I also believe that the Chewa have 
a political agenda because the Lozi agenda has always been very political” (Key informant 
interview/ Pre-colonial historian, Zomba, 8
th
 June 2012).  
If this is true then the case of trans-border ethnic politicisation is very high and could have a 
long term impact on power dynamics and state sovereignty of these three countries. As Flint 
(2006) observed, the Lozi regard themselves as „a state within the state‟ (see Chapter four). 
The Lozi have openly declared interests in politically becoming an autonomous region and 
the contemporary cultural celebrations, from a cultural nationalism perspective, is a process 
of keeping alive this realisation just as Hunchington (1987) explains about the Irish 
movement in United Kingdom. Recently, the Lozi caused a regional political sensation when 
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they declared that the time has come for them to politically become independent. In other 
words, if the Chewa Kulamba ceremony is a copy of the contemporary Lozi Kuomboka, then 
it has an implication on Chewa ethnic politicisation and state sovereignty. Specifically, the 
challenge would be twofold: through the process of enhancing the prominence of the 
traditional leader (King) and facilitation of „national‟ unity outside the state apparatus. 
In this regard, the study had to explore this link by first of all examining the origin and nature 
of contemporary Lozi Kuomboka and then examine its similarities to the Chewa Kulamba 
ceremony. Consequently, an extensive discussion of the Lozi Kuomboka is first discussed 
below. 
6.4.1 A Brief background to the Lozi Kuomboka cultural ceremony 
Flint (2006: 704-5) explains the Lozi Kuomboka annual ceremony as follows: 
Kuomboka (which, in Siluyana, means „to get out of the water‟) is an annual celebratory 
water pageant… Historically, the Luyi inhabitants of the floodplain built their houses on 
raised or extended termite mounds situated in the floodplain. As the floodwaters rose, 
they migrated from the floodplain to the higher plain margins to escape the inundation of 
their homes and villages. Thus, the celebration of Kuomboka represented a response to a 
time of crisis as homes and food-producing gardens became inaccessible for two to four 
months of every year…The litunga, or Lozi king, led the exodus in his specially-
constructed state barge called „Nalikwanda‟, paddled by up to 60 warriors…. Thus the 
procession resembled that of a father – in this case the king – leading his family or nation 
out of the danger posed by the irrepressible force of the river. 
 
According to Flint (2006), the original Kuomboka ceremony was a reaction to the annual 
environmental crisis, but since the Lozi ways of life have changed and they were not 
dependent on the river any more, the ceremony took on another meaning in later years, 
especially under King Lewanika. Taking into consideration that Lewanika, (who became 
King in 1878), was temporarily dethroned in 1884, he noted that his Kingdom was under 
possible internal and external threat. In order to consolidate his power, he re-branded the 
Kuomboka ceremony so that it had to become a unifier of the Lozi people with his throne 
taking prominence. The ceremony therefore has become more like an annual pilgrimage for 
all Lozi people where they re-affirm their commitment to their King and Lozi identity in 
general. 
 
Gleaning through the various newspapers, van Binsbergen (1987), notes that the Kuomboka 
ceremony had been organised and patronised by a multitude of stakeholders such as urban 
Lozi ethnic associations, state institutions, some private sector organisations and prominent 
office bearers in the state. For instance, below are some extracts from the Times of Zambia of 
3
rd
 April 1987 (quoted in van Binsbergen 1987) which shows the role of several players: 
 
Last year, American ambassador to Zambia, Mr. Paul Hare and Speaker of the National 
Assembly, Dr. Robinson Nabulyato, were guests of honour at the Kuomboka. This year, 
many more dignitaries, whose names were not released in advance, were invited…The 
Kitwe branch of the association has donated some safari suits for the royal drummers as 
well as other paraphernalia. The Kuomboka Cordination [sic] Association which has 
other branches in Ndola and Livingstone will no doubt have its efforts for this year's 
special Kuomboka  
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6.4.2 The Relationship between Chewa Kulamba and Lozi Kuomboka 
As was narrated above, in the pre-colonial period, Phiri (1975:54) claims that in order to 
consolidate his powers and weaken decentralisation, the Kalonga (while the headquarters 
were in Malawi) inaugurated the Mlira ceremony. According to Phiri (1975:54), “once each 
year, Phiri lineage chiefs were invited to Manthimba [former capital] for the ritual veneration 
of mlira or spirit of the great Kalonga…a cult of great ancestor worship whose major function 
was to bring „Malawi‟ chiefs together.” What is missing in the earliest writings and in the 
oral history of the Chewa, is the Kulamba ceremony itself. It seems that the ceremony 
emerged later when Undi and the Malawian Kalonga were in disagreement. Undi also wanted 
to strengthen his powers and so introduced the Kulamba ceremony. The way it was 
conducted was not as it is done in the contemporary period. According to the CHEFO 
chairperson, individual chiefs used to go to Kalonga Gawa Undi‟s kingdom, and in their own 
time, to pay homage (Interview with Dr Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe 10
th
 May 2012). 
Tradition says that the ceremony was banned in 1934 by colonial administrators and only re-
started in 1984 (but it took a full trans-border perspective in 1994). As already stated, the 
ceremony was not necessarily an annual gathering of all Chewa chiefs or even those who 
used to go to Undi‟s court who were only chiefs who had not declared themselves 
autonomous. In other words, the Chewa Kulamba is a contemporary re-invention whilst the 
Kuomboka was re-invented many years before Kulamba. The possibility of contemporary 
Kulamba copying from the Kuomboka is very high. The reason for copying the Lozi 
Kuomboka could be related to enhance the movement‟s socio-political agenda as the Lozi 
have done. In this case, the pre-colonial historian argues that the Chewa have periodically re-
invented history in order to achieve certain purposes. She explained that, “from time to time, 
the Chewa have used ethnicity or history to negotiate for space and also to meet their 
interests. They use history to back their claims and in some cases they have invented history”. 
(Interview with a pre-colonial historian, Zomba, 8
th
 June2012). 
Based on the analysis of available data, below is a summary of the similarities and 
differences between the Lozi‟s Kuomboka and the Chewa Kulamba ceremonies.  
 
Table 8: Similarities and differences between Lozi Kuomboka and Chewa‟s Kulamba 
Ceremonies: 
 
Similarities 
 Lozi’s Kuomboka ceremony Chewa’s Kulamba ceremony 
1 Trans-border Trans-border 
2 King is central in the ceremony 
(subjects pay homage) 
King is central in the ceremony (subjects 
pay homage) 
3 Urban-based ethnic associations central 
to organization 
Urban-based ethnic associations central 
to organization 
4 Government directly or indirectly 
involved 
Government directly or indirectly 
involved 
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5 Prominent public dignitaries in 
attendance 
Prominent public dignitaries in 
attendance 
6 Barotse Royal Establishment critical in 
co-ordinating the event 
Chewa Heritage Foundation (previously 
Chewa Royal Establishment) critical in 
co-ordinating the event 
7 Said to unify the Lozi people Said to unify the Chewa people 
8 Refer to historical background to the 
ceremony as legitimising the event 
Refer to historical background to the 
ceremony as legitimising the event 
Differences 
1 Credible recorded historical records 
depicting the event exist 
Credible recorded historical records 
depicting the event do not exist 
2 Has indirectly been a rallying point for 
secession 
No secession perspectives have been 
reported 
3 There is a documented record of official 
grievances against the colonial and 
post-colonial state 
No record of grievances lodged against 
any state  
4 Mainly attended by Zambian Lozi and a 
few other ethnic groups only (event less 
trans-border though Lozi people from 
other countries present) 
Mainly attended by Chewas from all the 
three countries of Zambia, Malawi and 
Mozambique (event more trans-border) 
5 Lozi chief is the only one unofficially 
recognised by the Zambian government 
as King i.e. Litunga 
Is recognised by Zambian government as 
Paramount Chief 
6 Lozi King is based in a country where 
the majority of his subjects are in 
majority (as compared to other 
countries where the Lozi are found) 
The Chewa King is based in a country 
where his subjects are in minority. 
Source: Author‟s own summary based on research findings 
It is difficult to conclude that the Kulamba is a copycat of the Lozi Kuomboka ceremony 
because evidence to that effect is inadequate. This study takes the view that both of these 
ceremonies have been re-invented to suit the contemporary cultural needs of their ethnic 
movements. However, to conclude that the Chewa copied from the Lozi may not be an 
accurate conclusion. According to a Zambian historian, he argues that “the origin and 
meaning of these two ceremonies are different. Kuomboka is a response to the annual floods 
which engulfed the Lozi area… Kulamba on the other hand is a ceremony to thank God for 
the good harvest and other good things experienced” (Telephonic Interview with Professor 
Phiri, Lusaka, 7
th
February 2013). What is most likely to be the case is that the Chewa might 
have revived or re-invented their ceremony after observing the successes of the Lozi 
ceremony but this does not necessarily imply that the underlying political motives of the Lozi 
ethnic group were also adopted by the Chewa.  
 
6.4.3 Critical analysis: Is the Kulamba ceremony a challenge to state sovereignty? 
From a Westphalian model perspective, the Kulamba ceremony may be regarded as a 
challenge to state sovereignty, due to its reinforcement of an informal leadership and 
facilitating (sectarian) unity outside the state institution. This may be summarized as follows: 
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Firstly, the re-invention of the cultural Kulamba ceremony, just like the Lozi‟s Kuomboka, 
was mainly targeted at reinforcing the authority and prominence of the position of Kalonga 
Gawa Undi. Before the ceremony was re-introduced, very few Malawians as well as 
Mozambicans were aware of his kingship. The ceremony, however, has significantly raised 
the profile of Gawa Undi across the three countries. As an informal leader, this poses as a 
challenge to the established state sovereignty of the said three countries. 
 
Secondly, the re-invention of Kulamba as discussed above, besides raising the profile of 
Gawa Undi, also focuses on unifying the Chewa people of the three countries. This also poses 
as a challenge to the state due to the fact that from a Westphalian perspective, unity of the 
citizenry is supposed to be with individuals within its state boundaries. Unity with ethnic 
groups across boundaries entails weakening the sovereignty of the state due to the potential 
loss of loyalty to the formal state. 
 
From a further critical analysis of the said differences and similarities, the view of this study 
is that it cannot be proved that the Chewa ceremony is taking an ethnic politicisation 
approach as has been the case with the Lozi. The argument that the Chewa may have 
borrowed from the Lozi in re-inventing their tradition may be plausible but extending this to 
also mean that they had copied the political elements might not be convincing enough. In 
other words, the evidence is not adequate or persuasive. Assuming the Chewa were using the 
ceremony to enhance political nationalism, the first country to experience the challenge to its 
sovereignty would be Zambia, because that is where the ceremony is hosted. However, in 
relation to Kulamba ceremony, “The most active Government in the preparatory stage is the 
Zambian Government which offers both financial and logistical support” (Interview with Dr 
Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe, 6
th
 December 2012). It is not surprising therefore that during the 
Kulamba ceremony, the Zambian national anthem is sung despite the presence of Chewas 
from the other two countries. According to Zambian historian, Professor Phiri, the event 
serves to enhance Zambian government‟s agenda, too, because“these ceremonies bring 
harmony and unity to the country. During traditional ceremonies politicians highlight 
government policies and the need for Zambian unity” (Telephonic Interview with Professor 
Phiri, Lusaka, 7
th
February 2013). 
 
Taking the observations of the above-mentioned respondents, it may actually be argued that 
the Zambian government‟s comprehensive support for ceremonies such as Kulamba may not 
be aimed at bringing about unity as publicly stated but it is the strategic move of the state to 
ensure that it captures potentially threatening movements in a discreet manner. This study 
agrees with Boone‟s (2003) observation on selective approach to state use of authority for its 
own survival. In other words, contrary to losing sovereignty, the Zambian government‟s 
response is the reflection of the state‟s ability to provide a framework for the expression of 
ethnic identity that would not derail the state‟s own ultimate goals. The state therefore lures 
trans-border ethnic movements such as the Chewa so that they operate according to its 
preferences or guidance- this should not be regarded as loss of state sovereignty. By allowing 
the ethnic groups to flourish, the state accepts its shortfall in meeting some of the individual 
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intrinsic social needs such as unique group identity, recognition and pride. The trans-border 
ethnic groups such as the Chewa ably provide this while not threatening the state itself. In 
other words, the state needs the Chewa movement and the Chewa need the state. They 
complement each other in order to achieve their diverse goals. 
 
Another important issue is that it is wrong to compare the Lozi and Chewa ceremonies in 
relation to the trans-border factor. Although the Lozi ethnic group are found in other 
neighbouring countries of Angola, Namibia and Botswana, their ceremony is not significantly 
trans-border as the Chewa, and this has implications of power relations. The King of the Lozi 
is based in Zambia where the majority of his subjects are, while Gawa Undi is based in 
Zambia where the Chewa are not in majority. More importantly, the Lozi have had a long 
history of officially lodging grievances against the state, which the Chewa have never done. 
In this case, the Lozi appear more militant politically unlike the Chewa, due to some of these 
significant differences. In other words, taking the trans-border and circumstances of the 
Kings‟ location, these could also explain why the Chewa movement is unlikely to be heavily 
politicised. Being trans-border, the Chewa movement‟s politicisation may be limited because 
the competition for resources and political power at national level is somehow factored out- 
which is not the case with the Lozi. The Chewa of Malawi do not have the same political 
interests as those of Zambia and Mozambique. If the movement was not trans-border the 
sense of ethnic identity would supersede the national identity. King Gawa Undi may not be so 
significant in Zambia due to the number of Chewa in that country but he is significant across 
the borders because their numbers are higher at that level. The leader of the Chewa in Malawi 
or Mozambique may not be so significant because he has to operate under King Gawa Undi 
who is based in Zambia. All in all the way the movement is structured renders itself less 
politically powerful in the contemporary nation-state context. In this case the Westphalian 
model is being confirmed that it ultimately determined the direction of national politics. 
According to Posner‟s (2004) article entitled “The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: 
Why Chewas and Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi”, he clearly 
demonstrates that the state borders play a significant role in determining the political 
behaviour of ethnic groups. In other words, although they may share ethnic identity, 
belonging to different states entails a different political behaviour and so confirming the 
importance of the Westphalian model. In short, the Lozi appear more politically militant 
because their geographical parameter of mobilisation is the same: the state. The Chewa do 
not share this factor hence the political militancy is unlikely to emerge, resulting in no real 
challenge to the Westphalian model. As one political scientist observed: 
 
GawaUndi is not significant in Zambia alone but he is significant across the borders 
because the Chewa population in that country is not huge, whosoever is claiming to be 
the leader of the Chewa in Malawi will not be significant because he has to operate 
under Zambian Gawa Undi. In this case, it renders the group less politically influential 
but if it was based in one state, we would have been talking of the case of Kabaka in 
Uganda who claims „I am a country of my own here‟ [sic] (Key informant 
interview/Political scientist, Zomba, 12
th
 June 2012). 
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6.5 The Gule Wamkulu culture and ethnic politcisation 
Some key informants have perceived CHEFO as a political institution which uses the cultural 
agenda to pursue its interests through the Gule Wamkulu. This study examined the extent to 
which Gule Wamkulu might be a smokescreen for Chewa ethnic politicization. Before such 
an examination, however, it is crucial to discuss the significance of Gule Wamkulu to Chewa 
culture as a whole. 
6.5.1 Significance of Gule Wamkulu in Chewa culture 
As was noted earlier, Gule Wamkulu refers to the masked dancers reserved for Chewa 
initiates as being central to Chewa ethnic identity; and it is therefore the central feature 
during the Kulamba and other Chewa ceremonies. The significance of Gule Wamkulu is well 
captured by one of the Chewa chieftaincy officials in an interview. When a newspaper 
reporter asked Mr Joseph Chikuta, a senior counsellor for Gawa Undi, the question “Is Gule 
Wamkulu  relevant in the present dispensation?”, his response was that although times have 
changed, “the place of Gule Wamkulu to the Chewa will never change… For a male Chewa 
to know his identity and be known to be a true Chewa, he has to go through Gule Wamkulu 
initiation…No Gule Wamkulu no Chewa” (Malawi News 17-23 September, 2011, p. 12). 
The view of Mr Chikuta was also reinforced by the CHEFO Chairperson, who emphatically 
stated that “The second thing that binds Chewas together is their tradition particularly Gule 
wamkulu. Gule wamkulu is specifically very, very important in Chewa because it is a process 
through which traditions are passed on from one generation to the next”.  He also explained 
that it is not just a dance but it is also an institution and the initiates are told some secrets 
which they “are not supposed to be divulged except for those who have been initiated so I am 
not going to tell you” (Interview with Dr Malewezi, CHEFO Chairperson, 10th May 2012). 
During FGDs conducted across the three countries in selected Chewa villages, one of the 
questions discussed was: “What makes you feel that you are the same as your Chewa 
colleagues across the border?” What featured highly was Gule Wamkulu in almost all the 
FGDs. Apart from Gule Wamkulu, other things that made the Chewa feel the same across the 
borders include common descent (bele limodzi) and use of a common language. 
6.5.2 Extent of politicisation in Gule Wamkulu 
According to two Malawian key informants, they pointed out that to appreciate the argument 
that Gule Wamkulu is central to trans-border Chewa ethnic politicisation, it is also necessary 
to know why Gule Wamkulu emerged in the first place. In this regard, it was argued that the 
Gule Wamkulu tradition emerged and is also sustained through local level Chewa politics 
(Key Informant Interviews, Zomba 15
th
 May 2012). According to these analysts, at village 
level, those who are very active in the Gule Wamkulu society, normally do not enjoy social 
power in their community and therefore tend to use the Gule Wamkulu platform to exercise 
it
19
. Consequently, the promotion of Gule Wamkulu from local to trans-border entails that the 
                                                          
19
In this case, since the Chewa follow the matrilineal system of marriage in which the man stays in the wife‟s 
village after marriage, men do not have social power in the matrilineal home;Thus they resort to Gule Wamkulu 
to enhance their social status and power. Gule Wamkulu members put on a mask when dancing and they are 
highly respected by everyone because they are regarded as representatives of spirits. 
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same politics is still at work but now taking a trans-border perspective. Specifically, one of 
the analysts mentioned that: 
 
The Chewa identity and culture revolves around the Gule Wamkulu and Gule Wamkulu is 
perpetually shrouded in secrecy. Whatever happens in the open is actually a 
representation of a hidden message which a few initiates understand. Whilst behaving as 
if they are entertaining you, they might actually be mocking, rejecting or even insulting 
you but all this is done in such a way that you do not know it. That is why I believe that 
there is something behind the trans-border Chewa movement which is far greater that 
what we actually see. My view is that they are using culture to advance some political 
gains which have not yet been communicated. However this may not be achieved in the 
long run due to the complex nature of trans-border politics (Key informant interviews, 
Zomba, 15
th
May 2012) 
 
On politicisation of Gule Wamkulu, the views of these analysts are also corroborated by 
Banda (2008) and Smith (1997). Banda (2008:123) argues that Gule Wamkulu can also be a 
form of political resistance which may “even be manipulated by politicians”. Providing an 
example from Malawi, Smith (1997: 204, cited in Banda 2008:123) reports that: 
 
In spite of his absolute control over the media (silencing almost every voice of dissent 
within Malawi and many outside as well), Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the first 
president of Malawi, failed to control Nyau [Gule Wamkulu]. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
Nyau became one of the only mouthpieces through which public dissatisfaction with 
the one-party system was voiced. A large number of Nyau political masks grew up at 
this time and appeared regularly at dances... 
 
 
The argument that CHEFO could be pursuing a form of political nationalism as opposed to 
cultural nationalism of the Chewa partially became plausible due to an incident involving a 
Malawian minister. In April 2012, the newly appointed Minister of Lands and Housing in 
Malawi, Henry Phoya, irked CHEFO when he mentioned that he had defected from the 
opposition Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and joined the ruling People‟s Party due to MCP‟s 
Gule Wamkulu practices. Apparently, MCP is led by a Chewa, and its membership is also 
Chewa dominated. Dr Justine Malawezi, the Chair of CHEFO, asked the Minister to 
apologise to the Chewa for his remarks or the matter would be taken to higher offices (see 
Appendix 15). The Minister apologized the next day and withdrew his initial remark
20
 (The 
Nation, 1
st
 May 2012, pp1-2).  
 
This incident was also commented on by several FGD members in Malawi with one 
individual arguing that “Zimene anayankhula a Phoya kuti ma membala a chipani cha MCP 
ndi anthu agule wa mkulu zinatikwiyitsa kwambiri. Asamaphatikize ndale ndi chikhalidwe 
cha anthu.Gule Wamkulu sakukhudzana ndi ndale”[What Mr Phoya said, that members of 
                                                          
20
 In the context of Malawi, this issue is very significant. The minister said something which is already widely 
believed (but heavily denied by CHEFO) amongst Malawians that the Chewa largely support the opposition 
political party, MCP. Gule Wamkulu was therefore being linked to a political party and not a cultural 
organisation. The minister‟s statement was a direct challenge to what CHEFO and Gule Wamkulu claim to be 
doing. 
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MCP are Gule Wamkulu, made us very angry. He should not mix politics and culture. Gule 
Wamkulu and politics are not the same] (Men‟s FGD, Lilongwe, 11th May 2012). 
It may be argued that the above mentioned reaction to the Minister‟s comments is actually 
evidence of the politicisation of CHEFO through Chewa cultural practices because as 
someone stated: “CHEFO was clearly defending MCP” a political party (Interview with 
political analyst, Zomba, 15
th
 May 2012). Chief Kaomba, a critique of CHEFO has stated 
several times that CHEFO serves the political agenda of certain individuals. One question 
that may clearly come out is: “Why did CHEFO react suddenly and strongly on the issue of 
Gule Wamkulu and was then also allegedly seen to be in support of the opposition MCP?” 
6.5.3 Critical analysis: Are CHEFO and Chewa cultural practices (such as Gule Wamkulu) a 
challenge to state sovereignty? 
 
From a Westphalian perspective it may be concluded that CHEFO is posing as a challenge to 
the state through its alleged secret political agenda. At the heart of Chewa identity as stated in 
the FGDs is Gule Wamkulu, so there is a higher level of loyalty to the sect by the majority of 
the Chewa communities
21
. The perspective of the Gule Wamkulu sect is likely to have a 
profound impact on the Chewa community - especially if it is indeed about ethnic 
politicisation.  
 
However, this study argues that CHEFO has indeed been involved in politics by challenging 
state authorities but not with the intention of challenging state sovereignty. This study also 
agrees with the cultural nationalism perspective that the cultural and political nationalism 
boundary is blurred. The power at the disposal of Gawa Undi and CHEFO is that of 
symbolism and imagery. One of the roles of CHEFO is to defend and promote the Chewa 
cultural interests. The „defence‟ and „promotion‟ cannot just happen if an institution is not 
perceived to be politically powerful. The trans-border nature of the institution adds the 
perception that it is politically powerful and it has to use this power when their cultural 
interests are seen to be under threat. This implies that the politicisation of CHEFO is not in 
relation to de-railing the state sovereignty. In other words, the above incident clearly 
demonstrates the Chewa movement‟s ability to venture into the political arena through their 
relations with the state but not with the intention of seeking political autonomy. This may be 
attributed to the unclear boundary between political and cultural nationalism; and so agreeing 
to the view that all cultural movements are inherently political because they have to pursue 
their interests in a highly politically competitive environment. This is not necessarily a 
challenge to the state, but the hallmark of state-society relations which argues that spaces of 
authority and sovereignty are constantly negotiated between the state and society. 
 
During FGDs, participants were asked “Do you see the CHEFO/Chewa entity as purely 
cultural movement or does it have some elements of political mobilisation?”  The responses 
clearly show that almost all the grassroots Chewa who participated in the study in all the 
                                                          
21
As mentioned in previous chapters, Gule Wamkulu is a Chewa traditional sect responsible for initiation of the 
young as well as propagation of Chewa beliefs and dances. 
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three countries do not see CHEFO as a political movement. This may mean that the political 
mobilisation in a party politics modality, that most rural people understand, may not 
necessarily be taking place within CHEFO. But the politics of another nature as explained 
above might be essential to the movement, and this is not a challenge to the state. Based on 
FGD analysis, it would be wrong to suggest that CHEFO is using cultural agenda to pursue a 
political goal- the political agenda has been in the realm of protecting and enhancing their 
identity. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the extent to which trans-border cultural ceremonies, such as 
Kulamba and GuleWamkulu, might be an expression of political or cultural nationalism. The 
chapter has outlined the Kulamba ceremony in relation to its origin as well as contemporary 
significance. Similarly, Gule Wamkulu was also discussed in terms of its origin and 
significance to Chewa ethnic identity. Several issues have emerged to demonstrate that 
Kulamba and Gule Wamkulu might to a certain extent be contributing towards trans-border 
Chewa ethnic politicisation or political nationalism. However, it has also emerged that the 
Chewa movement has, depending on the situation, pursued both political and cultural 
agendas. The political agenda was not pursued with intention of seeking political autonomy 
as political nationalism may suggest, but it was pursued to promote and enhance cultural 
interests of the Chewa. 
 
It may be argued that the Zambian government‟s comprehensive support for ceremonies such 
as Kulamba may not be aimed at bringing about unity as publicly stated but it is the strategic 
move of the state to ensure that it captures potentially threatening movements in a discreet 
manner and it is also guided by commercial interests. In other words, the state needs the 
Chewa movement and the Chewa need the state. They complement each other in order to 
achieve their diverse goals. The re-invention of the cultural Kulamba ceremony, just like the 
Lozi‟s Kuomboka, was mainly targeted at reinforcing the authority and prominence of the 
position of Kalonga Gawa Undi.  
 
It is wrong to compare the Lozi and Chewa ceremonies in relation to the trans-border factor. 
Being trans-border, the Chewa movement‟s politicisation may be limited because the 
competition for resources and political power at national level is somehow factored out- 
which is not the case with the Lozi. In short, the Lozi appear more politically militant because 
their geographical parameter of mobilisation is the same: the state. The Chewa do not share 
this factor and so the political militancy is unlikely to emerge resulting in no real challenge to 
the Westphalian model. 
 
From a Westphalian perspective it may be concluded that CHEFO is posing as a challenge to 
the state through its „alleged‟ disguised political agenda. However, this study argues that 
CHEFO has indeed been involved in politics by challenging state authorities but not with the 
intention of challenging state sovereignty. This study also agrees with the cultural 
nationalism perspective that cultural and political nationalism boundary is blurred. The power 
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at the disposal of Gawa Undi and CHEFO is that of symbolism and imagery. One of the roles 
of CHEFO is to defend and promote the Chewa cultural interests. The „defence‟ and 
„promotion‟ cannot just happen if an institution is not perceived to be politically powerful. 
The trans-border nature of the institution adds the perception that it is politically powerful 
and it has to use this power when their cultural interests are seen to be under threat. This 
implies that the politicisation of CHEFO is not in relation to de-railing the state sovereignty. 
 
The next chapter continues the discussion on Chewa ethnic identity but focuses on the extent 
to which the state borders of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia reinforce or hinder this 
identity expression. More importantly, the chapter also examines the implication of this on 
state sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER 7 
STATE BORDERS AND CHEWA ETHNIC IDENTITY 
7.0 Introduction 
 
The states of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia are engaged in re-demarcation and 
reaffirmation of their common borders while at the same time proclaiming artificiality of the 
same borders. This contradiction exemplifies the debate between formal versus informal 
perspective of the state borders (Westphalian perspective versus State-society perspective 
debate). On one hand, the states need a formal Westphalian perspective which entails 
reinforcement of borders, but on the other hand, they acknowledge informality of the same. 
These two actions, though they may seem contradictory, they actually complement each other 
in ensuring that the state remains relevant. This also explains why and how the state deals 
with trans-border ethnic movements such as the Chewa. Evidence shows that the formal state 
borders were not a hindrance towards expression of Chewa trans-border identity because 
when they cross the border for cultural practices, the borders are officially „relaxed‟ and their 
King crosses freely without any need for documentation. Furthermore, the Chewa 
themselves, generally, don‟t perceive the borders as a threat to express and share ideas on 
their identity. In other words, the borders are seen as flexible social markers. The failure of 
the state to inhibit ethnic identity is not a sign of state weakness but a sign of flexibility on 
the part of the state by responding to the needs of the communities who are constantly 
crossing borders to interact on matters which are not a threat to its existence. This is a basis 
of constructivist perspective of state-society relationship. Consequently, this chapter critically 
analyses the extent to which state sovereignty exercised through border control may pose as a 
hindrance to expression of Chewa identity. More importantly, the chapter also draws in and 
compares the Chewa from the trans-border Kurds of Middle East in order to determine the 
extent to which the Chewa scenario may be treated as a unique occurrence. In this case, the 
difference in the process of identity formation amongst the Kurds and Chewa is clearly one of 
the reasons why these cases are significantly dissimilar. Another issue is the duality in Chewa 
leadership- appealing to the traditional yet recognized by the formal state- and the ability to 
transcend borders creates a very unique scenario for the Chewa movement. Unlike the Chewa, 
the Kurds‟ identity formation has become a challenge to state sovereignty.  
 
7.1 The present status of state borders: Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia 
identity 
 
One of the dimensions of state sovereignty, as already mentioned, is border control. 
According to the Westphalian model, there is a link between borders and identity. This is the 
case because borders suggest an „in group‟ and an „out group‟ (who can come in and who 
should stay out and on what basis) and therefore it is a marker of identity, in the Westphalian 
model, a marker of national identity. Before analysing the relationship between border 
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control and Chewa identity, the present status of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique borders 
has to be discussed. The problem of border control is well known by the state officials of 
Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. This problem is two-fold: firstly, in most cases, border 
immigration officers do not have the capacity to ensure the official requirements that would 
control the wanton crossing of borders and, secondly, the actual borders themselves are in 
some cases indeterminate or unclear to the extent that communities living within these 
borders do not take them seriously. In order to broaden the context of this discussion, it is 
therefore necessary, as aforementioned, to discuss the present status of these state borders and 
the implication of such a status on Chewa trans-border identity will be analysed in subsequent 
sections. 
7.1.1 The case of ‘porous’ borders 
Cases of evidence of porous borders have largely been expressed by Zambian, Malawian and 
Mozambican state officials through their countries‟ media. Their concerns are that the 
borders are porous; hence allowing any individuals to pass through. This scenario is creating 
a problem of the potentiality of criminals to pass through and destabilize the peace in the said 
countries. For instance, a Malawian official‟s concern was captured by Malawi News (11-17 
September 2010: 3) as follows: “Inspector General of Police Peter Mukhito has said he is 
shocked with laxity by the policemen at Mtukwa border post who let a Malawi News 
undercover pass through into Zambia without any search or show of passport or documents to 
prove their identities” (Malawi News, 11-17 September 2010: 3). From the Zambian side, 
related concerns were also expressed by officials who said “For some time now, Zambia has 
continued to experience an influx of illegal immigrants and smuggled goods because of its 
porous borders with neighbouring countries” (Daily Mail, 13th November 2012). 
 
According to the Immigration Officer in Zambia, “It is a challenge and impossible to control 
these people because they are basically one ethnic group who culturally know each other 
better hence they don‟t understand the rationale of official boundaries” (Key informant 
interview, Chipata, 17
th
 May 2012). The same point was also highlighted by the Malawian 
and Mozambican Immigration Officers (Malawi-Mozambique border) who added that 
normally they know that there is no real problem when there is a cross-border cultural 
interaction because it doesn‟t pose as a security risk (Key informant interview, Angonia, 25th 
May 2012). This scenario may at face value be said to be creating a situation whereby state 
sovereignty is being compromised. 
7.1.2 The upsurge of border demarcation and re-affirmation exercises 
It is thought-provoking to learn that many years after the end of colonial rule in Malawi, 
Mozambique and Zambia, the borders themselves are in some areas not yet officially clear to 
the extent that these countries had recently embarked on the demarcation and reaffirmation 
exercise. For instance, as recently as October 2012, the government of Malawi, through the 
Surveyor General, stated that it had just completed the process of demarcating its border with 
Zambia and Mozambique (Nation 23
rd
 October 2012).  In relation to the Malawi and 
Mozambique Joint Permanent Commission of Cooperation the Daily Times of 8
th
 November 
2012 mentioned that: 
 
 
 
 
128 
 
Malawi and Mozambique are yet to reaffirm their common borders and that is an item 
at on-going three-day Joint Permanent Commission of Cooperation (JPCC) underway 
in Lilongwe… “This meeting will also look into issues of our common border. Of 
course, the border is already demarcated. We are only to reaffirm those borders”. 
The same exercise of border demarcation was also taking place between Zambia and 
Mozambique. For instance, in August 2012 the Mozambican government announced that its 
border demarcation exercise with Zambia had just been concluded (Sousle Manguier 9
th
 
August 2012). It had been observed that Zambians and Malawians were invading the 
Mozambican border inorder to build homes or illegally establish their own farms.  
It can be deduced from this scenario that, except in cases of criminal activities such as 
robbery, the porous and indeterminate border problems seem not to be the concern of local 
communities as well as immediate local immigration officers. The problem seems to be the 
concern of top level state officials who perceive this as loss of sovereignty and security. What 
is puzzling is the sudden interest in border demarcation and reaffirmation when most 
countries in southern Africa are now less suspicious of each other and globalisation is 
enhancing movement of the people. More importantly, with the trans-border cultural 
movements such as the Chewa taking prominence, politicians from all these countries have 
consistently declared that ethnic communities in these countries are one and the borders are 
artificial. The sudden interest to move towards reaffirmation and demarcation of borders 
seems to be the opposite of what is publicly declared. For instance, when the president of 
Zambia visited Malawi, the president of Malawi, Bingu wa Mutharika, emphasised the issue 
of artificiality of the borders (“Malawi, Zambia are one” The Nation, 4thFebruary 2009, p3, 
emphasis added). 
This contradiction of being engaged in border re-demarcation and reaffirmation whilst 
proclaiming artificiality of the same borders forms part of the debate between formal versus 
informal perspective of the state borders (Westphalian perspective versus state-society 
perspective debate) that will be discussed further in the subsequent sections. Suffice to 
mention that local immigration officers mentioned that despite complaints from national 
offices of the porosity of borders, the situation would have been worse if they followed 
exactly what the officials at national level expect. According to a Malawian immigration 
officer at the Malawi-Mozambique border: 
We rely on local communities to effectively do our job hence we sometimes overlook 
certain border crossing formalities in order not to offend them. This is sometimes 
interpreted as laxity on our part. Criminal activities are easy to identify when you work 
closely with communities. In this case we have to treat the local communities well such as 
the Chewa because we know that they normally cross for cultural purposes or just visit 
their relatives (Key informant interview/Immigration officer, Dedza, 28
th
 May 2012). 
7.2 The extent of state borders as an obstacle to Chewa identity 
The findings of this study show that the formal borders were not a hindrance towards 
expression of Chewa identity in several ways:  
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Firstly, when the Chewa are organizing their Kulamba ceremony in Zambia, the state borders 
of these three countries, according to CHEFO Chairperson, are “relaxed” to allow people to 
attend the ceremony (Interview with Dr Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe, 10
th
 May 2012). Based 
on an agreement reached between CHEFO and government officials, Malawians and 
Mozambicans travelling to the ceremony in Zambia do not need a passport but do have to be 
registered and appear on the list of names which is stamped by Malawi or Mozambican 
government officials. This list has neither personal identification nor photos of the said 
individuals; merely their names and the vehicle registration number plate in which they are 
travelling (see Appendix 11).  
However, apart from those provided with the special border crossing document, many other 
individuals actually cross the border without any documentation at all. According to CHEFO 
Chairperson, the masked Gule Wamkulu dancers (Chewa traditional dance members) are not 
even required to show anything (do not need to appear on the list of registered members) 
because in the Chewa tradition, the masked dancers are believed to represent their “ancestral 
spirits”.  Specifically, the CHEFO chairperson said: Kodi chilombo chiwonesa bwanji 
passport kapena chikalata pa border? Ndi chilombo chimenecho. [How can a spirit produce a 
passport or official document at the border? It is simply a spirit] (Interview with Dr Justine 
Malewezi, Lilongwe, 10
th
 May 2012). 
One female FGD participant also explained this phenomenon by saying that: 
Tikamapita ku Nkaika galimoto yathu imakhala pambuyo ndipo yazilombo (Gule 
Wamkulu) imakhala patsogolo. Imeneyo ndiye passport yathu ndipo wapolisi akaona 
zilombo samafunsanso passport amadziwa kuti tikupita kukawona abale athu kwa 
Gawa Undi. [When going to Mkaika -headquarters of Gawa Undi- the vehicle carrying 
Gule Wamkulu is in front.  That is our passport because when the police see the Gule 
Wamkulu they do not even ask for a passport, they know that we are going to visit our 
relatives at Gawa Undi‟s place](Female FGD, Lilongwe, 11th May 2012)  
According to the administrative officer at Mchinji District Assembly, the special pass that 
they are given is not really special at all and it does not mean anything. He mentioned that 
“the main reason they are given the pass is just to ensure that the Zambian and Malawian 
governments should be aware of the exact numbers of individuals who have crossed the 
border to attend the ceremony. He continued to explain that “The document is mainly for 
accountability purposes so that when something happens to them while in Zambia, someone 
should be able to trace; otherwise on its own, the document has no any other purposes” (Key 
informant interview/Administrative Officer, Mchinji, 15
th
 May 2012). 
Secondly, when the Chewa King, Gawa Undi visits the region, he is not required to produce a 
passport. According to CHEFO chairperson, there is no need for him to produce a passport 
because “Dziko ndilake ndiye passport yachani?” [The land belongs to him, why should he 
produce a passport?] (Key informant interview, Lilongwe, 10
th
 May 2012). Actually, he is 
given VIP treatment as a government official even though he is merely a traditional leader.  
According to an official from the Ministry of Local Government in Malawi, Gawa Undi is, in 
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fact, provided with a convoy and official security when in the country (Key informant 
interview, Lilongwe, 18
th
 May 2012). This phenomenon should be understood in the context 
that traditional authorities in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia have their own country 
specific Laws and regulations which do not cover traditional authorities outside their 
domains. In this case, the authority of Gawa Undi is not stipulated in the laws of Malawi and 
Mozambique but he is under the domain of Zambia. According to a Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs official in Malawi, all foreign government dignitaries visiting the country normally 
have to produce an official diplomatic passport and they do not merely enter the country 
without one (Key informant interview, Lilongwe, 10
th
 May 2012). This special treatment 
given to Gawa Undi is not necessarily imposed by the Chewa on the countries of Malawi and 
Mozambique but it is something that the said governments have done at their own volition.  
Thirdly, the Chewa themselves, generally perceive the borders as not being a threat to 
expressing and sharing ideas about their identity across the border. In other words, the 
borders are seen as flexible social markers. When FGD participants in all the three countries 
were asked: “Does the state boundary pose as a challenge to expression of your Chewa 
identity?” it was clear from the discussions that emerged, that state boundaries pose no 
problem at all.  
For instance, one female in Mozambique during FGD mentioned that when they reach the 
border, there is nothing that they fear, and she asked “if people manage to smuggle goods 
across who can therefore forbid us from uniting with our relatives on cultural matters? 
Otherwise they just want to find faults against you if they deny you” (Female FGD, Angonia, 
28
th
 May 2012). In other words, the response across the three countries clearly shows that the 
current state boundaries are not perceived as possible barriers to express, exchange ideas as 
well as unify the Chewa ethnic identity. In other words, for the Chewas, the state borders do 
not really mean anything other than a formal construct that has no impact on their cultural 
development and expression.  
However, despite this overwhelming agreement that state borders are not a threat to 
expression of trans-border Chewa identity, there were a few individuals who thought 
otherwise. Some felt that when one crosses the border (for cultural purposes) without a 
document, one is not a free person because one fears that anything can happen, such as being 
arrested. Taking a travel document might also be problematic due to the required bureaucratic 
processes and so it poses as a barrier to the expression of their identity.  
Apart from the Kulamba ceremony, all the Chewas mentioned that they constantly interact 
across the border on cultural-related issues such as marriages, funerals and installation of 
chiefs. During a male FGD in one village in Mozambique, one participant said: 
Iwo akakhala ndizochitika amatitenga ngakhalenso ife tikakhala ndizochitika kaya 
kubwera kwa a DC timawayitana iwo kuti tithandizane. Kayanso kukabwera a 
president awo kaya nduna amatiyitana kuti bwerani tizathandizane…kutereku tiri 
ndima flag awiri, ya Malawi ndi ya Mozambique. Ku chikondwerero cha ufulu ku 
Blantyre takhala tikupita limodzi ndi anzathu akumalawi ndikukavina gule. [when 
they have ceremonies they come and inform us so that we join them (to perform 
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dances) similarly when the District Commissioner is visiting us, we also invite them to 
attend…currently we have both flags, Malawian and Mozambican. We have also been 
attending the independence celebrations in Blantyre (city in southern region of 
Malawi) and performed traditional dances with our Malawian colleagues.][sic] (Male 
FGD, Angonia, 28
th 
May 2012) 
In Mozambique, the District Commissioners organise cultural dances for different ethnic 
groups which are showcased on a particular day in selected areas of the district. A week 
before this FGD was conducted in Angonia, such an event had actually taken place and it 
transpired that Malawian Chewas joined them in these dances.  What also emerged from this 
discussion is that when Malawian Chewa traditional dancers are invited to the Mozambican 
event, they mix and form one group with the Mozambican Chewas. Since foreign groups are 
not allowed to participate, the Mozambican government officials are not aware that the 
traditional performers are actually composed of members from two different countries- this is 
an informal arrangement. This also occurs when Mozambican Chewa traditional performers 
are invited to Malawi. This is why one FDG participant in the above quote mentioned that 
they “have both flags” of Malawi and Mozambique readily available so that they can pick the 
relevant flag depending on where they will perform. In this case, officials attending the 
traditional ceremonies wrongly assume that the performers are all citizens of only their 
countries. Another interesting observation is that this interaction has been going on for years, 
even before CHEFO was founded or before the reinvention of Kulamba ceremony. 
According to one key informant, this scenario shows a weakness on the part of the state as it 
„gives in‟ to the informal movements as well as the inability of the state to satisfy the need for 
„belonging‟ (Key informant interview, Lilongwe, 11th May 2012). 
7.2.1 Critical analysis: Is the state losing sovereignty due to ‘weak’ borders? 
From a Westphalian perspective, it may be argued that the Chewa trans-border movement is 
challenging the sovereignty of the states of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia when they 
„relax‟ borders to facilitate the identity formation of the Chewa. In other words, this may be 
summarized as follows: 
Firstly, in a strict Westphalian interpretation of state borders, each state would be regarded as 
an autonomous entity that develops its own culture and practices without major influence 
from external entities or communities. The state and its associated official entities could be 
regarded as the main socialising institution and facilitator of creating bonds across the border. 
Secondly, another expectation from the Westphalian model is that borders are a fundamental 
part of how its authority and control are expressed. In this case, the state would be interested 
to demonstrate this control and authority by, among other things, ensuring that there is strict 
observation and control of individuals crossing its borders. In this case, an informal traditional 
leader is being allowed to cross the border without any documentation- a treatment that even 
most foreign government officials do not receive. 
Thirdly, the „relaxation‟ of the borders during a traditional event is also a different expectation 
of the Westphalian state treatment of its sovereignty. In this case, the borders of Mozambique, 
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Malawi and Zambia become less authoritative as compared to the traditional event. Finally, In 
a Westphalian perspective of sovereignty, state subjects or citizens are supposed to perceive 
borders as official barriers that confine their expressions, identity and dreams within a 
particular entity. The perception shared by most Chewa people that borders are meaningless 
as far as culturally expressing and identifying themselves is possible is a demonstration of a 
challenge to the Westphalian model. 
The argument of this study is that contrary to Kehinde‟s (2010) perspective (which is similar 
to the above), the failure of the state to inhibit ethnic identity is not a sign of state weakness 
but a sign of flexibility on the part of the state by responding to the needs of the communities 
who are constantly crossing borders to interact on matters which are not a threat to its 
existence. This is a basis of the constructivist perspective of state-society relationship. 
According to Demirovi´c (2011) and Barkey and Parikh (1991), the perspective that the state 
is losing sovereignty when it is deemed to be failing to control ethnic groups who are 
expressing their identity, is based on a faulty understanding of the state. The state, in other 
words, normally interacts with the communities and in the process of interaction, what is 
wrong or right is defined within that parameter of interaction. The product, which might be 
seen as relaxation of borders, is not a loss of sovereignty but a product of the social 
interaction. In other words, the interaction ultimately expresses the “nature of state autonomy 
and capacity” (Barkey and Parikh 1991: 526) and it is not a challenge to its sovereignty. 
Another observation is that in the case of the Chewa trans-border identity, at national level, 
state officials express the Westphalian model rhetoric, while at local level immigration 
officers take into consideration the state-society relations. Consequently, at top level there is 
a move towards re-affirmation and demarcation of borders to curb the excesses of local 
integration. This seemingly contradictory approach to state borders is actually reinforcing the 
relevance of the state at international and local level.  This is why Nkiwane‟s (2001:287) 
observation that “the state may derive its power from a variety of sources, and in the context 
of Africa what may appear to be a loss of central state power may in fact be its 
reconfiguration” becomes valid here. In other words, for states to remain relevant at 
international levels, they implement the Westphalian model manifested in re-affirmation and 
re-demarcation of borders and this is normally influenced from the top state officials. At the 
same time, to remain relevant at local level, the state relaxes its formalities associated with 
the Westphalian model especially during cultural celebrations. In other words, the state tries 
to bring the human face to the formal state by responding to their immediate concerns. These 
two actions, though, may seem contradictory; however, the Westphalian approach and state-
society relations approach complement each other in ensuring that the state remains relevant.  
 
7.3 The Chewa perception of formal identity (nationality) and state borders 
 
One key aspect of the Westphalian state is political socialisation to the extent that a common 
descent and destiny is propagated by the state. This also forms the hallmark of a common 
state citizenship. A view that another agent, who is non-state, should propagate the 
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perspective that its citizenry share a common descent with another group outside the formal 
state boundary, is a direct challenge to its legitimacy and sovereignty. More importantly, if 
ethnic identity is valued more than national identity then this may have implications on state 
sovereignty whose survival is based on unquestioned submission to national identity. The 
discussion below analyses the extent to which the Chewa „common descent perspectives‟, as 
well as „national versus Chewa ethnic identity‟, may have an effect on state sovereignty. 
7.3.1 Common descent perspective 
 
The common descent perspective may start with a definition of the group‟s identity. The 
CHEFO Chairperson, Justine Malewezi, in a follow up interview, was asked “Who is defined 
as a Chewa? Is it the one who speaks Chichewa? The one who is under the authority of a 
Chewa chief? Or is it someone who follows the Chewa culture?” His response was that a 
Chewa is the one who gets it by birth and/or a socialisation process (Second interview with Dr 
Justine Malewezi, Lilongwe, 6
th
 December 2012). 
 
However, two years before this interview he had stated something a little bit different when 
he indirectly defined the Chewa at a cultural meeting. He had implicitly indicated that a 
Chewa is the one under the authority of Gawa Undi, speaks the Chewa language and also 
follows the Chewa culture. Below is a newspaper extract based on what he said: 
 
Chewa Heritage Foundation (Chefo) Chairperson Justin Malewezi on Saturday urged 
Chewas to be united in promoting their culture and development. Speaking during the 
Chizangala rite of passage ceremony at Sankhani 2 Village in T/A Njewa‟s area in 
Lilongwe, Malewezi said it is the wish of the Chewa supreme authority, Kalonga Gawa 
Undi, that the tribe maintains unity. “There are several things that unite us. We are united 
because we all fall under Gawa. We also have a unique language. Our culture is rich. 
That is why we have to remain united as bees in a hive (The Nation, 22
nd
 December 2010, 
p4, emphasis added). 
The idea of who is Chewa may not be very clear but it can be deduced that the one who has 
been brought up in the Chewa culture may officially be regarded as a true Chewa from the 
CHEFO perspective, but from a practical perspective, what the CHEFO chairperson said at a 
cultural meeting might be more significant. Another dimension to Chewa identity is what 
emerged during the FGD meetings. When the Chewa communities were asked what makes 
them feel the same as their counterparts across the border, one of the issues that frequently 
emerged was bele limodzi or common descent. Based on FGD results, the Chewa have a 
strong feeling that they belong to one family irrespective of where they are geographically 
based. Linked to this finding is the issue of national versus ethnic identity. FGD participants 
were asked “What do they consider as more important: your national or Chewa identity? Or 
both?” The results show that with the exception of the Chewa in Mozambique, an 
overwhelming majority chose the Chewa identity (See Table 9).  
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Table 9: Summary to the FGD responses on the question: “What do they consider as more 
important: your national or Chewa identity? Or both?” 
Source: Author‟s summary of FGD findings 
 
This reinforces Phiri‟s (1975) finding who stated that what is critical in the Chewa culture is 
the belief that all its ethnic members are “descendants of a common breast (bele)”. He further 
stated that as perceived descendants from „one breast‟ or family, they regard “themselves as 
perpetual nephews of a remote maternal uncle (tsinde)” (Phiri 1975:13). From all the FGDs, 
(except in Mozambique) which represented the views of the Chewas at grassroots level, as 
well as some key informant interviews, it was emphasized that their common descent as 
Chewas was critical for their trans-border identity and it also explains their motive for 
integration. In other words, based on the interviews conducted, it emerged that the history of 
origin of the Chewa strongly emphasises a common origin of the ethnic group. Almost all 
Chewa key informants and FGDs in all the three countries took time to explain in detail how 
they migrated from Uluba in present Zaire to their current place of settlement (although in 
some cases they provided a conflicting account of their origin). Although their stories of 
origin were not always consistent, and in some cases contradicted the well-established 
historical facts, what normally stood out was their pride in articulating their identity as „one 
family‟. For instance, in Zambia, one Male FGD participant mentioned (and his views were 
shared by his colleagues), “I prefer to be called Chewa because Zambian identity is limited by the 
current nation-state boundary. However, if I am called Chewa, my identity is almost unlimited 
because this identity is beyond Zambia” (Male FGD, Chipata, 17th May 2012).  
 
Most participants in Mozambique, however, mentioned that they prefer to be called 
Mozambicans first and their Chewa identity is secondary. This is not surprising in 
 Country FGD District/Province Response Observation 
1 
 
Zambia FGD 1 Chipata Chewa Identity Almost  a consensus 
FGD 2 Chipata Chewa Identity Almost  a consensus 
FGD 3 Chipata Chewa Identity Almost  a consensus 
FGD 4 Chipata Chewa Identity Almost  a consensus 
2 Mozambique FGD 1 Angonia, Tete Both Identities Hotly debated but very few 
(25%) were for Chewa 
identity 
FGD 2 Angonia, Tete National About 40% disagreed with 
the majority 
FGD 3 Angonia, Tete Chewa Identity Hotly debated but very few 
were for National & both 
FGD 4 Angonia, Tete National Almost  a consensus 
3 Malawi FGD 1 Lilongwe Both Identities Almost  a consensus 
FGD 2 Lilongwe Chewa Identity Almost  a consensus 
FGD 3 Lilongwe Chewa Identity Almost  a consensus 
FGD 4 Lilongwe Chewa Identity Almost  a consensus 
FGD 5 Lilongwe Chewa Identity Almost  a consensus 
FGD 6 Chikhwawa Chewa Identity Almost  a consensus 
FGD 7 Chikhwawa Both Identities Hotly debated but about 
43% for Chewa Identity 
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Mozambique because several research papers have stated that ethnic identity in Mozambique 
is very low due to their historical background. For instance, the harsh Portuguese colonial 
experience forced communities to work closely together and disregard their ethnic 
affiliations.  Despite this condition, the Mozambican Chewa identity is still cherished by 
them, exemplified by their constant quest to interact on cultural matters with their Chewa 
colleagues in other countries.  
 
7.3.2 A critical analysis: Perceived ‘common descent’ a challenge to state? 
These findings also confirm Ekeh‟s (1975) thesis that a common descent is pursued as one of 
the ways to legitimise the ethnic movements. This entails competing with the nation-state 
policies of nation-building. By regarding themselves as a distinct historical community 
ultimately contradicts the African nation-state building project of regarding ethnic identities 
as inferior to nation-state identity. This contradiction is reflected in Ekeh‟s „Two publics‟. By 
strengthening the Chewa descent, its members are undermining the „civic public‟ or state 
citizenship. This also entails them unconsciously politicising their movement. This is why 
Cohen (1974) views ethnic organisations as political organisations and even mentions in the 
preface of his book that a “political man is also a symbolic man”. Barth (1987) also supports 
this argument by stating that ethnicity is a matter of politics. 
 
Due to historical inconsistencies of the origin of the Chewa as provided during FGD, the 
findings also agree, to some extent, with the observation of some scholars, such as Brown 
(1999), who dispute the objectivity of most ethnic groups‟ historical accounts. Brown (1999) 
argues that even those who are pro-traditionalism do not dispute the argument that the 
common descent claims are not realistic. In this regard, he states that “the claims to common 
kinship are not based solely on the objective cultural traits and the real facts of common 
ancestry, but rather on the power of the myths and symbols of kinship… all refer to the 
belief, rather than the fact, of common kinship” (Brown 1999:289). 
 
In this regard, cultural symbols and history can be deliberately manipulated so as to create 
ethnic identity and organisation, thus producing a consciously constructed ethnic identity. 
However, in the context of the Chewa ethnic group, this study goes further and argues that 
this may not always be a problem because “discussion of history relates not to the past but to 
the present” or more precisely “history is not a product of the past but a response to 
requirements of the present” (Eriksen 2002:73).  Taking into consideration that historical 
record captures only a small part of the full account, the process of selecting what is to be 
recorded encompasses interpretation, reinterpretation and creativity. Consequently, what we 
normally call historical facts are not necessarily the past but merely “present-day 
constructions of the past” (Eriksen 2002: 73). This doesn‟t imply that historical accounts are 
inventions hence not to be taken seriously, but, if we take into consideration the process of 
developing these accounts as highlighted above, we will appreciate that historical accounts 
are, and should be, contested. This is why ethnic claims have always been contested and 
reinvented despite their claim to the past. In this case, Eriksen (2002) points out that research 
has shown that most of the so-called contemporary revived or revitalised traditions are not a 
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re-emergence of the formerly existing practices which were disappearing. The reality is that 
the critical aspects of such revived practices are entirely new “although they imagine 
themselves as old and glorify presumably ancient handicrafts, rituals or other cultural 
practices” (Eriksen 2002:86). What is paramount is culture innovativeness and creation, 
which may simply be defined as choosing what is relevant and discarding the irrelevant. It is 
in this holistic context of development of Chewa history, just like other ethnic groups, that its 
potential must be understood. Through interviews held, pride in common descent was 
consistently manifesting as one of the core underlying factors driving the integration. Pride 
was not only manifested in what was said, but also how it was said about their past. 
 
From a Westphalian state-building perspective, it can be said that despite the numerous 
efforts to erase ethnic affiliation during the post-colonial period (but instilling the national-
state pride) ethnic history and affiliation is still influential. In the case of the Chewa, the 
affiliation is more complex in the sense that it is trans-border. All FGD participants (except 
for a few in Mozambique) explained that they felt being called a Chewa was more important 
than being referred to as a citizen of their nation. However, it can also be deduced that the 
Chewa‟s emphasis on common descent exposes the contradiction in the movement‟s cultural 
nationalist motive because it indirectly politicises their agenda through claiming their 
distinctiveness. In this case, the boundary between political and cultural nationalism becomes 
blurred. 
 
A further critical point of analysis of Chewa common descent versus state identity can be 
brought to the fore if the Afrobarometer data is applied. The sections below will analyse 
whether the Chewa of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia are unique. This uniqueness will be 
measured by comparing the socio-political perceptions of the Chewa in Malawi, Mozambique 
and Zambia as well as the Chewa against other two major ethnic groups in their respective 
countries. If the data reveals that a unique Chewa pattern inside and outside the state exists, 
then the probability is high that they are forming a distinct identity parallel to that of the 
nation-state. The areas of comparison are the trust of own ethnic group versus other ethnic 
groups; the choice of ethnic identity or national identity; the trust in traditional leadership and 
level of influence in local governance; the perception of the time traditional leaders spend 
listening to the people, and the extent of political activism. Since traditional leaders are 
assumed to be at the core of shaping traditional identity, the third and fourth areas have 
deliberately been chosen to highlight their significance or insignificance in shaping identity. 
 
7.4 Uniqueness of the Chewa trans-border identity:  Comparison between 
trans-boarder Kurds and the Chewa22 
This section argues that the social constructivist approach provides a better understanding of 
the uniqueness of the Chewa movement. Drawing some insights from the trans-border 
Kurdish movement of the Middle East, the study provides further this uniqueness of the 
                                                          
22
This section does not claim to provide an exhaustive analysis of the Kurdish movement but only isolates areas 
that may have a bearing on the theme of this study. 
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Chewa. In a nutshell, the Turkish state (where the majority of the Kurds reside) has taken a 
more Westphalian interpretation of the state which reinforces one language, culture and 
nationality. This is different from the Chewa experience within the states of Malawi, Zambia 
and Mozambique where the state has provided a platform for expression of the Chewa 
identity. Taking into consideration that the Chewa King has a traditional authoritative 
element that connects him to his people, the state has capitalised on this by providing space 
for the Chewa cultural expression led by the King himself. This „capture‟ of the Chewa by 
the state has managed to instil harmonious relations with the Chewa community. Specifically, 
the flexibility of the state in the Chewa-state relations and the inflexibility of the state in the 
Kurds-state relations has been a decisive factor in explaining their difference. Consequently, 
from a social constructivist perspective, the historical experience of the Kurds has led them to 
construct a picture of the state which is deemed a threat to the Kurdish survival. 
 
7.4.1 Historical background 
There are many other transborder ethnic groups across the world, but this study argues that 
the Chewa case epitomizes a unique African ethnic trans-border experience. The significance 
of the Kurds is reinforced by the observation of Romano (2006:24) who points out that the 
experience of the ethnic Kurds in Turkey makes “a very interesting case for the study of 
ethnic nationalist movements in the developing world. The Kurds of Euroasia may share 
certain common experiences with the Chewa but there are some profound differences that set 
the Chewa case as a bona fide African experience. The Kurds are now regarded as the 
world‟s largest 'ethnic minority' with an estimated population of anywhere between 20 to 25 
million people (Loizides 2010). The Kurds do not identify themselves as Arabs although the 
majority are Muslim and they speak Kurdish which is closer to the Iranian language of 
Persian origin. After the First World War, the Ottoman Empire, which aligned itself during 
the war with the losing power Germany, fell apart. Through the 1916 French-British 
agreement known as Sykes-Picot agreement, the Kurds were split into the newly created 
borders of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran- just like the Chewa who are found in three countries. 
Although they are one of the world‟s largest ethnic communities, they do not have a state of 
their own. Just as almost half of the Chewa people are found in Malawi, similarly 
approximately half of the Kurds live in present day Turkey. These are, among other things, 
some of the broader similarities between these two communities. It is mainly their differences 
which create the puzzle. The fundamental question is: why are the Kurds currently fighting 
for an autonomous state when the Chewa are not doing the same- yet they share 
commonalities in core elements of their current status? 
 
While the Chewa had pre-colonial state experiences and ethnic ties, this was not the case with 
the Kurds. According to Loizides (2010:513), the Kurds can be referred to as „nations without 
history‟ because at no time in their pre-capitalist past have they ever been a one political 
entity. Originally the Kurds were fragmented kinship-based units under a tribal or religious 
leader and each community had a distinct geographical area it occupied, but usually in remote 
mountainous regions (Yavuz 2001). Although the Kurds were “at the crossroads of the 
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Persian, Arab, and Turkish worlds” they were not necessarily the sole occupants of the 
general area they currently claim but they existed in several large pockets which were 
surrounded by numerous other groups (Yavuz 2001). This is unlike the Chewa who occupied 
a continuous geographical area and other tribes which existed in this area were subjects of the 
Chewa King.  In other words, the historicity of ethnic unity, which transcends language, in a 
state polity did exist among the Chewa but this was not the case with the Kurds. The Chewa 
have a more legitimate cause for demanding state autonomy than the Kurds, but the opposite 
is happening. This puzzle is examined below in the comparison of Kurdish and Chewa ethnic 
identity formation discussion. 
 
7.4.2 Identity formation among the Kurds and the Chewa 
Modern ethnic identity of the Chewa and that of the Kurds shows some similarities and 
differences. Using the analysis developed by Gellner (1983), Loizides (2010) argues that the 
ethnic identity of the Kurds is a product of a transition towards modern industrial society. 
Industrialisation affects different people differently and this has implications on how they 
may react to the process. In this case, Loizides points out that “the demands of an industrial 
economy favoured homogeneity” which is reflected in form of language, skills for 
bureaucratic employment and several other related modernization attributes.  Comparatively, 
most of the Kurds had a peasant background and were ill equipped for a modernizing society. 
This failure to match their skills, language and other elements to the modernizing polity were 
interpreted as “conditions of discrimination”. Some group members made a decision to 
assimilate into the dominant culture by acquiring the required attributes while others turned 
away and formed the breeding ground for ethnic nationalist thinking. As Sarigil (2012) 
argues, for various social-political reasons, the Kurdish elites took advantage of this 
frustrated group to form a coherent ethnic national programme through an elaborate cultural 
framing process which included glorifying their socially constructed historical past. Although 
this situation was more pronounced in Turkey, it was similar in other countries where Kurds 
reside such as Iran, Iraqi and Syria. Even the profile of the leadership of the Kurds‟ armed 
nationalist movement in Turkey, the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – Kurdistan Workers‟ 
Party) shows that they were more Turkish than Kurds in their upbringing, culture, language 
and other associated attributes. For instance, according to Loizides (2010: 513), Abdullah O¨ 
Calan, the founder and leader of PKK, “himself was a native speaker of Turkish and 
according to his own account he had no previous attachment to Kurdish nationalism”. But he 
turned to Kurdish nationalism after encountering problems with the state- which had nothing 
to do with his Kurdish origin. Kurdish identity was therefore originally developed by the elite 
in relation to the social political context (Yegen 2007; Yavuz 2001; Sarigil 2012; Romano 
2006). Although the elite played a critical role in the identity formation of the contemporary 
Chewa, it was not really borne out of the frustration with failure of the masses to integrate in 
the state apparatus.  
 
This may explain the identity formation of the Kurds but the politicization of the Kurds, 
especially in Turkey, can be described through the process of Turkish state-society relations. 
According to Yavuz (2001) “the major reason for the politicization of Kurdish cultural 
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identity is the shift from multi-ethnic, multi-cultural realities of the Ottoman empire to the 
nation-state model”. When the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, 
emphasized the use of one Turkish language and culture, it was interpreted as a way of trying 
to suppress the Kurdish heritage hence politicization of the group. From Ataturk‟s 
perspective, it was a way of enhancing political integration after the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire. This is why Hiltermann (2012: 16) argues that “the Kurds are victims of history, 
geography and, on the occasions they overreach, their own ambitions”. In a nutshell, Romano 
(2006:52) points out that the semi-democratic nature of Turkey which is not open to the 
demands of the Kurds facilitated the process for development of radical Kurdish movements 
that operates from outside the state. Although there are several factions of the Kurds, Turkish 
Kurds play a de facto leadership role for others in Syria, Iran, and Iraq.  
 
The explanation for the whole puzzle in the Chewa and Kurdish identity formation and 
sustenance can be through the social constructivist perspective of state-society relations. 
Specifically, the whole issue is arguably revolving on the nature of the relationship between 
identity formation elites and the state. Another issue is arguably centrality of authority which 
does not exist in the Kurdish movement but does exist in the Chewa through traditional 
structures.  The Chewa have had an identifiable central structure of authority through their 
traditional leader Gawa Undi. The other elite such as members of CHEFO have been 
operating under the traditional authority of the King. The King has been „captured‟ by the 
state through co-option (duality of traditional leadership whilst being recognised by the state 
structure as a leader) to the extent that he cannot just rise against the state. In this case, the 
state has provided space for the King to exercise his authority over the Chewa people- though 
limited. This careful balance of the state and the ruling elite of the Chewa has put under 
control the nationalistic intentions of the Chewa. On the other hand, despite having a 
common interest for political independence, the Kurds are not fully united across the three 
countries. Apart from lack of centrality of authority, non-existence of duality in the 
leadership in the Kurdish community complicates the situation and encourages radical 
nationalist intentions. The state in the Kurdish case finds it difficult to easily „capture‟ its elite 
without centrality of authority. The Chewa case therefore epitomizes a unique African 
experience which cannot easily be replicated in crossborder ethnic movements especially 
outside Africa. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at examining the extent to which the state borders affect trans-border 
Chewa identity and its implication to the Westphalian model of the state. Partially, the 
chapter also analysed whether there are trans-border Chewa commonalities or divergences on 
issues related to state sovereignty and ethnic identity. In this case, this chapter is central to 
this study‟s field findings. Although the Chewa acknowledges a common descent, common 
cultural practices and the authority of Gawa Undi, the findings show that this commonality 
does not extend into socio-political attitudes and perceptions. In this case, the ethnic 
politicisation of the Chewa is largely limited as most of them still share socio-political 
attitudes and perceptions that are defined by their national-state politics and not trans-border 
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issues. In other words, there is no unique socio-political trans-border Chewa view or agenda, 
apart from cultural identity, that may pose as a challenge to the formal state. More 
importantly, the states of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia have willingly provided a 
platform and space for the expression of Chewa ethnic identity and therefore identified 
themselves with the community as an ally and not a competitor. Through this flexibility on 
the part of the state, the chapter has argued that the state has remained relevant to the Chewa 
while allowing them to express social citizenship.   
 
In a nutshell, the chapter concludes that in all the three countries, the Chewa believe or 
emphasise a distinctiveness or common descent which contradicts the Westphalian state 
perspective. It can also be deduced that the Chewa‟s emphasis on common descent exposes 
the contradiction in the movement‟s cultural nationalist motive because it indirectly 
politicises their agenda through claiming their distinctiveness. In this case, the boundary 
between political and cultural nationalism in their movement becomes blurred. When 
compared to the trans-border Kurds of Middle-East, what comes out clearly is that although 
the elite played a critical role in the identity formation for both, the Chewa and the Kurds, the 
major difference is the process in which this identity was constructed. Unlike the Kurds, the 
contemporary Chewa identity was not constructed due to their frustration with the failure of 
being integrated into the state system. More importantly, although the Kurds have leaders, the 
Chewa have a much more recognizable trans-border leadership which appeals to the mythical 
Chewa tradition and which is also recognized by the formal state. This duality in Chewa 
leadership- appealing to the traditional yet recognized by the formal state- and transcending 
borders - creates a very unique scenario for the Chewa which can not easily be replicated 
elsewhere. 
 
Having analysed the issue of state borders and Chewa ethnic identity, the next chapter 
concludes the study by, among other things, highlighting the critical issues uncovered as well 
as their implications to the stated research objectives of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
8.0 Introduction and Summary of major study findings 
.   
The study finds that the Chewa trans-border ethnic group identity largely complements the 
Westphalian model. Taken from a Westphalian perspective the state would be said to have 
been challenged and rendered irrelevant, but within the framework of [social] constructivism, 
the state demonstrates flexibility and innovation to remain legitimate by co-opting the Chewa 
movement. In this case, the study finds that the co-existence of the Westphalian model and 
trans-border Chewa ethnic identity is mainly due to the flexibility of the state in 
accommodating informal ethnic expressions, which ultimately reinforces the dependence on 
each other. In other words, state flexibility has frustrated the development of a politically 
motivated trans-border Chewa political agenda; hence the movement lacks a trans-border 
common socio-political view. It should however be mentioned that although there are what 
would seem to be political elements amongst the Chewa movement (especially at local level), 
these elements are deliberately framed as „cultural‟ by Chewa leadership (to suggest that they 
are a-political and thereby ensure their survival alongside the Westephalian state as non-
threatening, submissive entity. All in all, the study argues that the existence of the Chewa 
Kingdom thrives on exploiting the political and cultural elements in order to attain its goals 
of preserving and protecting the Chewa interests. Consequently, the interaction of these two 
perspectives promote the Chewa‟s power and recognition which in the long run has 
implications on Westphalian state sovereignty and territory of the three countries of 
Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia. 
 
8.2 Contributions to the field of study 
This study has made several contributions to the field of IR specifically in an African context. 
The discussion below presents these contributions from a theoretical and empirical/practical 
perspective. 
8.2.1 Theoretical contributions 
The theoretical contributions made by this study are several as highlighted below: 
Social constructivism has mainly tended to focus on state centred approaches and this led to a 
limited understanding of state-society relations. Using a constructivist approach that goes 
beyond the state as the unit of analysis tremendously improves our understanding of how the 
Westphalian model manifests in different spaces and at different times.  In a way this study is 
innovative because it employs the theoretical debates on cultural nationalism and politics of 
representation in such a way to move beyond the state and to explore how people construct 
their political realities (within the context of the Westphalian model). This study aptly 
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complements Smith‟s (2009) suggestion that when studying African IR, we have to move 
beyond the strict disciplinary boundaries that have defined the field and search for African 
state experiences. The Chewas have had an interesting experience of working with the formal 
and informal institutions across three countries for many years. This ability to discreetly 
pursue their interests despite a challenging trans-border scenario provides special insights of 
the relationship between the state and trans-border informal entities. However, the limited 
confines of IR discipline may not fully capture these dynamics. Consequently, apart from 
Smith, this study also contributes to Sindjoun‟s (2001) and Clapham‟s (1996) quest for 
strengthening of interdisciplinary approaches in IR which should embrace disciplines such as 
anthropology, sociology and other related fields. As Onuf (2013) once mentioned, social 
constructivism ably establishes links in diverse areas which were previously deemed 
impossible. However, efforts to go beyond the boundaries of IR have not been very effective. 
Building on the point discussed above, the study also contributes to the growing body of 
studies which argue that the Westphalian model of the state is not completely outdated, but it 
is applicable in some cases when states want to maximise their legitimacy. The meaning of 
sovereignty is thus negotiated between state and society, rather than imposed as a 
Westphalian ideal type may imply. In other words, the study reinforces the constructivist 
perspective that sovereignty is not static and pre-given, but dynamic and its uses change 
depending on the situation. Consequently, the study rejects the thesis that an African state is 
weak per se and succumbs to trans-border movements as argued by Kahinde (2010) and 
others. 
This study contributes to the understanding of contemporary form of trans-border nationalism 
pursued by ethnic movements. In other words, the study reinforces the argument such as that 
of Brass (1991) and Romano (2006) that ethnicity and nationalism are political constructions 
and to some extent the products of elites. However, the role of elites is not as Brass and 
Romano envisaged, but a contemporary form of nationalism as argued by Castells (2004) 
who pointed out that contemporary form of nationalism is among other things not primarily 
aimed at creation of nation-states but at the same time it is not limited to modern nation-states 
and although politics is not completely dismissed, it tends to be more cultural than political. 
The Chewa aptly epitomizes this contemporary trans-border nationalism as conceptualised by 
Castel, thus contributing to IR an empirical-led example of the nature, form and 
manifestation of contemporary trans-border nationalism. 
This study contributes to the social constructivists understanding of regional integration in 
Africa and other similar settings. Much of the literature on regional integration has focused 
on state institutions or highly formalised institutions. The informal trans-border institutions 
have not featured highly in the debate of trans-border state relations. In general theories and 
approaches to regional integration have largely ignored the potentiality of trans-border 
communities to facilitate cooperation of the formal state. This study provides some insights 
on the challenges and opportunities that regional integration scholars may further examine on 
how the informal trans-border communities can provide a platform for a deeper and more 
meaningful state cooperation. For instance, the Chewa of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia 
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have constructed a harmonious relation with the state to an extent that they do not perceive 
the state as a threat to their survival.  
Another contribution of this study is the unique scope of its case study within the context of 
IR. Few studies have embarked on an analysis of trans-border ethnic group research. Some of 
the few existing related research include Miles and Rochefort (1991), MacGonagle (2007), 
Robinson (2009), Posner (2004), Maclean (2010), Kehinde (2010) and Kayuni (2011). Using 
a quantitative approach, Miles and Rochefort (1991) focused mainly on a comparison of the 
rural and urban Hausa ethnic group of Niger-Nigeria in relation to the issue of nationalism 
versus ethnic identity. Due to the design of the Miles and Rochefort study, it did not 
comprehensively interrogate the core aspects of state, sovereignty and citizenship as 
conceptualised in this study. Like Miles and Rochefort (1991), Robinson (2009) explores the 
relationship between nationalism and ethnic identity in sixteen African countries. The study 
uses quantitative Afrobarometer data sets to generate findings. However, except in a few 
instances, the study mainly focused on comparing and aggregating ethnic groups within the 
state boundaries. More importantly, the study was not intended to thoroughly examine the 
various contending views of state, citizenship and sovereignty. Taking into consideration 
methodological constraints faced in his study, Robinson (2009:28) suggests that in future, 
“field work among groups which cross-state boundaries may lead to new insights about the 
reasons why individuals identify with the state”. Posner (2004) mainly compares and 
contrasts the Chewa and Tumbuka ethnic groups of Malawi and Zambia by, among other 
things, examining their voting patterns. Although the study was trans-border, it made no 
attempt at addressing the issues of state, sovereignty and citizenship as enshrined in the 
Westphalian model. Kehinde (2010) analyses the Yoruba ethnic identity along the Benin-
Nigeria border, but his focus is solely on the border issue and therefore neglects other 
important factors. Kayuni (2011) provides a very close analysis of the issues being 
investigated in this study by exploring the concept of Westphalian model versus the Chewa 
case study. However a major shortfall here is that this study is not empirically-driven. 
Consequently, its findings are limited and lack a comprehensive understanding of the 
phenomenon. More importantly, the core Westphalian elements of sovereignty and 
citizenship were not explored. In this regard, this study is an extension of the work begun by 
Kayuni (2011) so as to provide a more comprehensive analysis through empirically-driven 
investigation.  
 
8.2.2 Empirical/Practical contributions 
The results from this study are of practical significance to political leaders, cultural elites, 
civil society activists, policy makers, IR experts and other conflict management practitioners 
who focus on ethnic-state relations, especially at trans-border level. The study has 
demonstrated that trans-border ethnic movements are getting more sophisticated in relation to 
their organisational capacity; hence they will not diminish in the near future. It is also 
possible for trans-border ethnic movements to pursue their ethnic identity while retaining and 
even becoming proud of their national-state identity; these two should not be regarded as 
contradictory phenomena. The study has also demonstrated that not all state and trans-border 
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ethnic movement relations are politically „explosive‟. If the state pursues the state-society 
relations while the movements stick to the cultural agenda (but not completely losing their 
power of symbolism and imagery), the relations are likely to be beneficial to both sides. 
8.2.3 Areas for future research 
An area for possible future research would be a thorough and systematic comparison of the 
Chewa against other trans-border ethnic movements such as those of the Lozi, Ngoni, Lomwe 
and Tumbuka which are also found within the three countries. Specifically, the question 
would be: “To what extent are their organisations and operations a contribution or a challenge 
to the state?” In this case, a more comprehensive quantitative analysis would unravel a 
number of issues not considered in this paper.  
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APPENDIX 1: People Consulted/Participants to the Key Informant Interviews 
 Name Position 
Malawi 
1 Dr Justine Malewezi Former Vice President of the Republic of Malawi and 
current Chairman of Chewa Heritage Foundation 
(CHEFO), Lilongwe,  Malawi 
2 Mr Dzilirakhasu Publicity Secretary, Chewa Heritage Foundation 
(CHEFO), Lilongwe,  Malawi 
3 Dr Fidelis Kanyogolo Associate Professor, (Political Governance Expert) Law 
Department, University of Malawi, Zomba,  Malawi 
4 Dr  Garton Kamchedzera Associate Professor (Ethnicity and International 
Relations),  Law Department, University of Malawi, 
Zomba,  Malawi 
5 Mr Andrew Mpesi Political Scientists and Research Officer (Humanities & 
Social Sciences), National Commission for Science and 
Technology, Malawi 
6 Prof. Kings Phiri Emeritus Professor, (Pre-colonial Chewa and African 
Historian) University of Mzuzu, Mzuzu,  Malawi 
8 Paramount Chief Lundu Paramount Chief of the Chewa in Malawi, Chikwawa 
9 Mr Willington Chimwaye Village Headman, TA Mazengera, Lilongwe, Malawi 
10 Mr Sikaliyoti Salimon Village Headman,TA Mazengera, Lilongwe, Malawi 
11 VH Mwachilolo Village Headman, TA Mazengera, Lilongwe, Malawi 
12 Mr Hardson Chikhokho Group Village Headman, Bango, Lilongwe, Malawi 
13 Mr G.Chiwoza Group Village Headman, Chiwoza, Lilongwe, Malawi 
14 Mr Jailos Njolomole Group Village Headman, Nzunda, Lilongwe, Malawi 
15 Mr Grant Mbewe General Clerk (Desk Officer for Traditional Authorities), 
Mchinji District Assembly, Malawi 
16 Mr Thomas Chigwenembe Director of Administration, Mchinji District Assembly, 
Malawi 
17 Mr Mukuse Sagawa Principal Foreign Service Officer, Political Affairs 
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation, Lilongwe, Malawi 
18 Mr L.K. Sikwese Director, Rationalization Unit, Office of the President and 
Cabinet. Former Deputy Director, Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development, Lilongwe, Malawi 
19 Mr Lawrence Makonokaya Director of Chief‟s Administration, Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development,  Lilongwe, Malawi 
20 Mr Abels Mkandawire Foreign Service Officer, Political Affairs Department, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 
Lilongwe, Malawi 
21 (Name withheld) (Station name withheld) Immigration/Police, 
Mozambique/Malawi boarder, Malawi 
22 Mr Alufandika Supeyo Village Headman, Nkhabeka Village, TA Lundu, 
Chikhwawa, Malawi 
23 Mr Watson Bwanali Senior Group Village Headman,  Nkhabeka Village, TA 
Lundu, Chikhwawa, Malawi 
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24 Mr Spedson Afred Village Headman, Mwakulamwaona Village, TA Lundu, 
Chikhwawa, Malawi 
25 Mr Samson Chinyama Chief Lundu‟s Court Administrator,  TA Lundu, 
Chikhwawa, Malawi 
26 Dr Hendrina Mazizwa Lecturer, Pre-colonial Central Africa historian, University 
of Malawi, Chancellor College, Zomba, Malawi 
27 Joseph Chunga President, Political Science Association of Malawi, 
Zomba, Malawi& Lecturer, University of Malawi 
28 Senior Chief Kaomba Senior Chief Kaomba, Kasungu, Malawi 
Zambia 
29 Mr S.Banda District Commissioner, Chipata, Zambia 
30 Prof. Bizeck Phiri** Professor of History, Lusaka, University of Zambia 
31 Mr Kaunda Kapepula** Principal Economists (& Social analyst), Lusaka, Zambia 
32 Dr Neo Simuntanyi** Political Analyst and Executive Director, Centre for Policy 
Dialogue, Lusaka, Zambia 
33 Mr H.Banda Chewa Kulamba organising committee member, Chipata 
and Local government offical 
34 Mr Mole Nkhoma Village Head, Kasikula Village, TA Chanje, Zambia 
35 Mr Post Chirwa Village Headman, Mchiwila Village, TA Chanje, Chipata, 
Zambia 
36 Mr J.Banda Village Headman, Tenje Village, TA Chanje, Zambia 
37 Mr G. Zulu Village Headman, Mng‟omba Village,  TA Chanje, 
Zambia 
38 Mr K. Kamanga Chief‟s Counselor, Kasikula Village,  TA Chanje, Zambia 
39 Mr J.Banda Village Headman, Tenje Village,  TA Chanje, Zambia 
40 Mr K.Banda Group Village Headman, Ikwele Village,  TA Chanje, 
Zambia 
41 (Name withheld) Immigration Officer, Chipata, Zambia 
42 (Name withheld) Immigration Officer, Zambia-Malawi border, Zambia 
43 TA Chanje Traditional Authority Chanje, Chipata Zambia 
Mozambique 
44 Mr Adrivas Zitha Administrative Assistant, District Commissioner Office, 
Angonia,  Mozambique 
45 Mr A. Garafe Provincial Immigration Officer, Tete, Mozambique 
46 Mr Mauele Soko Retired Senior Administratior, Angonia, Mozambique 
47 Mr Vernanco Candodo Lecturer, Hesba Escola Teologica, Angonia. Mozambique 
48 Mr A. Mbemba Regional Frelimo member responsible for chieftaincies, 
Mozambique 
49 Mr Carlos Shenga** Mozambican Researcher based at the Democracy in Africa 
Research Unit, University of Cape Town. 
50 Mr Horacio Gervasio** 
 
Development Analysts, based in Maputo, Mozambique but 
currently PhD candidate PLAAS, University of the 
Western Cape 
51 (Name withheld) (Station name withheld) Immigration/Police, 
Mozambique/Malawi boarder, Mozambique 
52 Mr Makiyoni Kamkhwani Group Village Headman, Katsekaminga Village,  Tete 
Province, Mozambique 
53 Mr Amon Thamison Village Headman, Katsekamiga 1, Tete Province, 
Mozambique 
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**Telephonic interview or email follow-ups 
 
  
54 Mr Kumbuyo Gilibati Village Headman, Katsekamiga 2 Village, Tete Province, 
Mozambique 
55 Mr Lafuledi Zakaliya Village Headman, Katsekamiga 3 Village, Tete Province, 
Mozambique 
56 Mr Chonunkha Malitinyo Village Headman, Katsekamiga 4 Village, Tete Province, 
Mozambique 
57 Mr Tomasi Chichitsulo Group Village Headman, Mphande Village,  Tete 
Province, Mozambique 
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Appendix 2 (a) Application to collect data in Mozambique through a Malawian District 
Commissioner 
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Appendix 2 (b) Researcher’s introductory letter 
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Appendix 2 (c): Application letter to conduct research at Malawi National Archives 
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Appendix 3: Permission to conduct research in Eastern Province of Zambia 
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Appendix 4: Permission to conduct research in Angonia/Tete province of Mozambique 
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Appendix 5: Generic Key Informant and FGD Guide 
Generic Guiding Questions/Issues to be Explored Respondents/Participants 
CHEFO FGD CHIEFS 
Development of traditional Chewa Kingdom 
1. When and where the Chewa kingdom revival was discussed. √ √ √ 
2. Factors that led to its revival [probe the social, political factors such as 
democratisation, learning from others etc] 
√ √ √ 
3. Who were the main actors behind its revival? [probe the interests of the 
actors and their social levels] 
√ √ √ 
4. From which country were most of the actors behind the revival? [probe 
why?] 
√ √ √ 
5. Is there something unique about the Chewa as an ethnic group? √ √ √ 
6. How do you define a Chewa? √ √ √ 
7. What are the specific advantages of having the CHEFO organisation? 
[probe the economic, social-cultural, and political advantages] 
√ √ √ 
8. Why have the Chewas mobilised themselves in a trans-border model 
rather than confine their mobilisation to current national boundaries? 
[probe the national vs. trans-border advantages or disadvantages] 
√ √ √ 
9. Why are the individual Chewa willing to affiliate themselves to a trans-
border ethnic entity? Are there any specific benefits to be achieved? 
√ √ √ 
10. Assuming the Chewa had chosen not to mobilise themselves in any 
form, would there have been any difference to their socio-political well-
being? 
√ √ √ 
Type and extent of the Chewa Linkages 
11. What makes the Chewa feel that they are the same as their colleagues 
across the boundaries? [probe similarities and differences due to national 
politics etc] 
√ √ √ 
12. What is the significance of kulamba ceremony to the Chewa? [probe for 
social-cultural and political reasons] 
√ √ √ 
Extent to which there is commonality or divergence of views on State, Sovereignty & Citizenship 
13. How do the Chewa ethnic group members value their identity? [probe 
explanation] 
√ √ √ 
14. Has the nation-states of Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique affected 
some similarities or differences amongst the Chewa? [probe the 
historical, legal, policy etc explanations] 
√ √ √ 
15. [CITIZENSHIP]-What do they consider as more important: their 
national or Chewa identity? Or both? [probe for ranking of cultural, 
political, national-state identity] 
√ √ √ 
16. Assuming the colonial powers had demarcated a special Chewa state, 
could it have made any difference now? [probe: Is it necessary for 
political identity?] 
√ √ √ 
17. To what extent do the shortfalls of national-state lead to affiliation to 
Chewa identity. [probe for complementarity, divergence or similarities 
between national-state and Chewa identity] 
√ √ √ 
18. [STATE] -Does the state boundaries pose as a challenge to expression 
of Chewa identity? 
√ √ √ 
19. Do most ordinary Chewa villagers own passports? [probe for reasons] √ √ √ 
20. Do they attend Chewa funerals, marriage ceremonies or traditional rites 
and dances across the border? 
√ √ √ 
21. Is it a problem for them to cross the boundary so as to interact with other 
Chewa colleagues?  [for marriages, funerals, traditional rites and dances] 
√ √ √ 
22. Assuming the police and immigration personnel know the Chewa 
people‟s intention to cross boundaries (without official documentation) 
for tradition related issues what would they do? [Probe for specific 
examples/cases] 
- √ √ 
23. Assuming the MPs were replaced by their traditional authorities, would 
this be welcomed as appropriate representation? 
- √ - 
24. Does this trans-border organisation of the Chewa threaten or consolidate √ - - 
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state sovereignty? 
25. Does this trans-border traditional interaction threaten national or border 
security? 
- √ √ 
26. Assuming the local office of the councillors was abolished, would that 
make any difference to you? 
- √ √ 
27. Assuming the authority of the local chiefs was abolished and their role 
taken over by local assemblies, would that be problem? 
- √ - 
28. Assuming that it was decided that the Chewa in this country should only 
mobilise themselves locally without linking themselves to other Chewas 
in neighbouring countries, what would be your reaction? 
√ √ √ 
29. Assuming there is a suggestion that a local Chewa King should be 
appointed in each country to oversee the welfare of Chewa in those 
countries, what would be your reaction?  
√ √ √ 
30. [SOVEREIGNTY] -Do ordinary villagers know the Chewa King? √ √ √ 
31. How important in the Chewa king to them? [probe: Do they think that 
his role is challenging, contradicting, compromising, confirming or 
complementing the state authority?] 
√ √ √ 
32. When the Chewa villagers have a marriage or land dispute, to whom do 
they immediately turn to: state official or local chief? [probe for 
explanation] 
- √ - 
Linkages as a challenge, contradiction, compromise, or complement on state, sovereignty, and 
citizenship 
33. To what extent does the a-political, b-legal and c-policy frameworks of 
Malawian, Mozambique and Zambian states work as an advantage or 
disadvantage to Chewa kingdom organisation [probe: Do they challenge, 
contradict, compromise, confirm or complement the Chewa Kingdom‟s 
existence and operations?] 
√ - √ 
34. Most African political parties are ethnic based, do you also see this 
happening here or the possibility of this happening amongst the Chewa? 
- √ √ 
35. What do you think are specific factors that may enhance the trans-border 
politicisation of the Chewa?  
- √ √ 
36. Is there a potential of a trans-border Chewa political entity forming in 
the future? 
- √ √ 
37. Has CHEFO ever been involved in issues of policy advocacy? or if there 
are any policy issues that do not promote the welfare of the Chewa, 
would CHEFO take up the policy advocacy?  
√ - - 
38. How would you rate the level of trans-border interaction amongst the 
Chewa before and after formation of CHEFO? 
√ √ √ 
39. Assuming that it has been suggested that the non-chewas should be 
incorporated in CHEFO what would be your reaction? 
√ √ - 
40. How would you define the relationship between CHEFO and the 
governments of the three countries? Do you think there is a difference in 
how you relate to each of these? 
√ - - 
41. How do you ensure that there is unity between subordinate chiefs and 
Gawa Undi? or How is the King‟s authority sustained? 
√ - - 
42. When the political relations amongst these three countries has soured (as 
it happened during the Bingu administration), does it affect CHEFO? 
√ - - 
43. International conventions recognised the state and some international 
NGOs as key players in inter-state relations. Do you see the potential of 
informal trans-border ethnic groups such as CHEFO doing the same?  
√ - - 
44. Is the emergence of CHEFO a vindication that most African borders are 
artificial? 
√ √ √ 
45. Is this trans-border Chewa entity a threat or complement to democracy 
(representation, election, citizenship rights). 
√ - - 
Assessment of other formal and informal institutional arrangements  
46. Apart from Kulamba ceremony [and CHEFO] do Chewa have any other 
way of linking themselves with the other Chewa people across 
boundaries? 
√ √ √ 
47. Are these linkages adequate? √ √ √ 
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48. What do they think should be done to improve them? √ √ √ 
49. Do you see the Chewa as purely cultural movement or has some 
elements of political mobilisation? 
- √ - 
50. To what extent does the Chewa trans-border movement actually 
represent the grassroots Chewa people? 
√ √ √ 
Suggested opportunities for further linkages 
51. Have you ever thought of introducing commercial linkages of the Chewa 
through for instance the marketing traditional artefacts? 
√ - - 
52. Is there a possibility of enhancing interaction with other ethnic groups? 
How?  
√ - - 
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Appendix 6: Interview Guide for Researchers and Government officials 
 
General background  
1. Is ethnic identity a political issue in this country? 
2. In general, what are the contributing factors to ethnic identity or Why do individuals 
choose to align themselves with ethnic movements? 
3. What is the view of government on ethnic movements? Does it support or discourage 
these movements? What is government‟s reason for or against this support? 
4. What is the role of traditional authorities in this ethnic mobilisation? 
5. Do you see any difference or similarities between ethnic identity during the one party 
era and in the contemporary multiparty era? 
6. Apart from the Chewa, are you aware of any trans-border ethnic movement? 
7. What do you think is the advantage or disadvantage of having a trans-border ethnic 
movement? 
8. What value do ethnic movements add to national socio-political development? 
Rationale for trans-border model & benefits (to individuals and nations) 
9. Why have the Chewas mobilised themselves in a trans-border model rather than 
confine their mobilisation to current national boundaries? [probe the national vs. 
trans-border advantages or disadvantages] 
10. Why are the individual Chewa willing to affiliate themselves to a trans-border ethnic 
entity? Are there any specific benefits to be achieved? 
11. Assuming the colonial powers had demarcated a special Chewa state, could it have 
made any difference now? [probe: Is it necessary for political identity?] 
State, sovereignty, citizenship & Chewa identity 
12. To what extent do the shortfalls of national-state lead to affiliation to Chewa identity. 
[probe for complementarity, divergence or similarities between national-state and 
Chewa identity] 
13. Do you think that the state boundaries pose as a challenge to expression of Chewa 
identity? 
14. Does this trans-border organisation of the Chewa threaten or consolidate state 
sovereignty? 
15. Assuming that it was decided that the Chewa in this country should only mobilise 
themselves locally without linking themselves to other Chewas in neighbouring 
countries, what would be your reaction? 
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16. Assuming there is a suggestion that a local Chewa King should be appointed in each 
country to oversee the welfare of Chewa in those countries, what would be your 
reaction?  
17. To what extent does the a-political, b-legal and c-policy frameworks of Malawian, 
Mozambique and Zambian states work as an advantage or disadvantage to Chewa 
kingdom organisation [probe: Do they challenge, contradict, compromise, confirm or 
complement the Chewa Kingdom‟s existence and operations?] 
18. Most African political parties are ethnic based, do you also see this happening here or 
the possibility of this happening amongst the Chewa? 
19. What do you think are specific factors that may enhance the trans-border politicisation 
of the Chewa?  
20. Is there a potential of a trans-border Chewa political entity forming in the future? 
21. International conventions recognised the state and some international NGOs as key 
players in inter-state relations. Do you see the potential of informal trans-border 
ethnic groups such as CHEFO doing the same?  
22. Is the emergence of CHEFO a vindication that most African borders are artificial? 
23. Is this trans-border Chewa entity a threat or complement to democracy 
(representation, election, citizenship rights). 
24. Do you see the Chewa as purely cultural movement or has some elements of political 
mobilisation? 
25. To what extent does the Chewa trans-border movement actually represent the 
grassroots Chewa people? 
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Appendix 7: Discussion guide for the Malawian Government Officials 
Discussion guide for the Malawi Government Officials 
1. Which office is responsible for the welfare of King Gawa Undi when he is visiting the 
country? Why is this particular office responsible? 
2. What is the mode and level of protocol accorded to him? Is he handled like a visiting head of 
state or minister? 
3. What mechanisms are put in place to regularize this arrangement? 
4. To what extent is Malawi government involved in the affairs of Kulamba ceremony? 
5. During Kulamba ceremony, Malawian Chewas are allowed, for immigration purposes, to use 
an official letter of identification. Is this a permanent or adhoc arrangement? When and which 
principles guided this arrangement? 
6. To what extent does Gawa Undi have the authority to handle affairs of Chewa Chieftaincies 
in Malawi?  
7. Does the government put a limit to his authority? Is there any existing formal articulation of 
his sphere of authority? 
8. Which official documents/policies guide the relationship between Malawi government and 
Chewa trans-boarder movement in general? 
9. What value does the Chewa movement add to the socio-political development of the country? 
10. To what extent has the Chewa movement affected the immigration or other related policies of 
the three countries? 
11. To what extent is the Chewa trans-boarder movement a threat to the national state securities 
of the said three countries? 
12. What do you think are the socio-political advantages and disadvantages of having a trans-
boarder movement? 
13. In your opinion, do you think the movement is likely to inspire other trans-border ethnic 
groups to follow suit? Assuming it does indeed inspire other ethnic groups, Will this 
development be welcomed by the state? 
14. Do you have specific examples, as highlights, that need specific mention in relation to the 
Chewa movement and the state? 
15. In your opinion, do you think the Chewa movement will receive more or less attention from 
the state in future? Explain. 
16. International conventions recognize the state and some international NGOs as key players in 
inter-state relations. Do you see the potential of informal trans-border ethnic groups such as 
the Chewa doing the same? 
17. Assuming there are poor relations between Malawi and its neighbors, do you think this may 
affect the Chewa movement negatively?  
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18. Is the emergence of the Chewa movement a vindication that most African borders are 
artificial? 
19. Could the Chewa movement be another example of emerging „multiple citizenship‟ for its 
members? 
20. In your opinion, is the movement purely cultural or has some elements of political 
mobilization? 
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Appendix 8: Informed Consent Form (Key Informant Interviews) 
 
The purpose of this research is to examine how the concepts of state, sovereignty and 
citizenship as practically understood and experienced by the Chewa people in Malawi, 
Zambia and Mozambique. Specifically, the study examines whether this understanding and 
experiencechallenge, contradict, compromise, complement or confirm the formal 
interpretation. It is hoped that the results will among other things widen options for 
regional integration of the said three countries through linkage of the formal and the 
informal institutions of governance. 
 
Individually, you have been identified as a potential participant for this research because of 
your key position in society or formal position, and may have valuable insights for this 
research. All that is required is your participation in this interview which should last no 
longer than 45 minutes.  
  
Please be advised that participation is voluntary, and you may leave at any time. All 
responses will be treated confidentially and only used for reference purposes. Anonymity 
will be ensured, unless you are willing to be named. Furthermore, it is also imperative that 
you do not reveal the identities and information offered by other participants.This research 
results may be used for articles to be published in academic publications. The findings will 
also be reported through several channels.  
 
By signing below, it implies that you have read and understood the research intentions, as 
well as your rights, and that you have agreed to participate. 
 
Yours sincerely 
  
Happy Mickson Kayuni 
Tel: +265999078766 
Email: 3180332@uwc.ac.za 
  
 
I………………………………………………………………………………….. (Full 
names of participant) herby confirm that I understand the contents of this document 
and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research 
project. I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, 
should I so desire. 
  
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT: ……………………………………………..                             
  
DATE: …………………………………………….. 
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Appendix 9: Informed Consent Form (Focus Group Discussion) 
 
The purpose of this research is to examine how the concepts of state, sovereignty and 
citizenship as practically understood and experienced by the Chewa people in Malawi, 
Zambia and Mozambique. Specifically, the study examines whether this understanding and 
experiencechallenge, contradict, compromise, complement or confirm the formal 
interpretation. It is hoped that the results will among other things widen options for 
regional integration of the said three countries through linkage of the formal and the 
informal institutions of governance. 
  
As a group, you have been identified as potential participants for this research because of 
your understanding and involvement in Chewa cultural activities hence may have valuable 
insights for this research. All that is required from you is participation in this interview 
which should last no longer than two hours.  
  
Please be advised that participation is voluntary, and you may leave at any time. All 
responses will be treated confidentially and only used for reference purposes. Anonymity 
will be ensured, unless you are willing to be named. Furthermore, it is also imperative that 
you do not reveal the identities and information offered by other participants.This research 
results may be used for articles to be published in academic publications. The findings will 
also be reported through several channels.  
 
By signing below, it implies that you have read and understood the research intentions, as 
well as your rights, and that you have agreed to participate. 
 
  
Yours sincerely 
  
Happy Mickson Kayuni 
Tel: +265999078766 
Email: 3180332@uwc.ac.za 
  
I………………………………………………………………………………….. (Full 
names of participant) herby confirm that I understand the contents of this document 
and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research 
project. I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, 
should I so desire. 
  
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT: ……………………………………………..                             
  
DATE: …………………………………………….. 
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Appendix 10 
 
Gawa Undi gives us hope 
January 1, 2013 | Filed under: Editor's Choice | Posted by: Mwansa 
At a time when the institution of chief in Zambia is synonymous with stupidity, there is one who gives us hope that not all 
is lost. His name is Fred Daka; an engineer by profession. He is the reigning Paramount Chief Gawa Undi of the Chewa 
people. 
Gawa Undi (in white) is simply different from 
the current crop of traditional leaders in 
Zambia. There could be a few others who are 
like him somewhere in our villages, but Undi 
is a shining example of what a Zambian 
traditional leader should be. From the time 
he ascended to the throne at Mkaika in 2004, 
Gawa Undi has remained a true inspirational 
leader who cannot be abused by these 
political misfits who are running Zambia. 
Gawa Undi has always been neutral politically 
but very influential. When Gawa Undi speaks, 
he talks with authority about matters that 
affect his people. Gawa Undi never talks 
nonsense about opposition leaders. He never 
praises government officials unnecessarily or 
in order to be given money like most chief do. 
Gawa Undi never follows politicians to State 
House. They follow him to Mkaika. 
Gawa Undi in white robes 
We have never heard Gawa Undi tell his people to vote for this or that politician. He instead treats every Zambia like his 
child – like the true paramount chief he is. We have never seen Gawa Undi being paraded by some politician to utter some 
garbage in exchange for a second hand car from Japan or brown envelope containing stolen money. Gawa Undi is a man 
and ruler with personal integrity and respect.You cannot compare Gawa Undi with tuma chiefs like ka Mpezeni or chi 
Mwanachingwala or that Litunga with no backbone. Interestingly, Gawa Undi oversees the vastest empire. He controls 42 
Chewa chiefdoms in Zambia, 137 in Malawi and 33 in Mozambique.Yet, he remains very humble and does not use his 
power for personal gain. We wonder what would happen if a character like chief Puta or chief Mukuni was to be given such 
power. Gawa Undi’s exemplary personal life and leadership is a living rebuke to most traditional leaders in Zambia.  Most 
of the people who call themselves chief in Zambia today are not even fit to be advisors to Gawa Undi. They fall far much 
below the calibre required of a traditional leader. The behaviour of most chiefs in Zambia is embarrassing. Nowadays, 
whenever you hear a chief speaking, it is either he has been given money by politicians or is trying to attract attention so 
that his hungry belly can be filled by politicians. This is how low our traditional leadership has sunk. 
For Gawa Undi, we wish him good health in 2013 and many more years to come. We pray that even when Gawa Undi 
sleeps, he shall be given a good successor who is like him. For, in this life, good leaders are often succeeded by living 
disasters. Look at Mpezeni. The Paramount Chief who ruled before this ka hopeless current Mpezeni was a great man. But 
the moment he died, his successor almost tore the Ngoni Empire apart by raping a 14 year old girl. This is the man who 
would leave the palace at night to go and dance and ‘tow’ from Chipata night clubs. The current Mpezeni is not the kind of 
leader that inspires us. We hope that when the current Mpezeni kicks the bucket, a worthy Jere will take over that throne. 
Downloaded from: http://www.zambianwatchdog.com/?p=48258&cpage=1 
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Appendix 11: Copy of Kulamba ceremony border pass 
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